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THE ETHICS OF HOMICIDE: 
A CONTEXTUAL CRITIQUE OF THE SANCTITY-OF-LIFE PRINCIPLE, WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ABORTION AND REVO~UTIONARY VIOLENCE 
BY IVOR SHAPIRO 
Society never absolutely prohibits homicide: there are 
"grey areas" in which it is sometimes tolerated or even 
encouraged. Moral discussion of each area is usually carried 
on in isolation from the others, and perhaps for this reason, 
frequently ignores or underestimates the complexities of the 
morality of killing. This thesis attempts to identify a 
general method for analysing such issues, so that they can 
enrich one another. 
A contemporary theological survey indicates that there 
should be a balance in Christian ethical method between the 
polar values of obedience in respect of general standards, 
~nd freedom to exercise individual responsibility. This 
implies recognising a place for intuitions, and specifying a 
way in which these can be subjected to criticism. 
In contrast, the Sanctity-of-Life Principle seeks to 
impose a universal prohibition on the killing of "innocent" 
human beings. While the Principle provides a useful general 
guideline, it is deficient as a moral norm--partly because of 
fatal difficulties associated with the concept of innocence. 
The method adopted in this thesis is that suggested by 
(ii) 
Philip Wagaman: methodological presumptions are identified 
and then tested in a ~tilitarian way. For the ethics of 
homicide, I propose a primary presumption favouring the 
preservation of life, and various secondary and linguistic1 
presumptions. 
The contextual framework of the thesis is limited to two 
specific issues--abortion and revolutionary violence. 
Revolutionary violence is a form of war, which involves 
homicide on a grand scale. Christian moral tradition has 
evolved to a selective position on war--the just-war 
doctrine--which has in recent years become the basis of some 
justifications of violent revolution. Significant 
theoretical problems are associated with the just-war 
doctrine, but the general principle of recognising the 
authority of the State is not a fundamental obstcicle to 
revolutionary violence. Nan-violent strategies are 
frequently wrongly dismissed as unrealistic, and the 
long-term negative effects of violence are sometimes 
underestimated. In general, when scrutinised in the light of 
the presumptions of the ethics of homicide, the case for 
revolutionary homicide is problematic, but cannot simply be 
dismissed--even if only because of the agony of conscience 
which it usually reflects. 
Abortion is not obviously a matter of homicide, but 
rather of killing a being who may or may not be a human 
person. The presence of this theoretical doubt indicates a 
need for probabilistic decision-making. Since there is~ 
however, a 2Ci~@ f@£i~ case for treating the foetus as a 
(iii) 
human being, the presumptions-of the ethics of homicide do 
have a contribution to make to the abortion debate. In the 
light of these presumptions, one finds that spurious 
arguments have been used to defend abortions in various, but 
not all, situations. 
Conclusions: Contextual criticism reveals the Sanctity-
of-Life Principle to be fatally inadequate as a means of 
resolving dilemmas. In contrast, the utilitarian method of 
identifying and testing presumptions produces a number of 
surprising results which testify to its potential for the 
various "grey areas" of the ethics of homicide. 
(iv) 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE NEGLECTED ETHICS OF HOMICIDE 
Desire for wisdom! Explore everything around you, 
penetrate to the furthest limits of human knowledge, 
and always you will come up against something inexplicable 
in the end. It is called life. It is a mystery so 
inexplicable that the knowledge of the educated and 
the ignorant is purely relative when contemplating 
it. 
Albert Schweitzer1 
For Albert Schweitzer, human and other forms of life 
deserved reverence above all other things and values. And, 
though not frequently with the same degree of fervour as 
Schweitzer and other dedicated pacifists have exhibited, 
the human conscience in every age and culture has tended 
to place a high value on the preservation of life. Probably 
for as long as humankind has lived in community, there 
have been some moral and legal strictures against the taking 
of a human life. Humanity's respect for life is one of 
its key values. The alternative, a pre-civilised "survival 
of the fittest" form of communal existence, would fail 
to meet any but the most elementary human needs. 
Yet people do kill one another. Homicide (the killing 
of a human being) is as much a part of social life as are 
1Albert Schweitzer, Reverence for life (London: SPCK, 
1970), p. 114. 
l 
2 
realities like love, hate, sex, exploitation, work, rest, 
and politics. Sometimes, these killings take place without 
social disapproval. The killing of an enemy soldier (or of 
hundreds of enemy civilians in a key strategic facility) can 
earn medals for the killer or killers, while a civilian who 
kills in self-defence or in defence of his/her family's 
lives or property, is usually thought to deserve 
understanding and support. Along with strictures against 
homicide, then, most societies have enshrined the moral 
principle that in some circumstances homicide is justified 
or even necessary. While there are many individuals who 
,r 
regard homicide as unacceptable under all circumstances, 
societies have tended to tolerate both interpersonal 
homicide (such as killing in self-defence) and international 
homicide (war). 
In addition, most societies accept that homicide can be 
a function of the state in the maintenance of law and order 
(the killing of a pursued criminal; capital punishment), and 
·~ 
the idea of euthanasia (homicide as an act of mercy) is at 
least a subject of moral debate in most places where it is 
not actually allowed by law in some form or other. On the 
other hand, wanton homicide--which may be defined as 
homicide arising out of the greed or caprice of individuals 
--is universally both morally and legally proscribed. 
Forms of homicide can thus be cl~ssified according to the 
degree of social acceptablility they tend to command. At 
one end of the spectrum, there are forms of homicide which 
are almost everywhere both regarded as morally legitimate 
and legally sanctioned (for example, killing an enemy 
soldier). On the other pole, there are forms that are almost 
3 
never regarded as legitimate, and are classed legally as 
murder. Between these two extremes, there are vast "grey 
areas" consisting of forms of homicide which are the 
subjects of moral debate in many societies. These forms 
include: 
* EUTHANASIA, where homicide is usually (at least in 
modern western society) legitimated by 
reference to the needs of the person killed; 
* CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, where homicide is legitimated by 
reference to the need of the society for protection 
from serious classes of crime; 
* REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE, where homicide is 
legitimated, under certain conditions, by reference 
to the need for social change; 
* SUICIDE, when this is justified ethically as a 
"necessary sacrifice", rather than being simply a 
non-ethical act of despair; and 
*ABORTION (when it is regarded as homicide at all--
i.e. when the foetus is regarded as having the moral 
status of a human being). Intervention to terminate 
a pregnancy is most frequently legitimated by 
reference to various needs of the mother, although, 
as will become clear later, alternative motivating 
factors are frequently introduced. 
The neglected ethics of homicide 
In the ''grey areas" of the ethics of homicide, the 
issue of homicide itself is often neglected or 
oversimplified. For example, in the course of a debate 
about abortion, one might come across this type of 
statement: 
4 
Where a pregnancy arises out of a rape, the victim 
should be be allowed to decide for herself whether 
or not the pregnancy should be terminated. [I shall 
call this Statement "A"] 
Here, the moral question is focused on (1) the right of 
the victim to be spared additional pain, emotional 
suffering, and inconvenience; and/or (2) the adverse moral 
circumstances under which conception took place. The issue 
of homicide is not addressed within this type of 
statement--either because the foetus is not regarded as 
having the moral status of a human being (a complex question 
which will be examined later in this study), or because the 
matter of homicide is thought to have less moral 
significance than the victim's violated rights. 
On the other hand, one might during the same debate 
hear--this time from the mouth of an opponent of 
abortion--a statement like this: 
Abortion is always wrong, because it involves the 
murder of an innocent human being. [Statement "B"] 
In this type of statement (unlike type "A") homicide is 
addressed as central, but is oversimplified. Apart from 
ignoring the doubt that exists concerning the moral status 
of the foetus as a human being, this statement presupposes 
that homicide in this instance would be synonymous with 
murder. In other words, a morally conclusive term 
("murder", which means criminal killing) is substituted for 
a more neutral term ("homicide", which means killing with or 
without culpability), leadi~g to the natural conclusion that 
this form of homicide is always wrong. Yet the person 
5 
making this statement will usually quite readily acknowledge 
that there are numerous other types of circumstance where 
homicide is not murder. The ethical issue of homicide has 
thus been simplified in this type of statement to suggest 
that where the victim is unborn, homicide is murder (and 
therefore always wrong), whereas the killing of a born 
:? victim may or may not be justified, depending on the 
circumstances~ 
This tendency to either avoid or to oversimplify 
statements concerning homicide is by no means confined to 
the abortion debate. In debating the legitimacy of 
revolutionary violence, for example, one might encounter a 
statement such as: 
Violence in the cause of revolution is often necessary 
in order to bring about structures which are more just 
and benevolent for all citizens. [Statement "C"] 
As with statement "A" above, this type of assertion blurs 
the issue of homicide, focusing instead on the issue of 
social justice. The question, "under what circumstances can 
killing be legitimate?"--which is the central question of 
the ethics of homicide--is not addressed. Inieed, words 
like "killing" are frequently avoided altogether in favour 
of more abstract terms like "violence" or "pressure". It is 
simply presupposed that, at least under certain 
circumstances, it is acceptable to kill in the cause of 
social change. 
Again, one might encounter the following type of 
statement on the other side of the debate: 
., 
. ·~ 
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Revolution is never justified, because it involves the 
wholesale slaughter of persons. [Statement "D"] 
As with statement "B", such an assertion oversimplifies the 
ethical dilemma. If homicide is ever capable of 
justification, what are the parameters of such 
justification? Is there no extent of suffering, no type of 
governmental oppression, no number of deaths as a result of 
an unpopular regime's greed for power, sufficient to 
indicate that some deaths now might be called for in order 
·to prevent many more in the future? Typically, those who 
make statements of type "D" tend to avoid the complexities 
of such questions, preferring neater, more absolute moral 
judgements. As is the case with those who tend to make 
statements of type "B" concerning abortion, absolute 
pacifists constitute a small minority of those making the 
statement. Rather than any clear analysis of the ethics of 
homicide, there is a tendency to presuppose that the concern 
for justice cannot provide sufficient legitimation for the 
taking of human lives. 
The above discussion has shown that on both sides of 
the debate surrounding a "grey area" ethic of homicide, 
statements will often be made which will either shy away 
from from or ignore the complexities of the wider ethical 
issues raised. The primary question should not be "is this 
murder?" nor "is this necessary?" but rather: "Can homicide 
be justified under these circumstances?" No discussion of a 
"grey area" issue will be complete without an attempt to 
answer that central question. But to discuss that question 
is a complex matter, and this thesis is an attempt to 
·~ 
discover some disciplined way in which the task can be 
7 
tackled. The approach will primarily be within the 
-----~ -·· - . ·····----- ----··----------------·--··------
perspective of theological ethics, but also enlightened by 
considerable work that has been done by secular philosophers 
who have questioned a principle that some theological 
ethicists have taken for granted--the notion that human life 
is "sacred". How sacred? Why sacred? And within what 
limits? These are the theological questions which give rise 
to this thesis~ 
Con textual r r~f~!:ence points 
The questions indicated above have crucial relevance 
for all the "grey area" issues (and even for re-examining 
forms of homicide that have gained general social 
acceptance). This study is, however, confined to two 
contextual issues, abortion and revolutionary violence. 
These issues, it must be stressed, are discussed 
specifically with a view to grounding the more abstract 
debate upon the concrete realities of justification of 
homicide in actual situations. 
The question may well be asked: Why an examination of 
specific issues at all? Would it not be easier to confine 
the discussion to a theoretical analysis of the general 
issue of homicide? It would be easier but ethically 
questionable. Perhaps the greatest advance made in 
theological ethics during the twentieth century has been to 
ensure that "norm" and "context" are never far separated in 
the mind of the analyst. Especially in a study of this 
kind, dubious purpose would be served by abstract 
... 
generalisations about "homicide" without a disciplined 
grounding in the very problems that provide the issue with 
its urgency and give it concrete reality. Thus at every 
8 
stage of the present analysis, reference will be made to 
--and insights tested against--the two issues chosen as the 
contextual backdrop for this thesis. (A fuller examination 
o:f the limitations of uncontextual, purely normative 
approaches to ethics will be undertaken in Chapter 1 .) 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that this thesis is not 
a study of abortion and revolutionary violence ~ ~, but a 
study in the ethics of homicide. It is a contextual 
critique of the problems surrounding the notion of the 
"sanctity of life". 
Before proceeding to this study, however, a question 
must be answered. Granting that the ethics of homicide 
represents an important subject for study, and that this 
study must be grounded in the context of certain specific 
issues, it may still be asked why these two issues of 
abortion and of revolutionary violence have been chosen, 
rather than any of the other "grey area" homicide issues. 
The abortion debate is arguably the most pertinent 
homicide-related issue within individual ethics today, and 
revolutionary violence is perhaps the most pertinent social 
ethical issue. These two issues thus provide especially 
useful contextual studies within.which the ethics of the 
"grey areas" become both explicit and theologically 
intriguing. The most frank answer as to why abortion and 
revolutionary violence have been chosen, is, however, that 
... 
the writer happens to have a special interest in each of 
these two problems, and in their interrelationship. Each 
has already captured my concern in an academic way, and it 
has been the consideration of these two ethical problems 
9 
that has given rise to my exploration of the more general 
question that is considered in this thesis. It seems to me, 
after having studied the ethics of abortion and the ethics 
of revolution separately from each other and in isolation 
from each other, that there is a need to draw the various 
arguments surrounding the ethics of homicide together, and 
to allow the debates--so often conducted without reference 
to one another--to cross-fertilis.e, challenge and elucidate 
one another. If such a process could be encouraged and 
assisted in a wider context, it might facilitate a debate in 
which those who tend to adopt a more absolutist position on 
an.issue re-examine their aproaches in the light of the 
problems raised by a broader view of homicide. For example: 
It is possible for people to express strongly anti-abortion 
views at the same time as justifying homicide in the name of 
a revolution of social justice, and never appear to suspect 
that there is a potential moral contradiction between their 
two views--both of which views might, in the opinion of the 
proponents, have a strong basis in Christian religious 
teaching. On the other hand, some who argue strongly 
against wars of all kinds are quite serene in the face of 
escalating abortion-on-demand, never having considered the 
one issue to be linked to the other. If any homicide issue 
were approached from the primary perspective of the ethics 
of homicide itsel:f, the result might be a partial 
de-absolutisation of supposed norms, and consequently a more 
open debate on the issue. The two issues of political 
violence and of abortion seem to me to be sufficiently 
complex and to possess enough intriguing features to serve 
the end of placing the Sanctity-of-Life Principle under the 
10 
spotlight of rational debate. As a possible consequence of 
such a process, some stalemated debates on other "grey area" 
homicide issues may be opened up as well. 
The two debates also have an engrossing common 
characteristic. Neither constitutes a stereotypical debate 
between radicals on the one hand and liberals or 
conservatives on the other. The divisions among opponents 
to oppressive regimes, on the matter of violent versus 
non-violent strategies, are widely recognised. On the 
.matter of abortion, I recall having taken part in numerous 
heated discussions which have been characterised by not 
being able to predict where a particular person would take a 
stand. I remember in particular a sociologist, who 
described herself as a radical and a feminist, saying that 
even after intensive study and reflection on the issue, she 
could not identify a truly radical or feminist position on 
abortion. The particularly interesting feature of both the 
abortion debate and the revolutionary violence debate is, 
then, that these debates divide liberals, as they divide 
radicals and conservatives and those who· do not belong to 
any such movement. This is a feature not shared to anything 
like the same extent by ·the debates over such matters as 
capital punishment and euthanasia. 
General approach 
There are many possible ways to tackle such a study. 
The approach adopted here is as follows. 
In Chapter 1, the primary question of methodology 
itself is addressed. The law-Gospel debate is assessed in 
an attempt to draw conclusions on the relationship between 
obedience and freedom in the Christian moral life. The task 
1 1 
of Christian ethics is not to i:4entify universal norms, but 
to enlighten moral dilemmas within their unique contexts, by 
reference to Christian values based on a critical analysis 
of Scripture and tradition. Traditional norms, those 
perceived aspects of divine law which have guided moral 
teaching in the Judea-Christian heritage, have a guiding, 
but certainly not an absolute value for the Christian 
confront.ed by a moral dilemma. The Bible is commonly 
regarded as a _u_n:tgu~Jy central source of these norms, but I 
show in Chapter 1 that neither the Bible nor post-Canonical 
writings should be approached with a view to finding simple 
solutions to complex problems. The biblical hermeneutics 
debate, and more especially the sociological study of the 
Bible, has done a great deal to expel neo-fundamentalistic 
approaches to biblical ethics as a means to contemporary 
problem-solving. In this context the Bible is preferably 
seen as a source of the faith in the context of which moral 
problems can be solved. Contextual or social analysis is as 
essential a tool of Christian ethical decision-making as 
exegesis, and that analysis must be carried out in dialogue 
with those social and other disciplines best qualified to 
e"lucidate the problems under review. Also in this chapter, 
I discuss the possibility that negative acts can be required 
of Christians as "necessary evils". I examine, and reject, 
the form of argument which suggests that such negative acts 
should be excluded because they might constitute the first 
step on a "slippery slope" towards the destruction of 
morality. I then propose a methodological approach which 
accepts the need for contextuality without losing sight of 
guiding principles, and which further acknowledges the 
12 
significant part played by intuition in people's ethical 
decisions. My suggestion is that intuitions should be 
examined critically, rather than ignored. To recognise 
intuition as an essential part of decision-making enables 
the ethicist to use it in debate without allowing it to 
dominate. The method I propose in concluding Chapte~ 1 is 
based on Philip Wogaman's work, which calls for 
"methodological presumptions" to be identified and :tested in 
-the context of actual dilemmas. In this way, I show that 
the whole study of the ethics of homicide must be 
contextual--rooted in the analysis of situations involving 
choices regarding "grey area" acts (especially, for this 
thesis, abortion and revolutionary violence). At the same 
time, I recognise the existence of ethical principles and 
resources which facilitate a viable and definable response 
to a given moral problem. 
·~ 
In __ ~hapter 2, I give critical (and, of course, 
contextual) attention to the idea of the sanctity of life. 
Drawing on the insights of Christian tradition both within 
and outside of the Canon of Scripture,, it becomes clear that 
the preservation of human life has been accorded great, if 
not supreme, moral value in Judea-Christian ethics~ Life, 
in religious terms, has been viewed as "sacred", but its 
preservation is not the supreme norm of Christian morality. 
The Sanctity-of-Life Principle--which states: "One ought 
never to kill an innocent human being"--is criticised in 
this chapter, in the light of the reservations on pacifism 
expressed in Scripture, historical Christian doctrine, 
secular philosophy, and contemporary theology. The vital 
word in the Principle, · "innocent", is especially 
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problematic. The chapter goes on to seek a general answer 
to the question: Why, and in what way, and subject to what 
limitations, can human life be considered to have supreme 
moral value? The general answer appears to be that the 
preservation of a human life is of high, but not necessarily 
supreme v:::i.lue in resolving an ethical dilemma. Homicide, 
even where the orie killed· is innocent, may ethically be 
contemplated where commensurately high values are 
threatened, but the contemplation of such acts must be . 
disciplined by severe ·restraints. 
Part 2 of the thesis consists of a detailed examination 
of the two chosen "grey areas" of the ethics of homicide. 
Before addressing these issues, I extract from the 
discussions in Part 1 certain presumptions: one primary 
presumption for the preservation of life,- four secondary 
presumptions placing further restraints on the process of 
choosing to kill, and a number of linguistic presumptions 
concerning the decision-making process itself. 
The particular issues of abortion and of revolutionary 
tiolence (and, occasionally, other types of homicide) are 
referred to briefly throughout this thesis, whenever 
contextual elucidation of a theoretical point is 
appropriate, but in Chapters 3 and 4 the two issues are 
examined in more detail. This is essential if the study is 
to dig deeper than the level of abstractions and 
generalisations, instead producing methodological insights 
as well as possible contextual standards that will be 
valuable in exploring the ethics of homicide in a way that 
is helpful to decision-makers. Thus the complexities of 
these issues are fully explored, and an attempt is made to 
• 
PART ONE 
BROAD PRINCIPLES 
CHAPTER 1 
DECIDING ABOUT HOMICIDE: 
IN QUEST OF A METHOD 
From its very origins, the Judaeo-Christian heritage 
has never been lacking in normative statements concerning 
homicide and the sanctity of human life. The first book of 
the Bible sets the tone with: "Your brother's blood is 
calling out to me from the ground." (Genesis 4:10) The 
next book takes up the theme in a straightforward-enough 
way: "You shall not murder." (Exodus 20: 13) In the next 
book we find: "When one man strikes another and kills him, 
he shall be put to death." (Leviticus 24:17-19) And so 
this sub-theme of revelation continues through the rest of 
the Bible until the last book--"The rest of mankind who 
survived these plagues still did not ••• repent of their 
murders ••. " (Revelation 9:20-21 )--and on into the 
post-Biblical age. Later in this thesis, I shall show in 
some detail how the Biblical and later theological writings 
have repeatedly affirmed a high moral value--though far from 
an absolute one--for human life. As the years have gone by, 
these affirmations have been reflected in the statutes of 
both canon and civil law, prohibiting certain kinds of 
homicide, while at the same time conceding that under 
certain other circumstances a person may legitimately be 
killed. 
Some would assume that the task of a study in the 
16 
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ethics of homicide would be simply to list and compare the 
various normative statements on the matter that can be found 
in Scripture. Others would add the various authoritative 
statements that have been made by the hierarchy of the 
church over the centuries. I shall show later that an 
effort along these lines, however exhaustive, would not 
produce a helpfully conclusive result. Moreover, I argue in 
this first chapter that in principle the task of theological 
ethics has to be a somewhat more complex exercise •. My 
argument is presented under four headings. First, the 
complementary values of OBEDIENCE AND FREEDOM will be 
considered as an essential tension in Christian morality. 
Second, the SOURCBS of theological ethical reflection will 
be explored, examining, for example, the moral usefulness of 
· Scripture and of tradition. Third, I shall examine certain 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS that pertain to the method to be adopted in 
exploring the ethics of homicide, as opposed to some other 
areas of morality. And finally, I shall proceed to the 
central proposal of this thesis: a suggested METHODOLOGY 
which can give account of the challenges presented, and the 
insights derived, under the first three headings. The 
remainder of this thesis will be devoted to an effort to 
test and apply the method I propose, within the context of 
two specific focal issues, in order to make some headway in 
the broad sphere of the morality of taking life. 
1 .1 Obedience and freedom: the ideal couple 
Where should one begin the quest for an ethical method 
today? Christian ethicists--and especially Protestant 
ones--are obliged to choose among a host of possible 
starting points. One might, for example, begin with a 
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history of tradition concerning ethical theory, but this 
would only serve to accentuate the range of options, in 
effect delaying the beginning of the journey in order to 
check the map. Of course, that is not in itself a bad idea, 
but maps are not generally used to help one find out where 
one is beginning a trip: they are more helpful later, in 
discovering how to get somewhere else. Another possible 
starting point is that adopted by so many twentieth-century 
ethical treatises: a consideration of the relative 
importance of principles and context in ethics. But I 
believe this form of argument to have almost exhausted 
itself by now. The normative and contextual aspects of 
moral reflection are both essential, and hardly anyone would 
disagree that they complement each other in the course of 
modern ethical analysis. James M. Gustafson has 
demonstrated convincingly that the debate is "misplaced" 
today: 
The umbrella named "contextualism" has become so large 
that it now covers persons whose views are as 
significantly different from each other as they are 
different from some of the defenders of "principles". 
The defenders of the ethics of principles make their 
cases on different grounds, and use moral principles in 
different ways. 1 
Gustafson shows that wherever one takes one's stand in this 
"context versus principles" debate one is likely to--a.nd 
should--make use of both general principles and situational 
1 James M. Gustafson, "Context versus principles: a 
misplaced debate in Christian ethics, 11 Harvard Theological 
Review 58,2 (April 1965): 173 
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analysis (among other things) in contributing to the 
resolution of ethical dilemmas. 
There are other possible starting points on the road 
towards an ethical method. John Howard Yoder, for example, 
makes a strong plea for a return to the direct, 
naive-sounding method of looking to Jesus as the normative 
embodiment of Christian morality1 • For him, the starting 
point would be an examination of th~ the life and ~eachings 
of Jesus. Such an examination is by no means neglected in 
this thesis, but it seems to me an inappropriate starting 
point, as it assumes a method the validity of which is, in 
my view (for reasons I address especially in Chapter 2) 
highly debatable. 
In my opinion, the most helpful starting point is to 
ask a question which has to be answered before an ethical 
methodology can begin to be considered. That question 
concerns the extent to which the Christian life is a matter 
of obedience and the extent to which it is a matter of 
freedom. If the Christian moral life is primarily a matter 
of obedience, then the most helpful e~hical method will be 
one which seeks to define as clearly as possible, and in as 
much detail as possible, the deontological norms which must 
be obeyed. If it is primarily a matter of freedom, then 
ethical method will be a matter of clarifying options and 
consequences, so that individual Christians can be helped in 
making decisions which will rest, presumably, on 
act-utilitarian considerations (that is, decisions concerned 
1 John Howard Yoder, Th~ . .R..C?...!.~tics of Jesus (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1972), pp. 11-25. 
20 
with discovering which action in a situation will lead to 
the most desirable end). But if both obedience and freedom 
have complementary roles to play (as I shall argue is the 
case), then a method will have to be found of responding to 
both of these needs in the Christian moral life. 
The theological dispute which throws the most vivid 
light on the matter of obedience and freedom is the dispute 
over law and Gospel. The contemporary debate's origins lie 
in fundamental challenges posed to Roman Catholic theologr 
by Luther, Calvin and their disciples, but it has been given 
new life in this century, especially as a result of the work 
of Karl Barth. 
It is probably true to say that the dominant stream of 
Christian tradition down the centuries has held that the 
thrust of the moral life is conformity to certain defined 
laws of behaviour. Catholic tradition speaks of discipline, 
merit, and sanctification in this context. Protestant 
orthodoxy speaks of the Tertius usus legis (third use of the 
law), that is, a guiding use of the law for Christians. The 
first two uses of the law in this formula precede the 
radical act of believing the good news of Christ: law 
functions first in a civil or political way, to RESTRAIN 
people from social and political evils, and second in order 
to CONVICT sinners of their sin, and lead them to the saving 
grace of the Gospel. Believing Christians (at least to the 
extent that they do believe), have no need of these first 
two uses. But for them law has a third use--to provide 
GUIDANCE which proceeds from the Gospel itself. 
On the other hand, many theologians hold, in the 
tradition of Luther, that Christians are liberated by Christ 
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from all need of law. This proposition is not anarchistic 
but antinomian: it usually stresses self-imposed behavioural 
limits accepted by. Christians in the name of love~ While 
antinomians may concede that it can be helpful to take 
general norms into account when making moral decisions, they 
insist. that the Gospel frees Christians from the obligation 
of unconditional obedience. Law per ~ is in opposition to, 
and a denial of, the freedom promised by the Gospel. 
Of course, seminal features of the law-Gospel debate 
can be found within Scripture: in the Gospels (in Jesus' 
comments on righteousness), in Acts (regarding the religious 
duties of converted Gentiles), in the apparent conflict 
between the epistles of Paul and James concerning faith and 
works, and in Paul's arguments with Gnostic antinomians on 
the one hand and Jewish circumcisors on the other. Paul's 
arguments on the matter were crucial for Martin Luther. 
Luther acknowledged the outwardly useful civil use of law 
and its inwardly pedagogic usefulness in leading the sinner 
to confess a need for Christ. But he held that insofar as 
the Christian is a believer there is no possibility of a 
third use of law. Once the law has led the sinner to 
Christ, it has achieved its total purpose. 1 
Like the two-kingdoms doctrine of which it -forms an 
important part, Luther's antinomianism is frequently 
misunderstood. His vision of the Christian life is a 
1Martin Luther, A commentary on the Epistle to the 
1}alatians, trans. Theodore Graebner (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Zondervan, 1949), pp. 141-147. 
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dialectical one; At one and the same time, Christians are 
citizens of heaven and of the world. God rules over both 
heaven and earth, but within this rule, or kingdom of God, 
there is a "worldly regiment" and a "spiritual regiment". 
The Christian is a member of the "spiritual regiment", but 
at the same time must live in the world, in which worldly 
realities must be recognised1• Just as in the world there 
is a dialectic between the spiritual and worldly 
communities, so within the individual Christian there is a 
continuing dialectic between the "inner man" and the "outer 
man"--between the saint (believer) and the sinner (who by 
his/her sin, denies faith). Both are, realistically 
speaking, present in the Christian person, just as both the 
worldly community and the spiritual community are present in 
the world under God's rule. And it is God who rules on both 
sides of the line, but in different ways. The civil 
community is ruled by law, since only law can be understood 
and applied in secular society. The ecclesial community, 
however, is free of law, since God rules there by the Holy 
Spirit of grace2• In the same way, individual Christians 
are subjects of God both in their inner and outer natures. 
But while the inner person (the saint) is free, relying on 
God's promises rather than seeking to obey impossible 
1For an especially helpful assessment of the 
two-kingdoms doctrine, see Jurgen Moltmann, On Human 
Dignity: ?olitical Theology and Ethics (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 61-77. 
2 Paul Althaus, The ethics of Martin Luther 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), ch. 2. 
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commandments, the outer person (the sinner) can only receive 
God's word in the form of law, in order to control the 
lustful appetites which would otherwise be dominant. 
1 Within this dialectical framework, as Forde shows, a 
third use of the law is inconceivable. It \vould obscure the 
strict distinction in all of Luther's work between law and 
Gospel, wrath and grace, and so on. Nevertheless, it would 
be wrong to say that in Luther's thought there is no 
continuing significance of the law for Christians. Though 
for the purposes of his strictly dialectical method he would 
never use. the words "sin" or "law" in the same breath as 
"Christian" or "freedom", it is clear that he recognised 
that in reality, since they live in the world, Christians 
have as much need of law as anyone else. That does not mean 
a third use, but the first and second use of the law, since 
it is in the light of sin in the worldly community, rather 
than in the light of the freedom of the spiritual community, 
that the need for law exists as a restraining and converting 
force. As Klug2 puts it, Luther "never denied the 
continuing significance of the law in the sinner's life as a 
guide to godly living and behaviour"--even when the sinner 
happens also to be a Christian! 
1 Gerhard O. Forde, ~he law-gos2el debate: an 
internretation of its historical deve!2.l?..~~~i (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg, 1969), pp. 193-194. 
2 Eugene F. Klug, CJ:~i°t~"l& __ i_~i_g_ __ !_he Formula of Con cord: 
A histo:r:y and digest of the Formula (St Louis, Missouri: 
Concordia, 1977), pp. 46-48. 
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John Calvin had a far more positive appoach to law than 
did Luther. In Calvin's writings, the law appears as a 
great blessing for believer and unbeliever alike, and there 
is true harmony between law and Gospel. While he agreed 
with Luther that law has both a convicting and a civil 
usefulness, Calvin held that there is also a third use of 
the law, "most appropriate" for the Christian. Law is "the 
best instrument for enabling [believers] daily to learn with 
greater truth and certainty what that will of the Lord is 
which they aspire to follow, and to confirm them in this 
1 knowledge" • Thus the two Reformers agreed that the 
process of regeneration is always incomplete, but Calvin did 
not express this in dialectical terms. Rather, he 
unashamedly asserted that believers need the law as much as 
anyone else does--not just in the civil sphere, but for 
continuing guidance. Moreover, "even in the case of the 
spiritual man, inasmuch as he is still burdened with the 
weight~ of the flesh, the Law is a constant stimulus, 
pricking him forward when he would indulge in sloth"2 . 
Perhaps this dual guiding and "pricking" use of the law for 
the believer is not very far, in the last analysis, from 
Luther's reluctant admission of a continuing significance of 
law for that aspect of the believer's life which has not yet 
been redeemed by grace. But the difference between the two 
is less a matter of linguistics than of instinct. 
1John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion 
(London: James Clarke, 1962), p. 309. 
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Underlying the two expositions is, in Calvin, an overriding 
pessimism about people from which he derives his positive 
attitude to religious norms. Luther, on the other hand, was 
firmly optimistic about the radical change that the believer 
has undergone in being liberated by Christ from the world, 
and thus he refused to grant that the law can be a means of 
knowing God's will for the church as a spiritual community. 
Despite these differences, the fact that the law had--
in some sense--continuing significance for the believer in 
both Luther's and Calvin's systems, led quite unsurprisingly 
to the adoption of the third use of law in the orthodoxies 
of both Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism. Thus the 
Heidelberg Catechism defines good works as "done out of true 
1 faith, in accordance with the Law of God" , and while the 
Formula of Concord underlines Luther's view that 
regeneration is never complete "in this world", it concludes 
that "thus the Law is and remains the same, both for the •• 
• regenerate and unregenerate, namely, the unalterable will 
of God "2 • 
While Protestantism was consolidating its orthodoxy, so 
was Catholicism. There was no law~Gospel tension at all in 
the Council of Trent's formulations. Law was as much part 
of its Gospel as was grace. In contrast to Luther, the 
Council held, in its Decree on Justification, that it is 
1Question 91 ,"as cited in Arthur C. Cochrane, 
Reformed Confel?_f?..iQ.ns_q_:f_tl}.~_sixteenth century (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, i966), p. 322. 
2Article VI, cited in Klug, pp. 89-90. 
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both possible and necessary to obey God's coinmandments: 
otherwise, how could they have been commanded by God? All 
people nonetheless do fall into sin, and need to make the 
1 
"cry of the just: 'forgive us our trespasses'." While 
justification begins in conversion and baptism, it continues 
? 
through the life of the believer-. Therefore, no one 
should be "vainly· confident" of justification3 but all 
should work for its "increase 114 through obser~rance of 
God's and the church's commandments. The church thus has as 
one of its functions the safeguarding and promotion of law, 
while also proclaiming divine forgiveness for the failures 
of those who at times do not obey it in its fullness. 
Thus law has a continuing significance in both Catholic 
and Protestant orthodoxy~ The precise nature of this 
significance is rather different in the two traditions, 
since for the Catholics, obedience to law is a way of 
completing the divine work of justification, which 
Protestantism considers already complete for the believer. 
But on the question of whether or not the law has continuing 
significance, the differences among the theological systems 
of Luther, Calvin and post-Reformation Catholicism represent 
more a matter of context and instincts than a serious 
divergence with practical consequences for the moral life. 
1 The canons and degx .. ~~~--<?.~-:~}.'J.~_Q.<?.1!1!.q_i_l__of Trent 
(London: Routledge, 1851 ), chap. XI. 
2 I b id . , ch a p • V • 
3Ibid., ch~ps. IX, XII. 
4Ibid., chap. X. 
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In this century, however, the foundations of the debate 
have been shaken by the challenge of Karl Barth. 
In Barth's ''evangelical theology", the great divide is 
not between law and Gospel but between God's word and man's 
word. From this perspective, Gospel and law belong on the 
same side of the line--both are aspects of God's word--and 
Gospel always comes first, because all theological truth 
(whether concerning God or his creation or the 
reconciliation of the two) proceeds from the good news of 
divine grace. Thus the traditional concept of law leading 
people--either pedagogically or by means of convicting .the 
conscience--towards Gospel faith, is impossible. No one 
could be led to the Gospel by law, except in the negative 
sense that death leads to life. Rather, "we must first of 
all know about the Gospel in order to know about the 
law." 1 Law before or without Gospel is incomprehensible 
and distorted, since law is a "form" of the Gospel, whereas 
grace is its content. Since form is unintelligible without 
content, and vice versa, law requires Gospel and vice versa. 
Although in a given situation law may take the form of human 
commands, faith will recognise it as either God's word (to 
be obeyed) or man's word (to be disregarded). Faith 
depends, of course, on Gospel, and thus always it is Gospel 
that leads to correct apprehension of law. Thus, for Barth, 
"the relationship of law to Gospel, form to content, wrath 
to love, is a relationship of dialectical unity. Each is 
1 Karl Barth, .Community.,_ State and Church (Gloucester, 
Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1968), p. 72. 
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necessary to its opposite, yet the two are never to be 
synthesised."1 Barth blamed Luther's formulation (law 
leading to Gospel) for the support of the "German Christian" 
theologians for Nazism, since in Luther's dialectical system 
political ethics is a separate matter from the divine word 
of grace contained in the Gospel. Instead, he insisted that 
God's claim is part of the Gospel: because of the divine 
word of grace, whatever situation the Christian may have to 
deal with, he/she will be able to hear the divine word of 
law. Part of the good news, then, is that the Christian can 
discern the "command of God". 
And this divine command is not, for Barth, something to 
be found in universal norms, rules, or principles, but in 
the ethical "event". The activity of God can be recognised 
in any situation, if the seeker of God's word is in a true 
relationship with God, because such a relationship (the 
result of faith in response to the Gospel) will "ready" or 
"place" the Christian to identify and respond to the 
2 command. This idea that God's claim proceeds from the 
Gospel is by no means a new way of stating the third use of 
law: for Barth this is not a third use but the only way in 
which the concept of law can be of any use. A further and 
even more significant difference between Barth and his more 
orthodox Protestant (or, for that matter, Catholic) 
1 Gerhard o. Forde, The law-gospel debate: an 
interpretation of its historical development (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg, 1969), p. 149. 
2 Robert C. Willis, The ethics of Karl Barth (London: 
E.J. Brill, 1971), pp. 191-196. 
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predecessors concerned the content of law. For Barth, law 
is identifiable neither with scriptural commandments nor 
with natural law, but rather as a direct experience by the 
believer, of God's word to him/her in the context of the 
ethical situation, and in the light of the nature of the 
Gospel itself. (How exactly one is supposed to ascertain 
this divine command remains unclear to most critical readers 
of Barth. There appear to be roles for biblical exegesis, 
theological reflection, and what I would describe as 
intuition--but to the methodological aspects of Barth's 
ethics I shall return later in this chapter.) 
Thielicke1 is one of many who have fundamentally 
questioned the close link of law with Gospel in Barth's 
system. What is the meaning of Calvary, he asks, if the 
Christian life continues to be a life of obedience to law? 
The Gospel, he asserts, is not about obedience or imitation, 
but about a historical miracle vis-a-vis law--it is not 
merely a philosophy of grace. The difference the Gospel 
makes in regard to law is surely a "qualitative" one (posing 
a radical alternative to a life of obedience to norms) 
rather than merely "quantitative" (changing the content of 
those norms). In effect, Thielicke is suggesting that the 
law-Gospel problem cannot be solved in isolation from a 
theological understanding of the atonement. Luther's 
negative attitude to all law, for example, falls into place 
within the context of a concept of atonement as something 
1 Helmut Thielicke, Theological ethics, vol. 1 
(London: A&C Black, 1968), pp. 95-106. 
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achieved once for all by God in Christ on the cross--an 
event with so radical an effect on the believer that he/she 
has nothing to do but accept it and thus be freed by it of 
all enslavement, including all bondage to law, which exists 
for the sole purpose of regulating and convicting those left 
untouched by the atoning event. In contrast, Catholicism 
posits a more dynamic view of atonement, which does not end 
at Calvary but begins there, involving the believer in a 
reconciling process which includes sacramental participation 
in the death and resurrection of Christ, and, thereby, a 
drawing closer to God through a life of obedience. 
It is true that in the debate between the Lutheran and 
Catholic doctrines of justification, the essential 
difference lies in the understanding of the atonement. It 
is also true that this difference is the essential context 
of the Lutheran position on law and Gospel. Thielicke is 
being true to the spirit of the Lutheran law-Gospel 
dialectic, but more radical than Luther himself, when he 
says that the consequence of the atonement, as a dramatic 
event in the relationship between God and humanity, is to 
liberate Christians from all law. However, the actual 
necessity--Luther notwithstanding--of placing the question 
of the continuing significance of law strictly within the 
context of the atonement, remains debatable. When 
theologians like Calvin and Barth have recognised that law 
or obedience have some role to play in the Christian life, 
they have been recognising a pragmatic need for guidance in 
a difficult world, rather than addressing the means by which 
Christians are capable of achieving peace with God. 
Calvin's insistence on a third use of law arose, as I have 
31 
shown, from his pessimism about the human capacity--even 
when under the influence of divine grace--to live a good 
life outside of a controlling and challenging framework of 
divine law. Barth, while wary of generalised norms, also 
feared that without obedience as a fruit of the Gospel, 
Christians would be swayed by "the word of man" rather than 
the word of God. These are pragmatic considerations, 
arising not so much out of a theological analysis as from 
the recognition of a human need for moral help. Even Paul, 
whose rejection of the force of law was an essential 
consequence of his acceptance that a radically significant 
event had occurred on the Cross, was not above recognising a 
pragmatic usefulness of law. The restrictions on eating 
food sacrificed to idols, for instance, while having no 
objective importance, should be obeyed in the heterogenous 
Corinthian situation for the sake of the sensitivities of 
the "weak ones". (1 Cor. 8:7-13; 9:19-23; 10:23-30) 
The insight that seems to emerge most clearly from this 
whole discussion of law and Gospel is that obedience has 
less to do with fundamental Christian duties required for 
the maintenance of a relationship with God, than with the 
Christian's desire to respond to God by seeking and doing 
his will in a world that is perplexingly full of sin and 
pain. Obedience, then, is a free response to God's grace. 
But if that is the case, is "law" in fact a helpful word to 
use in the moral sphere of Christian life? Surely the word 
"law" implies something we obey because it is law--because 
the alternative is to incur displeasure or 
punishment--rather than something in terms of which we 
freely choose to direct our lives? If I drive at 60 
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kilomet:res an hour in an u:rban a:rea because I cons ide:r it an 
app:rop:riate and safe speed, I am not so much obeying the law 
as exe:rcising f:ree and :responsible choice. That this 
happens to be the speed limit, laid down and enfo:rceable by 
law, would appea:r to be i:r:relevant. If, howeve:r, I d:rive at 
that speed in fea:r of p:rosecution o:r out of a p:rincipled 
:respect fo:r legislation, I am simply obeying the law. It 
seems to me that when he u:rged the Co:rinthians to abstain 
f:rom food conside:red by othe:rs to be defiled, Paul was not 
' 
in fact giving sc:riptu:ral sanction to a thi:rd use of law, o:r 
any use of "law" as such, but was :rathe:r saying that the 
loving thing to do in this instance, in view of the 
"weakness" of those who still we:re sensitive about matte:rs 
of law, was to :ref:rain f:rom giving offence--even though in 
point of fact "the:re is nothing undefiled". 
This does not, howeve:r, dispose of the fundamental 
question of the :relationship between obedience and f:reedom 
in the Ch:rist ian life. If "law" is a poo:r wo:rd to desc:ri be 
that to which Ch:ristians :respond in f:reely choosing to seek 
and obey God's will, what is a bette:r wo:rd? "No:rms", 
pe:rhaps? O:r "commands", o:r "rules"? Va:rious suggestions 
have been made in an attempt not me:rely to :resolve the 
linguistic question but, in the p:rocess, to define clea:rly 
the whole notion of obedience in the context of Ch:ristian 
f:reedom and :responsibility. I shall mention some of the 
most helpful suggestions. 
(1) Guides to :righteousness. N.H. S¢e accepts the view 
of Kie:rkegaa:rd, Fletche:r and othe:rs that the New Commandment 
of John 13:34 should :replace all laws as having absolute 
status fo:r Ch:ristians. What of the othe:r commandments of 
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Jesus? 'llhese are not laws, but have the status of a guide 
to the "new rig,."'1.teousness", advice to those who are in the 
kingdom: "Rightly speaking, there is no 'thou shalt'; but 
all is changed to a 'Thou art set free to, thou art 
permitted to'. 1 
(2) Content of love. -2 C.H. Dodd also gives 
attention to Jesus' commands. They are not ordinances, but 
should be taken seriously, since they give content to love. 
While it is not always right or possible to "turn the other 
cheek", for example, this word of Jesus, and others like it, 
initiate ethical reflection. This is the meaning of 
Jeremiah 31 :31-34: "I will write my law on their hearts.'' 
Jesus' precepts set'up a process of ethical activity, 
involving the imagination, thought, conscience, and will, 
and issuing in action - all of which is possible for the 
Christian by virtue of his or her new relationship with God. 
(3) Servant of love. Helmut Thielicke places emphasis 
on the incompleteness of the Christian state. Because of 
this, law has regulatory, though not normative, content: 
The Law ••• is no longer the devouring wolf. Instead 
it helps to preserve intact the flock's connection with 
the shepherd who has already accepted the sheep as his 
own. ~ .• -Tc» this degree, the sustaining, nourishing and 
1 N .H.S,ie, "The three uses of the Law," in Norm and 
context i~ Christian ethics, ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul 
Ramsey (New York: Scribner, j.j68) ~ pp~- 313-314~ 
2
c.H.Dodd, ~os~el and Law: The relation of faith and 
ethics in early Christianiti (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1951 ), pp~ 73-81. 
34 
perfecting Law no longer has normative significance, in 
the sense of leading me as if it were the shepherd 
instead of simply the dog. It has rather a regulatory 
significance in that it reminds me of the way which my 
given obedience--to which I could never be forced by 
any law--may be exercised. It points me to specific 
areas in which the question of obedience is acute. 1 
According to Thielicke, then, law's authority is unchanged, 
but our· relationship to it is changed. It is a comforter, 
not a killer--"a servant of love in the political 
2 
sphere" • 
( 4) General absolutes. Brevard Childs 3 suggests that 
rules be seen as "general absolutes", a term he chooses in 
preference to "prescriptive absolutes", which is too strong, 
and "general guidelines", which is too weak. As "general 
absolutes", rules embody love, yet accuse the conscience. 
They reflect the ambiguity of the Christian's situation in 
the modern world. The Christian should live in dialogue 
with these "general absolutes", interpreting them to meet 
new situations, making use of "middle axioms" where 
appropriate, and attempting to resolve conflicting rules. 
These and many other attempts to define the role of 
normative statements vary significantly in the types of 
status they suggest for such statements in the Christian 
moral life. It does, however, emerge clearly from all of 
1Thielicke, pp. 133-4. 
2Ibid., p. 141. 
3Brevard S. Childs, ~iblical theology in crisis 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970). 
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them that Christian freedom does not exclude but rather 
embraces norms, standards. of conduct, guidelines for 
behaviour, and so forth. "General standards" may be the 
most expressive term. On the other hand, there must also be 
room for critical appraisal of all such general standards 
and of the amount of authority they are to possess. That 
appraisal must conform to the picture of which I have found 
elements in all the major positions on the law-Gospel 
dispute (from Roman Catholic orthodoxy through to Barth): 
the Christian is a new person, whose newness is never 
complete--a person who needs help in finding and heeding the 
call of God; a person, nevertheless, in direct and 
unmediated relationship with God, seeking his will in a 
world which frequently contrives to conceal him. 
The short answer to the question I have been exploring 
in the first section of this chapter, then, is that both 
obedience and freedom are essential elements in the 
Christian moral life. They are not enemies: they are the 
ideal couple in the quest for morality. This means that 
certain normative statements can be of considerable help in 
finding solutions to moral problems, so long as they do not 
take the place of the free exercise of moral responsibility. 
A method must be found for Christian ethics which gives 
account of both the divine gift of freedom and the Christian 
response of obedience. 
But first, this analysis of the role of obedience has 
left an essential question unanswered. How are the 
appropriate general standards to be identified--where are 
they to be found? This question will need to receive 
attention before the quest for a method can continue. 
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1.2 The sources of Christian ethical reflection 
( 1 ) Scripture 
If normative statements are to be accorded the status 
of general, though not absolute, standards for Christian 
ethics, this raises a particular problem with regard to the 
usefulness of Scripture as a source of these standards. It 
is hardly unreasonable to expect that the Bible will provide 
at least a starting point as a source of Christian moral 
norms, but what, precisely, will be the usefulness of this 
"book of books"? 
A fundamentalist like JOHN MURRAY1, for example, 
recognises few problems in regard to the use of Scripture as 
a source of ethical law. His book sets out to show "the 
basic unity and continuity of the biblical ethic", and on 
some issues he manages to produce a somewhat artificially 
harmonised set of "Principles of Conduct" (which is the 
book's title). However, the task of extracting clear and 
consistent ethical norms from Scripture is not one that can 
be achieved without some embarrassing contortions. For 
instance, Murray asserts that the Bible forbids the telling 
of a lie--but he is forced to concede that the Scriptures 
allow "concealment of truth from those who have no claim on 
. t" 2 l • He is careful to point out that Rahab the 
prostitute is commended in Heb. 11:31 and Jas. 2:25, not for 
lying to the king of Jericho but for hospitality to the 
1 John Murray, Principles of conduct (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1957). 
2Ibid., p. 146. 
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Israelite spies. How the la·tter could have been achieved 
without lying to the king's men .is not suggested. 
More critical scholars find it difficult to use the 
Bible as a moral textbook--not only because of the 
theoretical problems with regard to law and normative 
absolutes that have been outlined above, but in 
consideration of the nature of the Bible itself. The Bible 
is not a systematic omnibus of moral guidelines. It is a 
collection of poetic, prophetic, cultic, legendary and 
historical writings produced in different times and places 
for varying purposes and arising out of a variety of needs. 
Each of these writings is geared to communicating specific 
theological truths concerning God and creation. Together, 
they constitute neither a list of moral principles nor a 
unified historical reference work. Rather, as JAMES BARR 
suggests, Scripture is a collection of classic human records 
of divine events. As such, the documents are capable of 
scientific, historical and theological error, and they are 
to be sought out not in order to provide ready solutions to 
problems, but to enrich and build up the faith of the 
readers, in the light of which they may be enabled to see 
and judge themselves and their actions. Thus, insists 
1 Barr , there is no such thing as a heretical 
interpretation of the Bible. Rather, conflicts of 
interpretation are possible, just as the Bible itself 
provides a vivid pattern of controversy. 
Moreover, the Canon was finalised a long time ago, and 
1 James Barr, The Bible_!_~_t}!_e modern world (London: 
SCM Press, 1973). 
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after a compilation process that spanned centuries and a 
wide variety of cultural mil.ieus. T.o suppose its moral 
statements to apply literally or directly to any of today's 
societies would be to ignore the fact that the moral world 
is a facet of social life: moral dilemmas occur to us when 
we attempt to relate our ideas of right and wrong, good and 
evil, to the situations we meet in real life. These 
dilemmas cannot, therefore, be solved without serious 
reference to real life. Simply citing a text from a 
prophecy or letter directed to another community in another 
era--however inspirational we may find that document in a 
religious mode--will not answer our deepest questions, but 
only the most superficial ones. Also, the diverse nature of 
the Canon, even in terms of the varying moral standpoints 
found therein (both in content and in emphasis and focus), 
prevents us from isolating one supposedly authoritative 
"text" and acknowledging it as the solution to a given 
problem. 
BREVARD CHILDS, who is not one of those critical 
scholars who would seek to relegate the Bible to a secondary 
place in theology, nevertheless insists that to know God's 
will through Scripture is not something clear-cut, but a 
matter of perceiving tensions within the Canon. He proposes 
. 1 in a pace-setting work on biblical theology that the 
ethicist should begin any consideration of an issue by 
searching the Canon for witnesses and noting the internal 
dynamics among them. Such a process may in some instances 
provide a picture of unity among the witnesses, and a clear 
--·---------
1 3 s~~>p;.: . .34_ abqye (note ) • 
() 
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moral-imperative. In other instances, the diversity of the 
witnesses will provide guidelines for moral reflection, 
tensions to be taken account of in such reflection, or 
various moral options open to the Christian. 
BIRCH AND RASMUSSEN have developed the implications of 
Childs's Canonical approach for ethics. They suggest a 
functional distinction between central, consistent emphases 
in Scripture (such as identification with and care for the 
poor) and more diverse and peripheral witnesses (as on 
matters like sexuality). In these ways, there has been a 
justified backlash against scholars who sought to diminish 
the Bible's role in theological reflection on ethics and 
theology- in general. "The authority of non-biblical 
knowledge is crucial," acknowledge Birch and Rasmussen1, 
"but what distinguishes Christian from humanistic ethics is 
an insistence on the biblical witness as it has been handed 
down in the church as the primary authority establishing not 
the final word but the necessary framework for Christian 
moral deliberation." 
Thus the Christian ethicist cannot ignore the Bible. 
Scripture remains the most important source of religious 
insight for Jews and Christians. It provides the church 
'"Tith its basic identity: without it, Christianity would be a 
purely individualistic exercise, and there would be nothing 
that could be described as the message of the church. 
Christian ethics, too, cannot have a distinctive identity 
1Bruce C. Birch and Larry L~ Rasmussen, ~ible and 
ethics in the Christian life (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 
p. 158. 
40 
without making use of the Bible in some significant way. If 
the ethicist wishes to serve the religious community, due 
and serious cognisance has to be taken both of the values 
which tend to emerge from devoted study of Scripture and of 
the relationships (divine/human and interpersonal) which are 
formed under its influence--for it is in the context of 
those relationships that religious people make moral 
decisions. DENIS NINEHAM1 (whose phenomenological 
approach I do not, generally, find helpful) is correct in 
pointing to the centrality of the concept of relationships 
in understanding the importance of the Bible. The Bible is 
read in the context of a relationship between the reader and 
God, and its usefulness lies above all in serving and 
affecting that relationship--a relationship historically, 
though not fully comprehensibly, achieved by Jesus Christ. 
In regard to the centrality of relationships, r;rineham 
reflects the classic contribution of C.H. DODD2 , who 
argued that since only the living God has absolute 
authority, such authority cannot be ceded to a completed 
book~ The Bible has authority only insofar as as it 
mediates the word of God, enabling the reader to be touched 
by God through the experience of the writers. Only 
secondarily will the reader then turn, though with great 
respect, to those writers' theological opinions--their 
_,, ~ 
1 Den~ is Ni neham, T 'tl_~ Uf?..~~g_-~2.1!.8-. ~--<?_:t: __ th e Bib le 
(London: SPCK, 1978). 
2 C.H. Dodd, The authority of the Bible, rev. ed. (New 
York, Harper & Bros., 1958). 
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interpretations _of the human experience of God. These 
interpretations continue to be developed within the 
Christian community through the power of the Spirit, who 
continues to lead Christians into all truth (John 16:13). 
Dodd concludes his book with words which are wholly 
acceptable in concluding this summary of the role of the 
Bible in theological ethics: 
If the Bible is in.deed the "Word of God", it is so not 
as the "last word" on all religious questions, but as 
the "seminal word" out of which fresh apprehension of 
truth springs in the mind of man. 1 
(2) T radi ti on 
The Canon of Scripture~ then, provides a starting point 
for theological reflection, in which (in Dodd's words) 
"fresh apprehensions" of truth will arise, through which God 
continues to speak to his church. This suggests the second 
factor which has to be recognised in the ethical process: 
the history of tradition. The study of Christian morality is 
never conducted in isolation from the whole of the Christian 
church throughout the world and throughout history. 
Therefore views which have been expressed on any moral 
theme--and especially those views which have been more or 
less consistently expressed--by theologians from ancient 
times to the present, must be taken seriously. 
On the other hand, the way in which theology develops 
is a dynamic process. One who analyses a theological or 
moral problem in South Africa in the 1980s cannot pretend to 
be sitting with St Thomas Aquinas in a medieval monastery, 
1 Ibid . , p ~ 3 00. 
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any more than with St Paul in his prison cell. The problems 
to be solved, the dilemmas to be resolved, here and now 
(wherever and whenever that may be) are necessarily 
different from those considered by anyone else in another 
time and place. 
One might look briefly for example at the.doctrine by 
which certain armed conflicts can be considered "just wars" 
according to the extent to which they meet certain criteria. 
Those criteria may (or may not) have been wholly plausible 
in an age when soldiers laid siege to other soldiers in 
castles, killing and being killed by the dozen. The same 
criteria could become somewhat more problematic in an age in 
which an anonymous person--or computer--can initiate an 
unstoppable process which could wipe out half the world's 
population. They might also be inapplicable to a guerilla 
war in which the citizens of a country rise up to throw off 
the chains laid upon them by a powerful elite. Similarly, 
it may have been plausible for St Thomas to speculate that 
the human foetus possesses a soul from the fortieth day 
after conception in the case of males, and the eightieth day 
in the case of females--and thus to rule that after those 
deadlines abortion amounts to murder. Today, with 
anatomical and genetic evidence proving that at least the 
physical development of males and females progresses at an 
almost identical rate, those conclusions have little more 
than curiosity value~ 
None of this means St Thomas's work will be totally 
irrelevant to the debate about violence which will be 
considered in Chapter 3, or that about abortion in Chapter 
4. Rather, his insights can be examined respectfully and 
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cri·t;ically, with a view to discovering whether, and what, 
they contribute to the ethical problem of the day. 
The point is that an ethical dilemma is a dilemma only 
by reference to its context. In abstract terms, it is easy 
to say "abortions are wrong [or right]", or "it is never [or 
often] acceptable to rise up against the State". These 
things are more difficult to say--and even more difficult to 
hear without great pain and bitterness~--when they are said 
in the context of relationships with real people who are 
faced with making choices which they find difficult or 
nearly impossible. Few pregnant women find it helpful to be 
told what other people have said over the centuries about 
the problem of an unwanted child. Few citizens of an 
oppressed nation will be interested in what the Thomists or 
Scotists said about the morality of rebellion. These 
decisions {about abortion, rebellion and other such 
problems) are agonising because they are made not in 
classrooms or pulpits bu·t in the context of such earthy 
realities as pain, blood, despair, bitterness, passion, 
humiliation, hope, love, pride, fear and other incalculable 
factors which tend to make general norms impotent. The 
context produces the dilemma, and no ready-made solution to 
the dilemma is possible because, being ready-made, it will 
not refer to the context but rather to theoretical insights 
which may or may not be enlightening. 
Thus, while it mast be recognised that theological 
ethics cannot be described as Christian ethics unless those 
ethics are formed within the light shed by the Bible and by 
the theological heritage, the products of such ethics will 
not be helpful if they merely amount to lists of what has 
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been declared in former times in various places. Rather, 
the task is to illuminate with the light of the Gospel the 
darkest corners of human life, and facilitate better 
decisions in difficult situations by seeking to discover how 
that light might make rights and wrongs at least slightly 
easier to identify~ 
(3) Con text 
Besides Scripture and the theological tradition, then,· 
other factors must be recognised in a description of the 
theological ethical process; First; the ethicist must be 
humble enoug..~ to recognise that his/her insights are not 
complete without the contributions made by scholars of other 
disciplines--most importantly the human sciences (sociology, 
psychology, social anthropology, political science, history, 
and others), but on some issues (for example, as I shall 
show later, abortion), such natural sciences as biology and 
medicine. A particularly close natural relationship exists, 
of course, with ethicists in the non-religious philosophical 
sphere. In conducting what Birch and Rasmussen described as 
a "constant dialogue with the many other sources of 
knowledge through which God may be disclosing himself"1, 
theological ethics will have access to knowledge and 
insights which were not available to earlier sources. 
Second~ in taking the "real world" with the utmost 
seriousness~ the uniqueness of ethical situations must be 
firmly recognised and taken into account. Seldom will talk 
of a "typical" situation be helpful--and then only on a 
hypothetical level. The situation at hand must be fully 
1Birch and Rasmussen, p. 150. 
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analysed in order to bring to light such factors as the 
causes of the problem (including the historical background), 
the values operating among the groups and individuals 
involved in making decisions on the matter being surveyed, 
the likely consequences of the various options open to these 
people and groups, and the various factors operating which 
will influence openness and resistance to change. A study 
which includes analysis of these factors will avoid an 
ethical bias towards ideology, and ensure that ethical 
suggestions are realistic. 
(4) Subjective experience 
Up to now, I have been mentioning factors which are 
readily accessible to conscious study and .analysis· 
(Scripture, theology, scientific dialogue, and situational 
analysis). It is, however, also necessary to to recognise 
there are less conscious and unconscious factors at play in 
the ethicist's study. This is true whether or noJG the study 
is on the basis of the Bible or any other authority--this is 
a key element missed by those who would seek to posit 
"objective" ethics, whether based on Scriptural standards, 
natural law, or anything else. Unconscious presuppositions 
and preferences will influence the ethicist to favour 
certain factors and ignore others, without even realising 
that another scholar might disagree with the weight given to 
the various elements. 
Such unconscious pre-critical editing will inevitably 
take place especially when one is speaking of such 
subjective and relative things as "central themes and 
peripheral issues" (for example, with regard to Scripture 
and theology), or allegedly universal or natural values or 
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laws. The political philosopher Vernon Van Dyke provides a 
useful note of warning against the easy acceptance of any 
human science as conveying objective t~iths. His comments 
are as relevant to theology as to political science. He 
attacks a "deceptive" assumption that "to be objective, one 
must allow the facts to speak for themselves", saying the 
deception relies on the metaphor used: 
Whatever facts are • • . , they do not speak. Scholars 
do. The scholar asks the question, selects or ferrets 
out data that he considers relevant to it, and seeks an 
answer on the basis of the data. His selection or 
arrangement of the data may point towards or lead to an 
answer • • • but • • • if any speaking is done, he does 
•t 1 1 • 
Van Dyke nevertheless rejects a despairing renunciation of 
any attempt at objectivity--a goal that can at least be 
approached by the careful use of "generally accepted" 
(whatever that may mean) criteria 'in judging data to be 
relevant and reliable, thoroughness in locating and 
developing such data and weighing the facts, and logic in 
arriving at conclusions. 
W~h-~ther o~~-- not the_ologi(!_af -(~:r' any \other) -ethics could\ 
ever make claims of objective verity based on the adoption 
of these sound methods, they are no doubt.useful aids to 
self~judgement on the part of the theologian. But it is 
equally important to recognise and declare one's own 
prejudices, and one's own background, which will inevitably 
influence the way in which one selects, arranges, develops, 
1 Vernon Van Dyke, ~9..l~ii£~l_'.?_q_~~11~-~-~_A philosophical 
analysis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1960), pp~ 49-50. 
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and draws conclusions from the evidence. Among the most 
( 
important of these unconscious influences are one's 
religious experience and social and cultural experience. It 
is in the context of such experience that values are formed, 
and even the way in which one perceives undisputed facts 
will be influenced by one's presuppositions, formed within 
the context of social, religious and psychological life. To 
the extent that the social orientation of the ethicist is 
recognised, and compensated for~ theological ethics can be, 
as Villa-Vicencio1 pleaded for it to be, a de-absolutising 
discipline: "an exercise in naming the gods of a people" 
instead of merely accepting precognitively the 
presuppositions of the community in which the ethical 
process occurs, and proceeding from that point to ~ake 
proposals and draw conclusions which fit neatly into those 
parameters 
Thus Christian ethics is neither simply a matter of 
Bible Study, nor confined to a supposedly dispassionate 
survey of, and logical assessment of, normative guidelines 
proposed in biblical and post-biblical literature. Rather, 
theological ethics involves scientific analysis of specific 
situations, and the application to those situations of 
values formed in the context of religious and social 
relationships and experience. 
Having thus identified the task of any study in 
theological ethics, it is necessary at this ·time to ask what 
1Charles Villa-Vicencio, "Christian social ethics as 
a de-absolutising discipline," Journal of TheolQ.& for 
Southern Africa 31 (June 1980), p. 7ff. 
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justified as necessary to achieve a. higher end: in this 
case, a shorter war and thus fewer Allied casualties. 
The main problem with this form of argument is that it 
is notoriously difficult to weigh ends against means, and to 
reach acceptable conclusions about one justifying the 
other--especially since the methods used in an effort to 
reach an allegedly higher goal may have unplanned 
consequences which could be said to defile the intended goal 
of the means employed. Marrin asks of Christians who lend 
support to a war: "Having chosen the end, have we not also 
to a certain extent chosen the means of attaining it? ••• 
To what extent may evil be done in the hope of good coming 
out of it?" 1 This is no easy question to answer, and in 
attempting to do so, I shall rely on the telling critique of 
2 
moral perfectionism found in the work of Philip Wagaman . 
\ 
According to Wagaman, the early Christian writings 
contained a significant perfectionist aspect. This can be 
partly ascribed to the expectation of an imminent end of 
time, but not all the cogent arguments for pacifism, even 
from that time, can be dismissed as irrelevant because of 
that consideration.3 
In later Christian theory~ moral exceptions or 
1Ibid., p. 147. 
2J. Philip Wagaman, A Christian method of moral 
judgement (London: SCM Press, 1976). 
3The veracity of the frequently alleged pristine 
early Christian pacifism will be examined in Chapter 3 
below. 
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necessary evils were increasingly permitted. This was 
:rationalised in terms of the doctrine of the Fall. For 
example, St Augustine :regarded both war and slavery as 
necessary remedies for the effect of sin--at least in the 
last :resort--even while :recognising these ·types of activity 
as inconsistent with the Gospel. St Thomas Aquinas and 
'Martin Luther and others have argued along similar lines. 1 
Certain problems wi~h this form of rationale are easily 
recognised, but Wogaman is concerned with a more basic 
question. It it possible, he asks to organise ethical 
thinking and act; ion on the basis of positive presumptions 
only? He goes on to examine the thoug..~t of various 
Christian scholars who have answered: yes. 2 Tolstoy, for 
example~ saw non-resistance as a positive principle which 
must dominate Christian behaviour, :regardless of the 
consequences. W'ogaman's :response is that Tolstoy either 
overestimated the extent to which sin is a product of social 
conditions, or underestimated the extent to which the 
capacity to sin is an aspect of real humanity. But his more 
important rebuttal, I think, states that Tolstoy, by 
reducing Christianity to obedience to a principle, promoted 
a slave-ethic. Wogaman does not develop this thought, but 
it suggests that moral perfectionism makes human beings into 
automatons, asking them to ignore their sensitivity to the 
consequences of their actions and the complexities of their 
situations, in favour of reflex obedience to an absolute 
1 W ogaman, pp • 11 7 -11 8. 
2Ibid., pp. 119-126. 
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moral law. This is a kind of pharisaism which bases 
absolute norms on Christ's Sermon on the Mount, without 
understanding the basic critique of legalism, and of 
legalism's attention to outward practice~ which was the 
dominant theme of the collection of sayings in Matt. 5-7. 1 
A second affirmative answer to the question about 
positive pr~sumptions is offered by Jacques Ellul. Wogaman 
explains Ellul's thought on this matter as focused on the 
consequences of violence: though people inevitably respond 
violently to violence, that is always a futile response, as 
is every compromise with evil. As Wogaman suggests, it is 
difficult to refute a claim of this natu're, since it appeals 
to an indefinite and generalised future. It cannot be 
proven or disproved, though I shall return to the concrete 
results of social violence (and to Ellul' s proposals) in 
Chapter 3 below. 
A third affirmative answer to Wogaman's question is 
given by John Howard Yoder. Yoder's reasoning is that since 
Jesus took the path _of radical obedience, Christians can 
1 I shall return, in Chapter 2 below, to give detailed 
critical attention to the pacifist notion of the sanctity of 
life. Here I am concerned only with the methodological 
question raised by Wogaman regarding the possibility of an 
ethic based solely on positive presumptions. To appreciate 
his conclusion on this question, it is necessary to travel 
with him in a preliminary way as he explores the thought of 
Tolstoy, Ellul and Yoder--who unfortunately (because it 
produces a slight amount of repetition in the next chapter) 
happen to be thinkers who have focused on the issue of 
violence--rather than more general rule-deontologists like 
Kant. 
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take it on faith that adherence to the same path will be 
useful in fulfillment of the kingdom o:r God. This 
faith-recognition is made despite any historical evidence to 
the contrary, since there can be no reliable guide to 
Christian ethics other than Christ himself. Wagaman 
recognises the appeal of Yoder's argument, but proposes two 
major objections to moral perfectionism. 1 First, moral 
perfectionism understates the importance of economic, 
social, legal and political conditions. It says nothing is 
worth defending by means of negative acts. In saying this, 
moral perfectionism falls victim to sentimentality, failing 
to give adequate importance to the realities of--and 
intrinsic worth of--creation itself. According to Wagaman, 
Yoder's eschatology dominates his doctrine of creation, ivi th 
the result that present problems are understated in favour 
of the abstract future. One might add that to the 
cynically-inclined, perfectionism of this 
"faith-recognition" type could seem to be a radical's 
version of the traditional pie-in-the-sky-when-you-die sop 
to the oppressed--though that is certainly far from Yoder's 
intention. 
Wogaman's second rebuttal rests on the possibility that 
Christians may do negative things in a redemptive way. 
negative action for the sake of others can be a loving 
responsibility (what Luther called "strange love"), so long 
as objectively good ends are the concern: 
It is not enough simply to commend the vulnerable 
multitudes of human society to God's provident care in 
1 Wagaman, pp. 127-130. 
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some future time. God expects more of us than that. 1 
The broad thrust of Wogaman's argument is convincing. He 
recognises the strength of the perfectionist approach, and 
it is certainly important that Christians recognise that 
negative actions always pose a moral problem. But Wogaman 
correctly insists that in an imper:fect world Christian love 
sometimes needs to be expressed in negative actions. These 
actions remain "evils", but they may be "necessary" in 
service of the needs of others. At the same time, he 
recognises that a "heavy burden of proof 112 is always 
required when a terrible thing, such as war, is argtied to be 
a necessary evil. 
(2) A slippery slope? 
Even if they were to concede that there is no 
theoretical objection to the idea of a necessary evil, moral 
perfectionists would still argue that there are certain 
negative acts which are not merely destructive in 
themselves, but can be destructive in terms of the extrinsic 
effect of the acts' ac6eptance as permissible or 
justifiable. This is the argument known as the "slippery 
slope". Those who pursue this argument, for example in 
respect of abortion,· hold that if the killing of human 
foetuses is allowed, then people will gradually come to 
believe that homicide is acceptable outside the womb as 
well. An example of this form of argument is found.in a 
cautionary note in an Anglican commission report which will 
1Ibid., p. 130. 
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be examined later in this thesis: 
As far as society is concerned there is cause to fear 
that too great a relaxation of abortion laws could 
easily lead to a disregard of the value of human life 
1 
and to a general sense that "life is cheap". 
Another example is found in an essay on abortion by Paul 
2, A Ramsey rguments for abortion, he argues, necessarily 
become arguments for infanticide when based on such things 
as social disadvantage, deformity, rape, or incest. 
Prima facie, such an argument has some force. 
Particularly since the Nazi holocaust~ it is not difficult 
to imagine a society where the routine killing of foetuses, 
handicapped babies and old people--and, by extension, other 
allegedly "socially useless" people (such as Jews, blacks, 
or any other ethnic or economic group)--is not regarded as 
"really" killing at all. Thus, the argument continues, it 
is necessary to place a high value on life itself, in the 
womb as much as elsewhere, insisting that it be socially 
unacceptable to deprive a person of life (except, some would 
say~ under clearly defined and extreme circumstances where a 
choice must be made between one life and one or more other 
lives). If society fails to do this, the argument 
concludes, it will find itself on a slippery slope which 
leads inevitably to moral anarchy and rampant disregard for 
life itself. 
1 ~epo rt o:f._:~..I?.J .. ~£Q.I?.?-~ .S_.Y.g_od C O™-.h'.3-:.s i .9..11. on Abo rt ion 
(Johannesburg: Church of the Province of Southern Africa, 
1 980) ' p. 34. 
2 John T. Noonan, ed., ~ .... h.~._rg_q,,:r:8:..::J:.:i.J.Y- of abortion 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 
chap. 2, sec. 5. 
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While the argument of the slippery slope poses as a 
salutary warning against moral anarchy, it contains a 
logical fallacy which could imply moral tyranny. Morality 
always draws lines of distinction, and always allows for 
exceptions. Indeed, the fundamental assumption of all 
morality is that human beings are capable of making moral 
distinctions between different types of situation--that 
human beings are able to compartmentalise ideas. This is a 
fact of even average human intelligence. For example, there 
is no evidence to show that soldiers, who as a matter of 
professional necessity believe it is right to kill enemy 
soldiers in wartime, thereafter behave as if they have a 
right to kill at their own convenience in peacetime. Without 
even thinking about it, soldiers (and everyone else) make 
clear moral distinctions between different kinds of killing. 
After centuries of warfare, no slippery slope is evident. 
In the same way, there is no evidence to suggest that women 
who have had or considered abortions perceive the line 
between abortion and infanticide as arbitrary and 
unimportant. 
If there were a slippery slope, humankind would already 
be found somewhere on it, engaged in its perilous descent. 
Since time immemorial, socially acceptable killing has 
existed--in self-defence, in war, in capital punishment--and 
the list of these forms of justified homicide has not 
lengthened, as the slippery-slope argument would suggest it 
should have. Indeed, it would appear that as civilisation 
has developed the number of acceptable forms of homicide has 
decreased~ It was once widely accepted that revenge and 
wounded pride were ample reasons for homicide: now no 
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longer. Once they hanged petty thieves in England: now they 
hand no one. The slope appears to be neither steep nor 
slippery. 
The philosopher Marvin Kohl has shown that the idea of 
killing is not "contagious" as some would suggest--that is, 
the exposure of a person, group or society to actual killing 
does not "universalise and thereby extend" the phenomenon. 
Rather, "there 'is overwhelming evidence that human beings 
compartmentalise their ideas, and it is only when the normal 
process of compartmentalisation breaks down that one 
encounters difficulties". Kohl admits that human beings 
make mistakes in the process of generalisation or 
compartmentalisation, but there are important constraints on 
the process, including the concept of "same kind or same 
class of objects".1 For example, the one who crushes an 
insect, believing this to be acceptable, does not conclude 
that he or she has the :right to kill human beings--because 
an insect is not a human being. Likewise, the Allied 
soldier taught to kill German soldiers did not conclude it 
was permissible to kill all Germans at all times ("though of 
all mistakes this is the most likely")--still less that it 
was permissible to kill anyone with whom he/she one had an 
argument~ The lesson "I may kill" had been learnt with 
regard only to the one kind of object of killing: the enemy 
soldier. Though Kohl avoids more modern examples, his point 
1 Marvin Kohl, !_he~q£_1!~i"!!_y_~f._k~!~:h11&.; ___ ?_~g_9t~!Y- of 
life, abortionL-~119-__~utha11~sia (London: Peter Owen, 1974), 
p. 49. 
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might be well demonstrated by reference to wartime massacres 
such as that at My Lai in the Vietnam_W?-!' ~--· __ l]!'l_de.£_!!1~. _!1-_arsh 
conditions of a vicious and disorienting jungle struggle, a 
party of American soldiers made what we might categorise as 
a terrible mistake in generalising: they extended the class 
"enemy" to include women and children who might have 
harboured or assisted Viet Cong forces, or who might do so 
in the future. In condemning the massacre with horror, the 
American public (including, it appears, many who had no 
difficulty justifying the war itself, involving as it did 
the killing of large numbers of enemy soldiers) did not make 
that "mistake" of over-generalisation. The widespread 
acceptance of killing soldiers in wartime did not place the 
society on a "slippery slope" leading even as far as the 
acceptability of killing civilians who might have aided or 
might in future aid those soldiers. Still less did it or 
does it lead to the social acceptability of killing one's 
neighbour in a garden-fence boundary dispute, or one's wife 
when one falls in love with a younger woman. 
It is possible, therefore, for human beings to think in 
moral compartments. Neither with regard to revolutionary 
violence (in which the class of "objects" might be as broad 
as "members of the oppressor class" or as narrow as 
"collaborators of the system") nor in the case of abortion 
(where the killing is confined to objects in the class 
"foetuses") is there a real threat of the breakdown of the 
general moral prohibition against homicide, at least not 
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bacause of any alleged slippery slope. 1 It may be that 
there are sound moral reasons why homicide is not justifiable 
as a means of revolution and why abortion is never justifiable, 
but those reasons, if they exist, will emerge from an examination 
of the merits of those particular issues, rather than out 
of fear for what the so-called "logical consequences" of 
one or another conclusion might be in respect of what people 
feel about killing in general. 
Moral perfectionism, then, presents no insuperable 
obstacles to the task of considering possible limits to 
the "right to life" of foetuses, or of tyrants, or of others 
defined as potential objects of justifiable homicide. But 
how can such a consideration be approached? This study 
has now reached a stage where proposals can be made concerning 
a methodology for deciding about homicide. 
1.4 Methodological proposals 
H.E. T6dt 2 has suggested that an ideal schema for 
making ethical judgements should include: 
(1) definition of the problem; 
(2) analysis of the situation; 
(3) identification of the behavioural problem; 
1There are other constraints on generalisation, apart 
from the class of object. One such additional constraint 
is the set of circumstances under which an act is performed. 
For example, what is permissible in wartime may not be 
permissible in peacetime. 
2He T6dt, "Towards a theory of making ethical judgements," 
Journal of Religious Ethics 6 (1978): 108-120. 
59 
(4) identification and testing of the norms; 
(5) making the judgement; and 
(6) reconsideration ("retrospective adequacy 
control"). 
This typology provides a useful "check-list" of the elements 
which need to be present in an ethical methodology. Indeed, 
I have already committed myself to a framework for this 
study which embraces at least the first five elements--and 
the sixth does not apply to a completed ethical analysis 
(although the continuing reconsideration of judgements in 
the light of subsequent experience is certainly an essential 
dimension of ethics). The first three elements, being 
contextual, will be concentrated in Part 2 of this thesis, 
and the fifth, the making of judgements, is the business of 
the concluding chapter. A primary task is the 
identification and qualification of what I call general 
standards and what Todt calls norms. That task will be 
commenced in Chapter 2, and the standards will be tested 
contextually in the remainder of the thesis. However, to 
list the methodological elements is only a first step: my 
task in the remainder of the present chapter is to try to 
fit them together into a method that somehow gives account 
of the problematic dialectic of obedience and freedom in 
Christian morality. 
I suggest that a helpful indicator of the next step is 
provided by Arthur Dyck. He argues from the basis of 
gestalt psychology that in a certain moral situation a clear 
gap in the gestalt (totality or wholeness) of the situation 
may be perceived. He cites Wertheimer's proposition that an 
innocent person on trial, or a hungry child, provide 
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examples of the perception of a .gap in the totality. In 
order to complete the whole, it is absolutely clear that 
acquittal, in the first case, and food, in the second, are 
needed~ In this type of instance, moral requiredness takes 
the form of a "demand not to create a gap in what is seen as 
a complete harmonious whole"--or to fill the gap if one 
exists. From this view, "what is fitting is right or good; 
what is unfitting is wrong or bad."1 Some· situations, of 
course, are more difficult to judge, but the terms of 
totality and requiredness will always indicate that there is 
a wrong way· and a right way to assess the situation. 
However, certain conditions are necessary for correct 
perception. Here Dyck draws on work done by Wertheimer and 
Asch to call attention to various factors which should be 
eliminated if the gap in the gestalt is to be identified, 
and thus the manner to fill it found. Factors preventing 
correct perception include egocentrism, self-interest and 
ambition; fear, need and other passions; lack of knowledge; 
and restricted imagination or blunted sensitivity.2 This 
leads Dyck to discuss Firth's "ideal observer" theory, which 
would translate an ethical statement, "X is right", to mean 
that X would be approved by an ideal observer who is 
dispassionate, disinterested, omniscient (aware of all the 
relevant facts), omnipercipient (possessing all necessary 
1 Arthur J. Dyck, "Moral requiredness: Bridging the 
gap between 'ought' and 'is' --part II," Journal of Religious 
Ethics 9 (1981 ): 131-150. 
2Ibid., p. 134. 
61 
imagination and sensitivity) and otherwise normal (!). Dyck 
modifies this proposal simply by substituting for the 
emotivist term involved--"approval"--the notion of an 
experienced "awareness" of what is required (or fitting) in 
the situation. 
Dyck's method may be recognised as something that 
actually happens in some situations. But they tend to be 
situations where the morally "required" or "fitting" action 
is relatively easy to identify. Whether or not the method 
is directly applicable to more complex questions--such as 
those confronted in the "grey areas" of homicide ethics--is 
questionable. It is a fairly simple matter to see a hungry 
child and say "bread is missing", and to be led by that 
awareness to an ethical imperative of providing food to the 
hungry or sharing one's wealth (if one has wealth) with the 
needy. But another observer (and who is to say that she or 
he would be.any'less "ideal") might with equal validity look 
at hungry children and say "justice is missing", and the 
ethical imperative of providing justice involves difficult 
questions (such as, in some situations, the matter of 
revolutionary violence) that cannot easily be answered by 
reference to an "awareness" of a gap in the gestalt. 
However, by pointing to what may be done--indeed, I 
would argue, to what IS actually done, even if only 
subconsciously--where moral fittingness is easy to discern, 
Dyck steers us towards an essential factor which, if it is 
present in easy situations, must be present all the more in 
hard ones~ It is the intuitive factor in human awareness 
which is primarily responsible for the perception of gaps in 
the totality and of what is morally fitting. Moreover, if 
62 
it is true that freedom as well as obedience have roles to 
play in Christian morality~ the recognition of intuition 
could solve the methodological problem of finding a link 
between the two. This factor must therefore be taken into 
account in the construction of an ethical method. In fact, 
I shall argue in what follows that the intuitive factor is 
already present in most contemporary Protestant ethical 
models. This does not mean, of course, that such theorists 
as Barth, Fletcher, Yoder and the other giants in the field 
whom I shall cite have a great deal in common in terms of 
the way in which they use or understand (or fail to 
understand) intuition. On the contrary, there are vital and 
irreconcilable differences among their systems. 
Nevertheless, intuition is present in them--whether its 
presence is explicit or implicit, wheth·er or not its 
presence is apparent at first reading, and whether or not 
the creators and users of these models recognise that it is 
intuition at all! 
Ethical intuition may be defined as a non-rational 
feeling or sensation that something is right or wrong. 1 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall attempt to show 
that: 
(1) Social, theological and other rational analysis or 
reflection is only one partner in many of the, modern 
Protestant ethical systems. The other partner is INTUITION. 
(2) The presence of intuition in morality does not 
1Richard B. Brandt, Ethical theory: The problems of 
normative and critical ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 183-189. 
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necessarily lead those who recognise its presence to 
commit the logical fallacies associated with the 
philosophical theory of INTUITIONISM--but the critique of 
that theory provides certain important cautions for 
theological ethics. 
(3) By adapting the proposals of·Philip Wagaman, a 
METHODOLOGY can be developed which gives account of both 
intuition and rationality, and thus acknowledges the roles 
of both obedience and freedom in Christian morality. 
(1) Intuition in ethics 
Awareness of intuition's important role in Protestant 
ethics is nothing new~ I shall give examples in this 
section of how essentially intuitive elements have been 
isolated in the works of the great theologians of this 
century~ 
Intuition plays an important, though implicit, role in 
the work of one of the formative minds in Protestant 
theology in this century. KARL BARTH's approach to ethics is 
an extension of his "evangelical" dogmatics. That is, all 
theology and all morality must begin from the basis of what 
God reveals and how he acts in Jesus Christ. Only from the 
Gospel can principles about God, creation and human beings 
be deduced, and these principles include ethical principles. 
However, God refuses to_be tied to principles--while truths 
can be deduced from the evangelical basis, God still lives, 
reveals himself, and acts in human history; and therefore 
human deductions should not be considered so absolute as to 
tie down the awareness of the one reality which is really 
absolute, that is, God himself. Whatever principles or 
general truths may be deduced, therefore, are subject to the 
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absolute authority of the divine word, and this word will 
always have the possibility of contradicting general 
principles in the Grenzfall, the borderline case where 
people are presented with moral dilemmas under complicated 
and unique circumstances. In such an instance, the general 
rules and all other normal existence are interrupted by 
extreme conditions, and the "divine command" must be 
discerned and obeyed. 
It is in the Grenzfall that intuition can be recognised 
as having an important role in Barth's ethics. Certainly 
Barth does not use the word "intuition" (he would be 
horrified by it). As Williams1 has noted, Barth 
recognises the need for general (rational) principles or 
(again, rational) deductions (from the Gospel) in ethics, 
and, even in the Grenzfall, there is a decidedly rational 
dimension in the manner of discerning the "word of God"~ 
This discernment is, in part, a process of interpreting past 
Christian experience, being accountable in the present, and 
agonising over the future, including the various options and 
their various consequences. It is a responsible decision 
which must be open to the scrutiny of others in the 
community, and made in total humility. On the other hand, 
there is another element in this discernment that is not 
rational but rather intuitive--a "dimension of personal 
address by God • • • [a] mystical aspect of being attuned to 
1Ernest Claude Williams, "A critical appraisal of the 
Grenzfall in Karl Barth's ethics" (M.Th. dissertation, 
University of South Africa, 1981), pp. 116-122. 
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God," as Williams aptly describes it1 • 
One could c~iticise this conception rather severely. 
Yoder2 notes that Barth's argument begins with an appeal 
to God's sovereignty, but ultimately amounts to an 
individual's decision,. leaving as much to the human mind as 
would the reliance on rules. Yoder may even be right in 
suggesting that the Grenzfall is merely Barth's label for 
situations in which he feels moved to make a choice which 
runs against his own principles3--which makes the "di vine 
command" a "resounding phrase" for the goal of human ethical 
reflection, rather than an aid to it.4 The concept of the 
Grenzfall and the "word of God" are probably the vaguest 
points in Barth's theological system, and whatever he ma.y 
have intended by them, the conclusion is inescapable that 
there is a partnership of rational and intuitive elements in 
his method of discerning moral requiredness. 
Similarly, in investigating the method of another great 
mind of this century, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER~ Bennett5 has 
demonstrated that a dialectic of general assertions about 
1Ibid., p. 114. 
2 John Howard Yoder, Karl Barth and the problem of war 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), pp. 70-72. 
3r bid • , p • 7 3 • 
4Ibid., p. 78. 
5 John C. Bennett, Storm over ethics (Philadelphia: 
United Church Press, 1967)', pp. 7-8~ 
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mandates, rights, and life-ethics, on the one hand, and the 
contextual awareness of ethics as not "what is good once and 
for all, but the way in which Christ takes form for us among 
us here and now"~ on the other. In short, this amounts to a 
partnership between the rational and intuitive modes in 
Bonhoeffer's system, very similar both in form and content 
to his contemporary, Barth. 
· The same partnership appears--but now heavily weighted 
in favour of intuition--in the radically different system of 
"situation ethics" pioneered in Christian circles by JOSEPH 
FLETCHER. 1 Fletcher's act-agapism acknowledges no rules, 
and--despite his own protestations to the contrary--few 
principles, except that agape must be the deciding force 
behind moral decisions. Ends justify the means, and love 
discerns the desirable end, apparently simply intuitively. 
Once again, the partnership of rational analysis (of the 
consequences of actions and the dimensions of situations) 
and intuitive knowledge (involving the direction in which 
self-giving love must turn--for example, in the case of 
abortion, whether towards the foetus or the mother) is quite 
clear. 
If one were to construct a spectrum of great modern 
theologians' systems concerning rationality and intuition, 
one might place Fletcher on the extreme left, giving supreme 
weight to intuition, and Barth and Bonhoeffer somewhere in 
the middle. On the extreme right would be the voice o~ JOffi\f 
1Joseph Fletcher, Situation ethics (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1970). 
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HOWARD YODER. 1 Starting from a basis which is totally 
different from the various "mainstreams" of modern ethics, 
Yoder holds that New Testament ethics are of direct 
relevance to modern dilemmas, though not in a 
biblicist-normative way. For him, the cross represents a 
social ethic, spelled out for various situations by Jesus 
himself and by Paul after him. The ethic is one of "radical 
submission": forgiveness rather than hostility, servanthood 
rather than control, and so on. There are certain things 
which he concludes to be totally wrong in the light of this 
ethic, such as killing and power-seeking. But what is the 
content of submission in complicated moral dilemmas? To 
discern the direction to be taken by radical submission in a 
concrete situation, once again, for all his emphasis on a 
concrete and available New Testament social ethic, the 
disciple of Yoder, too, will have to rely on intuition. 
The situationist PAUL LEHMA.L"rn' proposes that ethical 
activity is recognised as such by the fact that it "bears 
the marks of God's transformation of the world in accordance 
with his purposes, of the world's resistance to what God is 
doing, and of God's ultimate overcoming of the world"2 
With God shaping the human condition, in dynamic situations," 
there can never be any action that is "right". Rather, acts 
are "potentially instrumental", re lying on the hope that 
1 John Howard Yoder, The politics of Jesus (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1972). 
2Paul L. Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian context (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 152. 
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1 that they serve God's pu~pose • To act ethically, then, 
requires a faith that is able to read the signs of the 
times, and to recognise God's will. This intuitional 
reliance on faith and hope is somewhat, but far from 
completely, offset by Lehmann's emphasis on koinonia, the 
Christian community, as the context for grace and wisdom. 
Dialogue with fellow Christians becomes a key step in 
ethical reflection. But all Christian fellowships know 
differences of opinion, and the partnership of intuition and 
rationality seems strongly weighted in favour of the former. 
JOHN BENNETT questions the emphasis placed by 
contextualists such as Lehmann and Bonhoeffer on the 
question "what is God doing?", since an easy identification 
of God's action with any particular form of human action 
involves the risk of either radicalism or authoritarianism 
for their own sake2 • Instead, he seeks to spell out what 
Christians can bring to the ethical situation, in terms of 
general criteria (such as the need for order and the need 
for freedom) and more specific objectives (such as 
overcoming segregation and preventing nuclear war). Yet he 
recognises too that the facts and options of any ethical 
situation are unique, and that in some situations where 
objectives and axioms may conflict, there has to be a 
certain amount of "playing by ear" (for example, in the 
conflict between preventing nuclear war and deterring 
1 I bi d • ;- p • 1 44 • 
2 Bennett; p. 9. 
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aggression). In these situations, one must "hope that the 
decision makers never abandon deep concern for either 
objective"1• Thus while the role of intuition in 
Bennett's framework may be more limited than in those of 
other contextualists, he, too, clearly recognises a need for 
flexibility. What, after all, does "playing by ear" mean if 
not a certain reliance on intuition? 
Finally, the partnership of rationality and intuition 
unashamedly pervades the system of IAN T. RAMSEY, a 
Christian ethicist with a strong philosophical bent. He 
holds that situations are composed of facts and values, 
necessitating scientific analysis to clarify the facts, 
whereas value claims must be intuited2 . When analysis and 
intuition come together, there is a "disclosure" experience, 
"the penny drops", situational understanding becomes 
something more than spatio-temporal; and the facts "come 
alive", claiming and demanding a response. 3 It is not 
entirely clear what Ramsey means by the "disclosure" of an 
"odd discernment", but it seems to be a surprising awareness 
of some knowledge, without being aware of why one knows this 
thing. That certainly amounts to an intuitional complement 
to rational analysis. 
1Ibid., p. 20. 
2 Ian T; Ramsey, Christian empiricism (London: Sheldon 
Press, 1974), pp. 50-54. 
3rdem, Religious .. lan~a:@: An empirical placing of 
theological phrases (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 26. 
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This brief survey of some contemporary methods of doing 
Christian ethics has been far from exhaustive. Some 
important names have, inevitably, been neglected: names like 
Helmut Thielicke, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, Jurgen 
Moltmann, Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, H. Richard 
Niebuhr, and others. But the sole purpose of the summary I 
have provided has been to show how wide-ranging are the 
theories which witness to a partnership of the rational and 
the intuitive in Christian ethics. 
It is my view that the partnership cannot in fact be 
avoided--at least not unless Protestant ethics returns to 
the false security offered by casuistic legalism. Though 
sometimes the certainties of casuistry seem whimsically 
attractive, they offer only a false security, because 
casuistry rests upon at least three false assumptions. 
First, there is the assumption that there is enough 
similarity between ethical problems of a particular type to 
allow the formulation of rules of behaviour which will be 
applicable to all problems of this type. This assumption is 
false because people are unique, and moral dilemmas 
inevitably arise when unique people find themselves 
confronted by situations which are unprecedented simply 
because they involve those unique people and others who are 
equally unique. To categorise human situations in an 
inflexible way necessarily involves categorising people, and 
thus denying their individuality, their complexity, and 
their unique responses and responsibilities. The unique 
individuality of human beings is a necessary part of what 
it means to say that people have the image of God--and the 
unpredictability of people (as of God) is a necessary 
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consequence. 
A second assumption behind casuistry is that actions 
have value in and of themselves. But the moral critique 
which can be said without exaggeration to pervade the 
teachings of Jesus in the Gospels is that actions are given 
value at least partly by motives, attitudes and consequences 
concerning people's needs. At least that much can be said 
to be self-evident from Jesus' attacks on pharisaic 
legalism. From this perspective verbal abuse is as serious 
a sin as murder (Matt. 5:21-22); sacrificial generosity is 
as essential as obedience to the commandments (Mark 10:17); 
a widow's mite is more precious than wealthy people's large 
sums (Mark 12:41-44); it is superficial judgement which 
condemns the healing of a person in contravention of sabbath 
law (John 7:23-24), and so on. 
~ 
The third assumption behind casuistry is that in any 
given situation ethical choices will be clear, and options 
can be classified (either at the time or afterwards) as 
clearly right or wrong. In fact, there are many actions 
which cannot be so classified, even with the benefit of 
hindsight. For example, was it "right" or "wrong" to use an 
atom bomb to bring the Second World War to a swift end, thus 
saving perhaps as many lives as may have-been lost? This 
question. is still debated today by people of goodwill. 
Whatever one's opinion, the issue is not a simple one. The 
same is true of a great many moral decisions--and as it 
happens all moral decisions have to be made without the 
clearer vision of hindsight. One has to recognise that 
serious problems of morality tend to involve not 
black-and-white truths but (in Fletcher's now-classic 
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phrase) the "penumbra of conscience". 
But apart from these false assumptions behind the 
purportedly rational ce.rtainties offered by casuistry, there 
is a more basic reason for accepting the partnership of 
rationality and intuition in theological ethics. As 
Friedrich Schleiermacher has shown, religion has its roots 
in a consciousness of dependence, and. a consequent 
experience of obligation. To experience oneself as 
dependent on a transcendent other is to experience a 
transcendent claim on oneself--and this, to Schleiermacher, 
is the essence of religion. Similarly, the experience of a 
prior claim (as Crossley puts it1 ) is the essence of all 
religion, which is why Christian ethics must be grounded in 
theology. Therefore Schleiermacher rightly emphasises the 
relation between feeling and thought. If ethical reflection 
is rooted in the realm of feeling (dependence and claim), 
how can it attempt to isolate itself from intuition? 
Indeed,. intuition is the necessary "leap beyond our thinking 
of particulars in an attempt to know things in their 
wholeness. It reaches in the same direction as thought, and 
then completes thought's quest for 'complete' vision when 
thought reaches its limits."2• Put differently, a sense 
of commitment is a necessary ingredient in making moral 
decisions. Prior to rational reflection, there is a complex 
1 John P. Crossley, Jr., "Theological ethics and the 
naturalistic fallacy," Journal of ,;Religious Ethics 6 ( 1978): 
121-134. 
2As quoted by John Macquarrie, "Schleiermacher 
reconsidered," Expository T ime.s 80 ( 1969): 198. 
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of feelings, values and other largely intuitive factors 
without which there would be no commitment to ethical action 
and thus no decision to be made at all. 
Macquarrie has pointed out that a missing element in 
Schleiermacher's work is any notion of thought having a 
critical function with regard to feeling or intuition. 1 
Is there not a sense in which reflection on actual 
experience must support--or falsify--what one believes? 
Yoder asks of Barth's (intuitional) divine command: "How do 
we test the spirits?"--that is, how do we know that the word 
supposedly of God is truly of him?2 Barth provides no 
answer, and, it seems safe to say that for Barth there are 
no precautions at all. 
Nor are hard-and-fast guarantees possible, short of 
casuistry. But to recognise that there is a partnership of 
rationality and intuition in theological ethics is not to 
say that intuition must simply be accepted uncritically. 
Yoder's question about testing the spirits is a serious and 
valid one, and deserves an answer (even if Yoder hinself, as 
I have shown, does not avoid the.problem in his own 
proposals). 
The role of intuition in morality has been extensively 
explored within the realm of the philosophy of ethics, and 
in order to clarify the.nature of the partnership being 
identified here, it is helpful to examine the deba.tes that 
have taken place within that discipline. 
1Ibid., p. 199. 
2 Yoder, Barth, p. 48. 
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(2) Intuitionism: a philosophical critique 
Because of the complexity of the meta-ethical field, it 
is important to recognise at the outset of this section of 
discussion that the intuition debate cannot be treated 
exhaustively here. The meta-ethical debate is a many-sided 
one, with the various protaganists often, though not 
without difficulty~ grouped into three camps: naturalists, 
non-naturalists--among whom the intuitionists represent the 
most influential party--and non-cognitivists. Even within 
the group loosely called intuitionists, the use of the term, 
intuition, is far from unambiguous. 1 
The NATURALIST approach, which was pioneered by Hobbes, 
is to identify moral terms (such as "good", "right", "ought" 
and so on) .with non-moral or empirical terms (such as "that 
which satisfies desire" or "that which ensures survival"). 
Ethical statements thus become empirically verifiable. 2 
NON-NATURALISM was a reaction against naturalism. 
Non-naturalism holds that ethical concepts cannot be defined 
in terms of natural or empirical concepts. Nevertheless 
"good" and "ought" and so on are, indeed, properties, and 
some things and actions have these properties--but they are 
1For example, four distinct usages of intuition are 
listed by T.A. Roberts, "Bishop Kirk and modern ethical 
intuitionism," Church Quarterly Review 167 (1966): 30-33; 
but the distinctions are unnecessary for the purposes of the 
present study. 
2 Encyclopedia of philosophy, 1967 ed., s. v. "Ethics, 
problems of," by Kai Nielsen; see also the article s.v. 
"Ethics, history of," by Raziel Abelson and Kai Nielsen. 
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non-natural, non-empirical and indefinable properties. · The 
question then becomes: "If an ethical property is not 
empirical, how can it be recognised?" In answering this 
question, non-naturalists are divided into two groups. Some 
pursue the RATIONAL INSIGHT theory, which says, in effect, 
that "we just know rationally what is right". Most, 
however, are INTUITIONISTS, holding that "we sense, or feel, 
what is right". 1 According to intuitionists: 
• . • Our basic principles and value judgements are 
intuitive or self-evident, and thus do not need to be 
justified by any kind of argument, logical or 
psychological, since they are self-justifying or, in 
Descartes's words, "clearly and distinctly true". 2 
The third broad grouping of meta-ethical approaches is 
NON-COGNITIVISM. Together with intuitionists, 
non-cognitivists deny that ethical concepts are verifiable, 
definable or identifiable with natural or empirical facts. 
But non-cognitivists also deny intuitionism's tenet that 
"rig.}it", "good" and so on express properties actually 
possessed by things or actions. Rather, these concepts are 
expressions of attitude or intention, or imperatives of 
perceived duty (the precise nature of ethical concepts 
varies among non-cognitivist theories, but they are always 
by nature subjective utterances). 3 
1 Brandt, pp. 183-189~ 
2 William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 102. 
3Encyclopedia of philosophy, s. v. "Ethics, problems 
of". 
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The intuitionist view can thus be identified most 
clearly by contrasting it to the other two major schools. 
Unlike non-cognitivists~ intuitionists hold that ethical 
statements refer to actual properties which actions and 
things can have~ But unlike naturalists, intuitionists 
declare that these properties are indefinable and 
non-empirical, and thus ethical statements are unverifiable. 
The most prominent intuitionist, G.E. Moore, expresses it 
this way: primary ethical terms are "simple" (that is, 
indefinable), and therefore only by means of intuition can 
one attain knowledge of the properties these terms describe, 
and of which things or acts possess them. Tn this, ethical 
terms are not really unique, according to Moore. One can 
say with certainty that a table is "yellow" without being 
able to define yellowness, or prove the veracity of the 
statement to someone who doubts the yellowness of the table. 
If someone is colour-blind~ that person may not recognise 
the table as being yellow, and this may lead to an argument 
over its alleged yellowness--but "yellow" remains a 
description of an actual, objective property. In the same 
way, one "simply" knows that a certain act is "good". If 
arguments arise over whether or not it is good, that is not 
because of any lack of objectivity of the term "good", but 
because one or both parties to the argument has an 
"incorrect intuition" about whether that particular act 
1 possesses the property of goodness. It follows, of 
course, that arguments over ethical presumptions can never 
' 
1 Roberts, pp. 34-35; Encyclopedia of Philosopny, s.v. 
"Ethics, history of". 
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be settled, .because there is no way of knowing which 
intuition is correct--if any! 
The theoretical basis of intuitionism lies perhaps most 
fundamentally in the rejection of what Moore called a 
"naturalistic fallacy": the tendency in naturalism to 
identify moral goodness with a natural (observable) 
property~ and then equate the two in a definition. According 
to Moore~ this is a fallacy because moral goodness is a 
"simple", unanalysable quality, whereas the qualities which 
naturalists identify with moral goodness are "relational" 
(such as conduciveness to pleasure, capacity to arouse 
interest, and so on). The logical fallacy lies in 
identifying a simple quality with a relational quality, 
which Moore says is logically impossible. "Yellow" is as 
simple as "good", and "yellow" cannot be defined in 
relational terms. It must simply be accepted as a given 
reality, and the same is true of "good". But this 
characterisation of moral goodness as "simple" is an 
aasumption by Moore. It, too, cannot be proven--perhaps it, 
tco rests upon an intuition! Certainly it does not rest 
solely on the so-called "open-question argument". This 
argument shows that whatever naturalistic identification is 
made for moral goodness, the question can always be asked 
whether the thing identified is, in fact, "good", and the 
question will not be tautologous. (For example, if a 
naturalist says the pre-ser-v-ation of life is good, the 
qu.3stion can sensibly be asked "is the preservation of life 
always good?") This does not prove, however, that ethical 
qualities are "simple"--only, perhaps, that they are too 
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complex to be identified with one particular thing. 1 
Moreover, what on earth (or in heaven) is a "non-natural 
property"? Yellowness is very different from goodness 
precisely because yellowness is empirically demonstrable (by 
means of the physics of light). The intuitionists have 
failed to provide a really satisfactory answer to that 
question; merely insisting that the truth is self-evident. 
Yet it is clearly not self-evident--as witness the 
considerable amount of argument among philosophers as to 
whether or not there is such a thing as intrinsic goodness, 
and if so~ what it is. Primarily because the intuitionists 
have failed to provide a comprehensible and plausible 
description of what they mean by a non-natural quality, 
intuitionism is not a popular solution to the meta-ethical 
problem today. For practical purposes, too, pure 
intuitionism leads inevitably to a sense of uselessness in 
ethical argument, since there is no way to test whether a 
concept of, or statement about, moral goodness is a correct 
or incorrect intuition~ In denying that ethical statements 
are evaluative (as opposed to descriptive), intuitionists 
effectively remove themselves from any possibility of 
rational debate about normative statements. 
For all these reasons, I suggest that intu.itionism's 
appeal to transcendent or objective revelation of what is 
good or right should be rejected. However, this does not 
necessarily mean accepting non-cognitivism's resignation to 
ethical statements as m~rely subjective statements of 
1Philip Blair Rice, On the knowledge of good and evil 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 42-58. 
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attitude. 1 Frankena has appealed for a sensible theory of 
meta-ethics which recognises that ethical language is a 
language of approvals and disapprovals, in which we may 
"express our sentiments • • • and put them out into the 
public arena for rational scrutiny and discussion." Left 
there, his statement would seem to be a form of emotivist 
non-cognitivism, but if "rational scrutiny and discussion" 
includes certain naturalistic elements--that is, certain 
identifiable, observable things which are argued to be 
generally desirable or undesirable consequences of 
acts--then the way seems to be open towards an ethical 
method which would meet the needs that have been recognised 
so far. This would have to be a teleological ethic which 
incorporates intuitions or non-cognitive feelings (there is 
not a significant difference between the two, once the idea 
of objective moral properties is rejected). This does not 
overcome the open-question problem, but to say something is 
generally observable as a desirable end is not to say it is 
always so. Thus, for example, one might say that the 
preservation of life is generally a desirable consequence of 
actions. This does not provoke the open-question rebuttal, 
as it concedes that the "generally" desired end is not 
absolutely identifiable with moral goodness. It does rely 
on a pre-rational assumption about the preservation of life 
being at least a generally good thing, but few if any would 
argue with that. 
This excursus into meta-ethics was undertaken out of a 
desire to explore the theoretical plausibility of a method 
1 Frankena, p. 108. 
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of ethics which gives account of the partnership between 
rationality and intuition in moral reflection. It would now 
appear that the quest for an ethical method is a matter of 
setting out a methodology which allows for general 
presumptions to be made, but also for teleological 
exceptions to the rule. That is no small challenge: if, as 
I have argued, rationally accessible concepts are to have a 
critical role vis-a-vis intuitional evaluations, what would 
such a method look like? 
(3) Towards a methodological solution 
Philip Wagaman has outlined a method which, I believe, 
exactly meets the need just described. Intuition, according 
to Wagaman, wi~l ___ always play some kind of role in moral 
judgements--partly because of the general need for speed in 
making these judgements, and partly because of the unique 
complexity involved in eyery moral situation. But Wagaman 
recognises the need for rational reflection to be critical 
of intuitional leanings, both before and after the leap of 
faith which is involved in every difficult moral decision 
and action: 
Before, [rational reflection] can prepare us for more 
faithful, loving, dependable intuitions, so that when 
we move intuitively it will be instinctively in the 
right direction. Afterwards, it can help us analyse 
our intuitions, assessing their inadequacy, correcting 
1 
our errors. 
Wogaman's method thus aims to provide for rational criticism 
of, and even rational formation of, intuitions. He proposes 
th f +h d , . , e use 0 mev. 0 o~og1ca~ 
1w - 20 ogaman, p. • 
presumptions, that is, biases 
81 
against which other alternatives "bear the burden of 
proof". 1 Wogaman believes everyone operates on the basis 
of presumptions of this kind--even if unconsciously. Many 
of one's presumptions are instinctive, instilled in early 
life. Others are.the products of reflection on experience. 
The concept of a "burden of proof" is, of course, a forensic 
one, but for Wogaman it has a connotation of 
rule-utilitarianism: the moral presumption must prevail 
unless it can be shown that greater good will result from 
the exceptional stance than from following the direction 
indicated by the presumption. Wogaman's notion of 
"presumptions" is, however, distinct from the notion of 
"rules". A presumption is more like a "rule-of-thumb", 
which stands until it is clearly outweighed by utilitarian 
proofs. 
As a method of Christian ethics, ·Wagaman' s proposal 
allows for ethical presumptions to be derived. from 
theological reflection (in dialogue with other human 
sciences), without being inflexible in those uniquely 
complex situations which produce moral dilemmas--and moral 
intuitions which may be right or wrong. The difference 
between this and looser concepts like Barth's Grenzfall has 
to be clearly understood. It is true that Barth's general 
deductions from the Gospel are the theoretical equivalent of 
Wogaman's presumptions. But whereas Barth consciously 
decides to put his deductions aside when he seeks the divine 
command in the Grenzfall, Wogaman's presumptions stand as 
valid until they are proven invalid by utilitarian 
1Ibid., p. 40. 
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considerations in the specific context. 
Since it appears to meet the need I have described, 
I shall adopt--and thereby test--Wogaman's method in this 
study. At this methodological stage, there is no need 
to be unduly concerned with the content of Wogaman's presumptions. 
It will, of course, become necessary to specify the presumptions 
which are appropriate to a study specifically of the ethics 
of homicide, and a beginning will be made on that task 
in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, a brief survey of Wogaman's 
main presumptions is appropriate here, in order to give 
flesh to the theory which will so centrally affect the 
rest of this thesis. 
Wogaman suggests four key positive presumptions for 
all Christian ethics. These are: that created existence 
is good, that individual life has a high value, that humankinq 
is called to unity, and that persons are equal before God. 
Therefore burdens of proof weigh against actions which 
corrupt the natural order, against all homicide, against 
exploitation and discrimination among nations and races, 
and against structural inequality. 1 
There are also negative presumptions, which are derived 
from the limitations of the human condition. Human finitude, 
and human sinfulness, are presumed. The effect of these 
two negative presumptions is to call into question any 
social policy which depends on the assumption that people 
will always do the right thing, and to suggest a need for 
two compensatory presumptions. The first calls for a 
1 Ibid., pp. 73-104. 
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burden of proof against self-interest. It presumes that 
people are selfish and tend to their own gratification. 
The second is a presumption for the underdog: it presumes 
that Christian· moral action will tend to empower the weak. 1 
Finally, Wogaman suggests polar presumptions, where 
two opposite values are both necessary, and a burden of 
proof operates against any policy which substantially neglects 
either. Both the individual and the social nature of humanity, 
both freedom and responsibility, both conservation and 
innovation, and so forth, should have a place in moral reflection. 2 
In this study, I shall identify certain presumptions 
that appear to apply especially to the ethics of homicide. 
Against these will be weighed any utilitarian arguments 
for homicide in the "grey areas"--the burden of proof operating 
for the presumptions in all instances. Before these presumptions 
can be identified and applied to concrete issues, however, 
it is necessary to examine the Sanctity-of-Life Principle. 
This is a normative statement that seeks to radically simplify 
the ethics of homicide by providing a clear-cut and well-established 
standard of behaviour. If valid, this frequently-cited 
norm would largely avoid the need to struggle with presumptions 
and greater goods. Unfortunately, I shall show in the 
following chapter that the Principle is fatally flawed. 
1Ibid., pp. 106-115. 
2Ibid., pp. 132-153. Wogaman's method for moral judgement 
also involves presumptions about moral authority, ideological 
presumptions, and social strategic considerations, but 
these are not especially relevant here. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SANCTITY-OF-LIFE PRINCIPLE 
2.1 Life: the most basic human right 
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the 
security of person," states the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 1 It is no coincidence that the right to . 
life is the first specific right mentioned in this document 
and others similar to it. The right to life is widely 
considered to be the most basic of all human rights--so 
basic that other rights pale beside it; "The ri~ht to life" 
has become a catchword for the anti-abortion movement, 
extending the idea of this basic right to pre-natal 
humanity~ War, capital punishment, euthanasia have all been 
condemned from time to time as offences against the right to 
life enjoyed by everyone~ Clearly, of course, life is the 
most basic of rights in the most literal sense: no one has 
rights if he or she is not alive. But the purpose of this 
chapter is to explore the extent to which it can be held as 
a tenable doctrine that there is a universal right to life, 
and to what limitations, if any, such a right may be 
subject. 
1 Amry Vandenbosch and Willard N. Hogan, The United 
Nations: Background, o~gani.sation2 functi.ons, activities 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 430. 
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Normally, the first limitation placed on the right to 
life is some such concept as "innocence", a term that can be 
understood in a variety of subjective or objective senses 
(the range of which I shall explore later in this chapter). 
In some theories, the requirement of innocence is the only 
limitation on the right to life, and the idea that the 
innocent person may have an abolute right to life has become 
known to philosophers as the Sanctity-of-Life Principle. 
This is normally stated as: "One ought never to kill an 
innocent human being." The relevance of this Principle to 
the debates over abortion and revolutionary violence should 
be clear. Relatively few would quarrel with the elimination 
of tyrants who kill and oppress the poor and powerless: what 
bothers most moralists about revolutionary violence is that 
it cannot be surgical. The innocent as well as the guilty 
tend to be harmed in revolutionary events. Similarly, to 
the extent that the qualities and rights of a human person 
can be attributed to a foetus (a complex question to which I 
shall return in Chapter 4), no one could question the 
characterisation of the pre-natal human form as innocent 
(and, of course, archetypically weak). Since it is thus the 
homicide of the innocent that is of special concern in this 
study, there is a need to deal carefully with the purported 
Sanctity-of-Life Principle. 
This thesis began with a reference to Albert 
Schwei·tzer's reverence for life--that "mystery so 
inexplicable that the knowledge of the educated and the 
ignorant is purely relative when contemplating it". For 
Schweitzer, the fact of life and the quality of life (a 
conflict between the two is clearly inconceivable for him) 
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constitute th·e beginning and foundation of all morality. 
The rest of ethics is automatic, and all ethics is 
meaningless without this basic reverence for life. 
Reverence for life (fact and quality) is the.meaning of love 
and of the Great Commandment of Jesus. What distinguishes 
people from the rest of nature is a capability to revere 
life; to have compassion. And preserving life, relieving 
pain, suffering or fear from any creature (human o~ 
otherwise) is both the greatest moral good and the source of 
th t t h . 1 e grea es uman Joy. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a system of 
ethics--still less of Christian ethics--which would not 
promote a reverence for human life in some form or other. 
However obscured a doctrine of Creation might become in a 
world of pai~ and a post-DaMvinian age, the incarnation of 
God as a human being, constituting the foundation of 
Christianity, would necessarily seem to imply a certain 
necessary reverence for human life as something sanctified, 
if not sacred ~ ~· Asking in the most abstract terms, 
"what specifies the values of the self-made man", Ralph 
Wendell Burhoe suggests that the advancement of the living 
system is the goal of all true material and moral 
2 
advances. Life is necessarily on top of any hierarchy of 
values, and moral advances, like those in the technological 
field, will be those which conform to an accurate 
1Schweitzer, pp. 114-125. 
2 Ralph Wendell Burhoe, "What specifies the values of 
the self-made man?" Zygon 6 (1971): 224-246. 
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understanding of the universe, what it will permit, and what 
is viable. 
Like secular philosophers, Christian theologians have 
tended to recognise the fact of human life as constituting, 
at least in broad principle, the most basic right of all. 
The forms in which this recognition appears vary widely 
depending on the specific contextual issue which is being 
considered (abortion, war, self-defence, etc), but is 
usually at least implicit wherever a homicide-related issue 
is under review. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, for example, bases 
his argument upon the divine will exhibited in creating 
human life: 
Since it is God's will that there should be human life 
on earth only in the form of bodily life, it follows 
that it is for the sake of the whole man that the body 
possesses the right to be preserved. And since all 
rights are extinguished at death, it follows that the 
preservation of the life of the body is the foundation 
of all natural rights without exception and is, 
therefore, invested with a particular importance. The 
underlying right of natural life is the safeguarding of 
nature against intentional injury, violation and 
killing. That may sound very jejune and unheroic. But 
the body does not exist primarily in order to be 
sacrificed, but in order that it may be preserved. 
Different and more exalted considerations may give rise 
to the right or the duty of sacrificing the body, but 
this in itself presupposes the underlying right to the 
conservation of bodily ~ife. 1 
1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (London: SCM Press, 
1955), p. 1 31 • 
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This theological principle leads Bonhoeffer to affirm, in as 
pure a form as may be found anywhere in theology or 
philosophy, the Sanctity-of-Life Principle: 
The first right of natural life consists in the 
safeguarding of the life of the body against arbitrary 
killing~ One must speak of arbitrary killing wherever 
innocent life is deliberately destroyed. 1 
In other words, the primary moral rule for Bonhoeffer is the 
Sanctity-of-Life Principle: innocent people must not be 
killed. 2 
The Sanctity-of-Life Principle, then, is present in 
much popular, philosophical, and theological ethics, as one 
might expect to be the case upon even superficial reflection 
on human society~ In this chapter, I shall show that while 
the Principle indeed provides a useful general guide for 
morality, it should be approached with caution when a 
specific contextual dilemma is confronted. 
In seeking clarification of the usefulness or otherwise 
of the Principle, I shall not at this stage attempt a 
history of doctrine on the matter. 'Both in Scripture and 
tradition, theological teaching on homicide has usually been 
contextual: the doctrine has been developed variously, 
1 Ibid., p. 134. 
2Bonhoeffer goes on to explain (ibid., p. 135) that 
the word "innocent" implies one who "does not engage in a 
conscious attack upon the life of another and • • • cannot 
be convicted of any criminal deed that is worthy of death", 
the second clause being a somewhat obscure qualification 
that he does not clarify, except t.o state that his maxim 
excludes neither killings of enemies in war nor capital 
punishment. 
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depending on the specific type of issue being considered 
(e.g •. abortion, self-defence, war). So too, in this thesis, 
the development of these traditions will be clarified within 
the contextual chapters: In the present chapter, I shall 
adopt a more systematic approach, in an attempt to gain a 
lf gi~~; O!'~rview of the broad theological issues raised by 
the Sanctity-of-Life Principle, drawing on the insights 
offered by selected theologians. In this way, I hope to 
show briefly the general usefulness of the Principle, but 
also its limitations, before proceeding to do the real work 
of this study, which is to assess the Principle 
contextually. 
First, though, I am obliged to refute any notion that 
the Sanctity-of-Life Principle might be contained in, and 
proven by, Scripture itself (and thus, perhaps, a matter not 
for any kind of contextual critique, but rather for faithful 
obedience). 
2. 2 Scripture and t.h.e sanct i ty__q_f_l_i_fe 
Do the Judea-Christian Scriptures support an absolute 
right to life for innocents? In attempting to answer this 
question, I shall not pretend to provide a comprehensive or 
consistent picture of all the relevant scriptural 
references. As I have already stated, the Bible is not 
concerned with the Sanctity-of-Life Principle in general 
terms, but focuses on specific issues. Thus I shall attempt 
to be rather more comprehensive in my scriptural surveys in 
Part 2, where I deal with the two focal issues of this 
thesis. Here I see~ to do justice to the "big picture", by 
demonstrating the range of attitudes to homicide which can 
be found in a number of parts of the Bible. 
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Clearly, MURD~R is consistently condemned in the Bible. 
Key texts on this aspect are Exod. 20: 13 and its parallel in 
Deut. 5:17, as well as Gen. 3.10, 9:6, Matt. 19:18 and Mark , 
10:19. However, not all homicide is murder. Exod. 21:12-14 
attempts to state the distinction in a clear casuistic form: 
Whoever strikes a man so that he dies shall be put to 
death. But if he did not lie in wait for him, but God 
let him fall into his hand, then I will appoint for you 
a place to which he may flee. But if a man wilfully 
attacks another to kill him treacherously, you shall 
take him from my altar, that he may die. 
The value of human life is further upheld in Deut. 30:15-16, 
and death is there, in Job 2:9, and elsewhere seen as 
something that happens against God's will. Life is given by 
God~ death is caused by people. 1 Life is not, however, an 
absolute value in the Canon. The guilty and even the 
negligent are liable to lose their lives under the 
provisions of the lex talionis (Exod. 21 :23-25; 22:2-3; 
etc.) though Jesus condemns REVENGE as a motive for violence 
' (Matt. 5:38-48 and parallel at Luke 6:27-36). WAR is 
justified, commanded, initiated and even sanctified by God 
(1 Chron. 5:22; 2 Chron. 6:34; 13:12; 20:22; Psalms 146:1; 
Deut 20:13 Judges 5:4-5; Jer. 6:4; Joel 3:9) and is used by 
God as a means to punish even his own chosen people (Hab. 
1:6; Isa. 10:5ff; Jer. 25:1-9). This is not to say that the 
Canon upholds war as always good. There appears, if 
anything~ to be a bias in the. Canon towards a position that 
1Gerhard H. Ettlinger, S.J., "The value of human life 
in Judea-Christian perspective," in Human life: :problems of 
_birth, of li vi.11g,_and of dying, ed. William C. Bier (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1977), p. 6. 
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while war is often necessary, the taking of life is a 
negative act. David is not permitted to build the temple 
because he is a man of war (1 Kings 5:3). The final 
consummation of time will do awa:y with war (Isa. 2:4; Mic. 
4:3), though by means of war (Dan. 7:10; Zech. 14; Psalms 
110). In the New Testament, soldiers are neither condemned 
nor commended for their profession (Luke 3:14; Matt. 8:5-10; 
Acts 10:1ff). Jesus sees war as inevitable (Matt. 24:6), 
but has harsh words for those who live by the sword (Matt. 
26: 52). Military men are included, by the writer to the 
Hebrews (11 :32) among the heroes of faith. 
It is apparent, then, that the Bible does not support 
an absolute "right to life", but some would respond that the 
Scriptures nevertheless promote an ethic protecting the 
lives of INNOCENTS: the poor, the defenceless, the 
strangers, the widows, and so on. Certainly there is a 
.special concern for the weak and the innocent in the Canon, 
and in every place that they are specially mentioned it is 
as objects of special divine compassion or as ones who are 
worthy of human sympathy. These people are specifically 
protected against homicide in such texts as Exod. 23:7; 
Deut. 21:9; Prov~ 6:16-17; Jer. 22:3 and Wis. 12:3-7. 1 
Throughout the ministry of Jesus the weak and innocent are 
objects of compassion and special concern. But the Canon as 
a whole does not permit an absolute value to be attached to 
the lives of the innocent. For example, in time of war, 
women and children of the enemy nation are liaQle to placed 
10ther important texts include Lev. 
19:9-10,13-16,32-34; Isa. 1 :17; Zech. 7:10. 
·~ 
92 
under the "Ban" along with the able-bodied men and their 
cattle. Here there is a di vine command for the slaugh.ter of 
the innocent! (Jos. 6:17,24; Lev. 27:28-29; Deut. 13:16; 
Judith 16:19) 
To summarise this point, the Canon appears to contain a 
bias against the shedding of human blood, and especially 
against the killing of an innocent or weaker person. But a 
scriptural survey does not in and of itself support an 
absolute right to life: circumstances may, in the minds of 
the biblical writers, call for even innocent people to be 
killed. While supporting general strictures against 
homicide as a high moral value, the Scriptures do not rule 
it out altogether. 
However, it must be admitted that while an analysis of 
the Scriptures is insufficient to justify the Sanctity-of-
Life Principle, the Principle cannot justifiably be 
condemned simply on the basis of a few Old Testament 
references to the punishment of the chosen people's enemies. 
The critique of simplistic attitudes to the use of the 
Bible, outlined in Chapter 1, should be sufficient to steer 
us clear of so easy a rejection of an ethical idea 
which has been accepted by some of history's greatest minds. 
2.3 Bxceptions to the ruleL_~nd 
t~~ . .J2.roblem of self-defence 
There is, then, a broad Scriptural bias indicating 
respect for human life. According to the Jewish theologian 
Immanuel Jacobovitz, this bias translates into an absolute 
rule-deontology of the sanctity of li:f'e: 
In Jewish thought and law, human life enjoys an 
absolute, intrinsic and infinite value. Man is not the 
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owner of his body but merely its custodian, charged to 
preserve it from any physical harm and to promote its 
health where this has,been impaired. 
This principle has both positive and negative 
applications. It turns healing where necessary into a 
religious duty, devolving on doctor and patient alike. 
Conversely, neither patient nor doctor has the right to 
refuse receiving or rendering such medical aid as is 
essential for the preservation of life and health.1 
So, for Jacobovitz, the general responsibility of a doctor 
to be truthful to his/her patient is overshadowed by the 
doctor's responsibility to preserve life, and thus the 
doctor should have "no compunction in suppressing the truth 
from the patient or even in deceiving him" when there is a 
danger that telling the truth about the pattent 's cond·i tion 
could result in a physical setback or in breaking the 
patient's will to live. Moreover, the patient's desire or 
consent is irrelevant to the duty of the doctor to perform 
whatever procedures are necessary in order to save the 
patient's life.2 Here, then, is a true sanctity-of-life 
1 Immanuel Jacobovitz, "The doctor's duty to heal and 
the patient's consent in the Jewish tradition," in Consent 
and medicine: Conversence and divergence in tradition, ed. 
G.R. Dunstan and M.J. Skelton (London: King Edward's 
Hospital, 1983), p. 32. That Jacobovitz is here giving just 
one possible view of Jewish ethics is indicated by the 
participation of rabbis in wars both in Israel and in the 
diaspora--or perhaps, for Judaism as ·for Christianity, the 
ethics of war co-exists with other spheres of ethics (in 
this case, the medical sphere) without necessarily being 
consistent or correlated with them. 
2Ibid., pp. 33-34. It is interesting to contrast 
this position with that taken by the following article in 
the same publication, in which the Catholic moralist Brendan 
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ethic, with the value of human life overriding all other 
considerations. How acceptable this is as a rigid maxim of 
medical ethics is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
But the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how many 
objections can be~ have been, and should be raised to the 
notion of the Sanctity-of-Life Principle as a universal 
social ethic. 
Certainly, qrdered human society depends on some strong 
restraint against the denial of life to one's fellow humans. 
That restraint may have a statutory nature, or be a moral 
teaching, or simply common sense, but it must exist as a 
feature of what some would describe as natural law. It is 
unnecessary to prove, but can be taken as a given, that it 
is at least wrong to take a human life without due cause. 
That is not a subject for debate in Christian ethics in the 
contemporary or any other period. The debate rather 
surrounds the question: what--if anything --constitutes due 
cause for homicide? 
If the Sanctity-of-Life Principle were relegated, then, 
to the status not of an absolute standard but of a general 
guideline or primary value, there would be little, if any, 
debate over it. Clearly, for most people--and certainly for 
all Christi~n theologians--it is usually wrong to take an 
innocent life! I have already shown that in Scripture such 
a general guideline would be well supported. But whether 
absolute or general, the phrasing of the Principle is too 
Soane insists that in the Catholic tradition the decision 
about medical treatment is always shared by doctor and 
patient (p~ 37). 
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vague to be greatly helpful in the ethics of homicide. 
Common-law principles of justice dictate, for example, 
that where an armed man X attacks another man Y, Y may 
respond with violence and, if the attack is serious enough, 
kill X in self-defence. Now if X is attacking Y maliciously 
and with premeditation, then the Sanctity-of-Life Principle 
does not apply in any way, since X is not in any sense 
innocent. But if X is intoxicated or insane, he would 
normally be considered innocent of crime (even if he is in 
.need of therapy). Yet Y would still be considered justified 
in killing him under the principle of self-defence. Thus 
there is a second reason for rejecting the Sanctity-of-Life 
Principle as it is usually stated. Not only is it 
impossible to support as an absolute standard, which it 
purports to be, but the concept of innocence does not 
express well the meaning which society attaches to the 
general principle of the sanctity of 'life. Nearer the mark 
is Marvin Kohl's linguistic re-interpretation of· the 
Sanctity-of-Life Principle: 
Generally speaking, one ought not to kill a human being 
whose existence or actions neither have caused nor will 
cause imminent harm. 1 
This modified version of the_Principle would allow for 
homicide in self-def'ence; in line with most social ethical 
systems. But this matter of self-defence is a critically 
serious problem in the ethics of homicide. It provides the 
basis of many or perhaps most legitimations of killing. If, 
as social norms seem to suggest, it is "natural" to kill in 
1 Kohl~ p. 30. 
96 
order to save one's own life, a reasonable corollary is 
that it would be right to kill in defence of the life of 
someone else. Another consequential argument holds that 
since it is right to kill in self-defence, it is also right 
for a country to wage war in its own defence. And therefore 
it must surely be right for a coun-try to wage war in defence 
of either its own security or that of another country. Most 
wars can be and have, in fact, been. defended by some form of 
this argument. Revolutionary violence, too, is easy to 
justify from this form of argument, since such violence 
tends to arise in defence of the masses against violent 
oppression. As will be seen later, this form of argument 
also has relevance to abortion, where the foetus can be seen 
as a "material unjust aggressor". Thus the not ion of 
self-defence purports to provide not a marginal but a highly 
important exception to the sanctity-of-life rule. This 
calls for a survey of theological reflections on 
self-defence. 
St Augustine, in his letter to Marcellus, upheld 
violence in self-defence, on the basis that its purpose is 
really to benefit aggressors, by teaching them the 
consequences of aggression. It is indeed good to overcome 
evil by good, but this general rule pertains to an inward 
disposition more than to outward actions--so violence in 
self-defence may, if oriented to the benefit of the 
aggressor, be a good Christian act. The State, too, must 
conform to this inward disposition--that is, it must'have at 
heart the interests of all its citizens and even its 
enemies. But with such a disposition, a war can be a 
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benevolent duty, "in order that, by bringing under the yol}:e 
the unbridled lusts of men, those vices might be abolished 
which ought~ under a just government, to be either 
1 
extirpated or suppressed." 
Similarly, St Thomas Aquinas argued that while people 
should be prepared to refrain from self-defence, sometimes 
they must exercise it for the common good or for the sake of 
2 their opponents. In another place, Aquinas uses the 
principle of defence of society as a reason for capital 
punishment: 
If, therefore, the well-being of the whole body demands 
the amputation of a limb, say in the case where one 
limb is gangrenous and threatens to infect the others, 
the treatment to be commended is amputation. Now every 
individual is as it were a part of the whole. 
Therefore if any man is dangerous to the community and 
is subverting it by some sin, the treatment to 'be 
commended is his execution in order to preserve the 
common good, for "a little leaven sours the whole 
lump". 3 
In short, one person's rights--including his/her right to 
life itself--may only be upheld to the extent that the 
rights of others are not interfered with. St Thomas and St 
Augustine were b·oth aware of the tension between 
self-defence and the Gospel of a God who, as a man, died 
without defending himself. Self-defence is not justified by 
these theologians because it is a natural instinct, but 
1 M . arrin, p. 64 
2 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae (London: 
Blackfriars, 1975), p.85. 
3Ibid•, p. 23. 
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because it can benefit either the attacker or the common 
good. There is a certain amount of strength in the argument 
from the common good (callous people would have free reign 
in society if good people were unwilling to defend 
themselves and others) but it is difficult to see how anyone 
can be helped by being killed! This ambiguity, however, 
only highlights the trouble which is presented to Christian 
theologians by the notion of self-defence. 
If one turns from the most influential historic voice 
of Roman Catholic orthodoxy to the most important 
Evangelical theologian of the present century, one finds the 
problem expressed quite clearly. In principle, Karl Barth 
had no hesitation in affirming that the time can come when a 
person must kill in obedience to the divine command. Human 
life is not valued for its own sake, but as something willed 
by God. Therefore it must be acknowledged that not life, 
but God's will, is the supreme value: 
Human life--one's own and that of others--belongs to 
God. It is his loan and blessing. For God has 
unequivocally and fully accepted it in Jesus Christ, in 
the incarnation of his Word. Therefore respect is due 
to it, and, with respect, protection against each and 
every callous negation and destruction. Obedient 
abstention from such destruction, and therefore the 
obedient protection of life, will naturally include 
knowledge of its limitation. It is not divine life, 
but creaturely~ • • • Thus the protection of life 
required of us is not unlimited nor absolute. 
Since human life is of relative greatness and limited 
value, its protection may also consist ultima ratione 
. ..... d 1 "f" 1 in i~s surren er an< sacri ice. 
1 Karl Barth, 9h~_!:_9h Dogmatics, vol. III, pt. 4 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1961), p. 391. 
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orthodoxy does not dismiss but actually defends the 
"natural" position on self-defence against the various 
assaults based on the radical meaning of the Gospel. 
Pope John Paul II has reaffirmed that "Christians have a 
right and duty to protect their existence and freedom by 
1 proportionate means against an unjust aggressor." There 
is no doubt that the "unjust aggressor", who may be justly 
killed by the one threatened, refers no-t only to one who 
threatens life, but also to one who poses a threat to other 
kinds of rights: 
Catholic theology has been willing to equate other 
values with physical human life itself. Manuals of 
moral theology justified the killing of an unjust 
aggressor as a last resort in defense of one's life, 
bodily integrity, spiritual goods "of greater value 
than life or integrity" such as the use of reason or 
conservation of reputation in very important matters, 
and material goods of great value. 2 
Nor need the unjust aggressor be "subjectively guilty for 
what he is doing" 3: the intoxicated or insane person may 
be killed with equal justice if he/she is a "material unjust 
aggressor"--that is~ one who poses a threat to life, health, 
liberty, property and so on, without being morally 
1 Walter Wink, "Entering the fire: violence and 
nonviolence in South Africa," Sojourners, January 1987, 
p .29 •. 
2Charles E. Curran, New.-12.~~~~tives in moral 
theology· (Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1974), p. 
191. 
3Ibid., p. 189. 
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blameworthy. 
However, if an unjust aggresssor is to be deemed 
justifiably killed, there must be clear evidence that he/she 
' 
posed a serious threat to essential rights or values. This 
' is the doctrine of proportionate reason. Pickpockets, for 
example~ may not be legitimately killed by their victims~ 
They are certainly unjust aggressors, but the inconvenience 
or loss they cause to their victims would be unlikely to 
amount to proportionate reason for homicide, which acts 
against a right of far greater value than a wallet or 
handbag: the right to life. 
Of course, Protestant orthodoxy on any matter is more 
difficult to isolate than Catholic orthodoxy. There is no 
evidence of anything like a common position on self-defence, 
and it would be beyond the scope of this study to go 
searching for the range of viewpoints expressed by leading 
theologians of the Protestant persuasion. Nevertheless, it 
is safe to say that the mainstream Protestant churches--as 
opposed to the historic peace churches, such as Mennonites, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, and Quakers--have not been noted for 
preaching against self-defence. In fact, by their silence 
in the face of common law, they appear to accept the 
principle of proportionality, at least implicitly, in regard 
to homicides in defence of life and other values. 
If the idea of proportionality is accepted, then the 
question of self-defence becomes a matter of deciding what 
rights and values are of proportional value to human life, 
in order that one may decide under what circumstances the 
notion of self-defence can give proportionate reason for 
homicide~ Put differently, this could be seen as a question 
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about when a person loses hts/her "innocence", and thus 
forfeits the protection offered by the Sanctity-of-Life 
'Principle. 
Pacifists, of course, reject any such question out of 
hand. Christian pacifists hold that a Christian should 
under all circumstances choose to lay down his or her own 
life; if necessary~ rathe.r tha.n kill another. 1 Pacifists 
go further than the Sanctity-of-Life Principle as 
traditionally stated: the concept of "innocence" does not 
arise, and the concept of an unjust aggressor and the notion 
of proportionality are irrelevant. Homicide in the pacifist 
perspective is an absolute evil: one ought never to kill any 
' 
human being. This represents a fundamental challenge to the 
orthodox positions of Roman Catholi.c, Protestant and secular 
, ethics, and presents a call to strengthen, not discard, the 
Sanctity-of-Life Principle. The nature of this challenge, 
in its various forms, needs to be understood before a final 
1 Is suicide, or the voluntary surrender of one's 
life, a violation of the Sanctity-of-Life Principle? Few 
·viould ar.gue so. The Principle is most usually cited against 
the killing of another person, and a wholly different set of 
arguments applies to a decision concerning one's own life. 
Many (such as Jacobovitz· and Bonhoeffer in their works cited 
above) have argued that one does not have rights even over 
one.' s own life, but where an actual choice has to be made 
between surrendering one's life and killing another, the 
choice of sacrificing one's own would tend to be considered 
an act of moral courage in the tradition of the martyrs, 
rather than a matter of homicide. More usually, of course, 
suicide is not an act of ethical relevance but one rooted in 
despair. In any event, this is not a focal issue for the 
present study. 
-----.. - .. ---·---·---·----·----------~· 
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were followed consistently in a literal way!) 
But the Christian pacifist position is not dependent 
solely on the Sermon on the Mount, nor on other literal 
interpretations of Scripture. Pacifists claim to be 
following the only possible ethic which is true to the-
teaching and example of Christ. This form of argument 
frequently understates the enormous difficulties encountered 
both in ascertaining the actions and statements of the 
historical Jesus and in carrying out the hermeneutical task 
of interpreting the New Testament's relevance to modern 
social issues. Because of these difficulties--and the 
inevitable presence of subjective standards whenever anyone 
seeks ethical guidance in the Scriptures--it should come as 
no surprise that the teaching and example of Christ is 
appealed to by advocates on both sides of the debate on the 
Sanctity-of-Life Principle. St Augustine (who is also cited 
in this regard by Aquinas) argues from Jesus' failure to 
condemn the Roman centurion whose slave was healed, and also 
appeals to the prominence in the Canon of military men from 
David to Cornelius. Of John the Baptist's exhortation to 
the soldiers, he writes: "To be sure, when he commanded 
them to be content with their military wages, he did not 
forbid them to serve as soldiers. 111 However, as Turner2 
says of the argument from Jesus' silence on war, such an 
argument must take second place to the far more central 
1 St Augustine of Hippo, Selected letters, trans. J.H. 
Baxter (London: William Heinemann, 1969), p. 327. 
2Geoffrey E. Turner, "The necessity of Christian 
pacifism," .The Churchman 92,2 (1978): 150. 
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message of "peace, reconciliation, .•• the positive power 
of good." Christ's teaching on love is certainly more basic 
to the proclamation of the kingdom than passing references 
to his acceptance of soldiers as persons~ 
It is in terms of this teaching of love that certain 
South American bishops have rejected recourse to violence in 
the struggle for social justice. Thus the Chilean bishops: 
~ .• At the bottom of this impatient violence there is 
more hate than love, more passion than reason, more 
desire to destroy the present evil than to construct 
the future good. • • • Let us struggle for justice, 
but let us struggle with love. 
Also the Bishop of San Isidro: 
The struggle for justice • • • must not only be judged 
from the point of effectiveness, but also by the spirit 
that animates it. A struggle that will perhaps have to 
be hard, but upright, fair, without hate. Every 
Christian struggle, if it is to be Christian, must 
contain a ferment of love and unity that is stronger 
than hate. 1 
Have these bishops then solved the problem of applicability 
of the Sanctity-of-Life Priµciple? Does the word "love"--so 
indisputably one of the key words in Christ's teaching--make 
it impossible to contemplate the ethical homicide of an 
innocent, thus proving that the P~inciple (or even some more 
stringent formulation) is an inevitable distillate of 
Christian doctrine on this matter? Unfortunately, the 
question is too complex to allow so simple a solution. (As 
will be seen in Chapter 3, the South American bishops 
1 Both statements cited in ~~~e...f!_a..11._e...!~e fails: 
Christ ial'l__ar~rnent~_9E..~~Q.l8-.f!°!!.._~e-~o_lu_~i_<?_I!,, ed. "IDO-C" 
(Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970), pp. 211-214. 
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clearly recognised this complexity in the historic 
statements made at their second general conference, at 
Medellin in 1968.) Even the word "love", so seductively 
simple to pronounce and so attractively inoffensive, is a 
difficult word to apply in ethics. Joseph Fletcher, of 
course, insists that love is a meaningful concept for 
ethics, and he constructs his whole system of "situation 
ethics" around it--though between the pacifism of the 
above-cited episcopal statements and the act-utilitarianism 
of Fletcher there is a wide gap indeed. Love, according to 
Fletcher, is not a sentimental matter, but a matter of 
justice and of all-inclusive self-giving. It would appear 
to be the thrust of Fletcher's system that love is a 
quantifiable criterion, a matter of helping as many people 
as possible while hurting as few people as possible. Where 
Fletcher is right (and the above-quoted bishops are thus 
wrong) is in insisting that Christian agape in the New 
Testament style is less a matter of passion and "spirit" 
than of sacrificial actions. But Fletcher is equally guilty 
of over-simplifying love when he suggests it is a matter of 
doing arithmetic concerning how many people are helped and 
how many are hurt by by a proposed course of action 
(supposing one can predict those numbers with any 
certainty). "Helping" and "hurting" are not simple terms 
either--as the sayings "spare the rod and spoil the child" 
and "hurt in order to help" may suffice to ·indicate. Someone 
has remarked that the Grand Inquisitor, too, regarded 
himself to be motivated by love. 
Far more direct in his treatment of Jesus' teaching and 
example in regard to homicide is Yoder. He writes that 
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Jesus' objections to the Zealot option were not so much that 
it was doomed to failure as the fact that even if it could 
succeed, it could not produce a really new order. By 
subjecting people to causes, the Zealot line "preserves 
unbroken the self-righteousness of the mighty and denies the 
servanthood which God has chosen as his tool to remake the 
1 
world." As will be seen later, Yoder's critique along 
these lines is a potent argument against contemporary 
revolutionary movements. 
In the eyes of pacifists, violence becomes even more 
suspect when Jesus' example is examined along with his 
teaching. Ferguson2 is adamant. that the cross is the 
essential revelation of God and the characteristic Christian 
answer to questions about social ethics. He quotes Gandhi 
as a challenge to those who choose violence: "If you 
Christians rely on soldiers for your safety, you are denying 
your own doctrine of the cross." In a lighter vein, he 
recalls Tom Lehrer's "The Lord's my shepherd, says the psalm 
/But just in case, we'd better get a bomb"3. The cross, 
according to Ferguson, is not a path only for the eccentric 
and the saint, but "the way which is laid upon anyone who 
wishes to be a follower of Jesus." 
1 
_John H. Yoder, ~he ori~inal revolution: Essays on 
Christian nacifism (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 
1971), pp. 24-25. 
2John Fergi1son, T~e polij_ics of love: Tne New 
Testament and non-violent revolution (Greenwood, South 
Carolina: The Attic Press, n.d.), p. 104. 
3Ferguson adds: "In American English, that rhymes." 
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Sadly, again (for the emotive potency and conviction 
of this basic argument for an ethic of radical submission is 
undeniable), the "cross" is no more effective than "love" as 
a magic word to solve complex ethical questions. The cross 
(like happiness in the ditty) is different things to 
different people. While for Ferguson it is an call to 
radical submission, for Burgess Carr it sari.c~i:fj_t3S . 
violence: 
If for no other reasons, we must give our unequivocal 
support to the liberation movements because they have 
helped the church to rediscover a new and radical 
appreciation of the Cross. In accepting the violence 
of the Cross, God, in Jesus Christ, sanctified violence 
into a redemptive instrument for bringing into being a 
fuller human life. 1 
All one can reasonably say about Jesus' own attitude to the 
Cross is that he saw it to be God's will for him, and 
deductions of any ethical relevance, other than that 
Christians must be willing to suffer as the cost of being 
God's servants, are speculative~ 
It must, however, be conceded that what can be known 
and understood of the teaching and example of Christ lends a 
definite weight to the pacifist position. In every place 
where Christ is reported to have taught about matters 
involving conflict between a disciple of his and another 
person, it is the other who snould be forgiven, accepted, 
allowed to have his/her way, even to the detriment of the 
self. Clearly, there is a need for at least a presumption 
1 Excerpt from an address delivered in Lusaka, May 14 
1974, cited in Charles Villa-Vicencio, Between Christ and 
Caesar: 91assic and contempora.!:Y:_ texts on church and s~ate 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: William P. Eerdmans, 1986), p. 177. 
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against self-interest (which includes self-defence) as an 
automatic validation of homicide. The idea that the 
Christological bias towards submission constitutes an 
absolute norm is, however, debatable to sa:y the least. 1 
2.5 Conclusion 
This preliminary discussion of the Sanctity-of-Life 
Principle (preliminary because, as I argued in Chapter 1 , 
the real test of the insights gathered here will be met when 
they are applied to the grey-area issues themselves in the 
remainder of the thesis) has suggested certain tentative 
conclusions about the Principle's validity in Christian 
ethics. It would appear that the Sanctity-of-Life Principle 
is not tenable as an absolute. While the Judeo-Christian 
Bible and Christian thought since the finalisation of the 
Canon, as well as most secular morality, certainly affirm 
the value of human life, and particularly lay emphasis on 
the need to protect the lives of the weak and innocent, 
there does not appear to be justification in those sources 
for an absolute right to life, even for the innocent. It is 
hard to escape from the fact that human life in society 
necessarily involves people in conflicts of rights (that is, 
situations in which the rights of one person conflict with 
those of another person, or in which certain general values 
conflict with other values, and a choice has to be made). 
These situations do n9t lend themselves to easy solutions 
such as is offered in the simple, uncompromising language of 
the Sanctity-of-Life Principle. It is possible that in some 
such situation an ethical choice must be made which will 
result in the death of an innocent person or persons. 
Neither vague appeals to "love" nor emotional invocations of 
1 1 1 
"·the cross" render impressive defences of the Principle, and 
Jesus' own teachings and example have been appealed to by 
those who have argued for both sides of the debate over 
justifiable homicides. On the other hand, it has to be 
recognised that homicide is never--even (or perhaps 
especially) in instances of self-defence--an easy act for 
the Christian to justify. 
In view of the methodological arguments set out in 
Chapter 1, it should come as no surprise that at the end of 
a mainly theoretical survey such as the foregoing, no firm 
conclusion has been reached other than that easy solutions 
are not possible. Rather, meaningful ethical analysis of 
the question of the sanctity of human life will have to take 
place in the context of the issues themselves: in the 
present study, the issues of abortion and revolutionary 
violence. This analysis will be attempted in Part 2, which 
thus becomes, predictably and of necessity, the most 
important part of this thesis. 
Meanwhile, the Sanctity-of-Life Principle is not 
proven. Certainly, a survey of Scripture and theology 
indicates that the taking of a human life is always a 
serious matter, and an act to be contemplated only where 
another life, or lives, or matters of proportionate 
importance to life itself, are at stake. To say such 
homicide can be contemplated under those circumstances is 
not to prejudge the question of whether or not it will be 
justified. All that can be said at this stage is that the 
Principle cannot be allowed to arrest (as it seeks to do) 
the serious contextual consideration of ethical choices 
related to homicide. 
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On the other hand~ the foregoing is sufficient to 
caution us, in the course of those considerations, against 
speaking casually of violence or of abortion, and the 
alleged justifications for those acts, as if we were 
concerned with anything other than one of the most serious 
morally negative acts in the theological lexicon. Writing 
about euthanasia, the Catholic G.C. Goosen (echoing 
Jacobovitz, quoted above) holds that life has "intrinsic 
worth which all accept, although individuals may articulate 
this in different ways. 111 In the same publication, Rabbi 
Abner Weiss cautions that euthanasia in any form involves a 
rejection of deontological standards in favour of 
teleological considerations (a rejection of which he 
disapproves). 2 ·whatever one's views on the merits of 
deontological versus teleological criteria, the same comment 
could be made, I suggest, on all forms of moral killing, and 
it indicates the need for caution; As Kohl has pointed out, 
people have believed they have the right to kill in order to 
protect "almost anything they consider to have great 
value"--including life, property, honour, chastity, liberty, 
religion, moral principles, mental well-being, and general 
well-being.3 In examining issues of homicide, therefore, 
the Christian theologian must be cautious not to charitably 
or sentimentally accept statements and arguments which 
1 G.C. Oosthuizen, ed., Euthanasia (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), p. 27. 
2Ibid., p. 37. 
3Kohl, p ~ 34. 
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purport to justify killing by reference to vague principles 
(such as justice, peace, and so on). Rather, the questions 
should be asked of any alleged justification of a killing: 
What is the conflict of values here? Are the conflicting 
values proportionate? What is to be the prevailing value, 
and why? And is any value here sufficiently important to 
people that it can really demand the elimination of a human 
life? 
PART TWO 
CONCRETE ISSUES 
PROLOGUE TO PART 2 
The focus of this thesis now shifts from broad 
principles of method and substance to actual dilemmas in 
Christian morality. Each of the following two chapters will 
be devoted to one "grey area" issue of the ethics of 
homicid:e. 
In the method I have proposed, which I am now 
proceeding to test, METHODOLOGICAL PRESUMPTIONS must be 
identified. These presumptions will determine where the 
burden of proof will lie in weighing the case made for 
homicide in any context. I shall identify in this prologue 
the presumptions that will be applied to the debates 
contained in Chapter 3 (concerning revolutionary violence) 
and Chapter 4 (concerning abortion). In those chapters, I 
shall attempt to address the two focal issues with the 
utmost seriousness~ in an effort to rigorously test my 
proposed method. I shall then be able to move on, in Part 
3, to assess the degree of success attained in applying the 
method, as well as to draw on the contextual criticisms 
themselves in an attempt to highlight any important insights 
which appear to emerge about the ethics of homicide and the 
sanctity of life. The first task, then, is to identify 
methodological presumptions which will be applied and tested 
in -the following chapters. 
1 1 5 
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not an absolute in theological ethics, and that not even the 
preservation of the life of an innocent person is a 
plausible absolute~ Nevertheless, the discussion in that 
chapter is certainly far from irrelevant to the search for 
ethical values pertaining to homicide. It is not 
inappropriate to restate the conclusion of Chapter 2. While 
the Sanctity-of Life Principle is not proven, biblical and 
theological considerations support a view that homicide is 
always a serious matter; and an act to be contemplated only 
where another life, or lives, or matters of proportional 
importance to life itself, are at stake. It is not 
difficult, then, to identify as a PRIMARY PRESUMPTION of the 
analysis to follow, that HUMAN LIFE IS A GOOD in Christian 
ethics. Thus any attempted justification of any act that 
involves homicide will bear the burden of proving its moral 
necessity on the basis of the greater good. 
There is clearly no other conclusion arising out of the 
foregoing chapters that is as fundamental to the ethics of 
homicide as is that just named as a primary presumption. 
However, a varie·!;y of other· presumptions can be identified, 
which may be described as SECONDARY PRESUMPTIONS, that is, 
presumptions which do not rival the primary one in 
importance or in terms of purpose, but which will serve to 
elucidate and flesh out the primary presumption in analysis 
of actual issues: 
It will be recalled that in Chapter 2, while discussing 
the pacifist ethics of Jonathan Dymond, I_conceded that the 
principle he proposed, which we might describe in shorthand 
as a principle of disinterested love for the other, was one 
117 
which was difficult for the Christian to dispute. Wherever 
Jesus speaks about con:f'licts between one person or party and 
another, it is to this principle that he summons his 
disciples: .love for the other, even the enemy, concern for 
his/her needs over and above one's own (after Christ's own 
example); and so on. Yoder describes this principle as a 
matter of "radical submission"~ Though I have rejected the 
attempts by both Dymond and Yoder to elevate this idea to 
the status of a moral absolute for the Christian, there is 
no disputing its force as a general standard. Thus Wagaman 
proposed what. he called a compensatory presumption against 
one's own self-interest in any decisions where one's own 
tendencies towards selfishness might be expected to be 
expressed."1 This bias against self-interest is of 
sufficient importance to be specified as a secondary 
presumption on the ethics of homicide: that THE INTERESTS OF 
THE OTHER will be presumed to be paramount: the one who 
would commit homicide in his/her own interest will bear a 
special burde'n of proving the act's necessity. 
Wogaman's compensatory presumptions--which he developed 
in the light of his "negative presumptions" about human 
sinfulness and finitude--also include a presumption for the 
interests of the underdog. In assessing the scriptural 
witnesses on homicide, it was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that 
most of these references (though not all) display a special 
concern for protecting the lives of those who are weak and 
powerless: This concern should also be evident in a 
Christian ethic of homicide, taking the form of a 
1 Wogaman, pp. 113-114. 
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presumption FOR THE LESS POWERFUL where their interests 
conflict with those of the more powerful in society. Those 
who seek to justify the killing of powerless people by 
powerful people will bear a special burden of proving the 
necessity of the act~ 
It was acknowledged in Chapter 2 that homicide can 
occasionally be contemplated in circumstances where the 
rights of one person or party conflict with those of 
another. However, it was also shown that the ethical 
resolution of such conflicts should come under the influence 
of the theological principle of proportionate reason. For 
example, the affirmation of the value of human life 
contained in the fundamental presupposition stated above 
cannot reasonably be called upon to bow to relatively 
trivial denials of rights such as might be inflicted by a 
pickpocket. So, all other things being equal, the killing 
of a pickpocket by his/her victim cannot be justified~ Thus 
it will be a presumption in what follows that ONLY AN 
EXTREME DISEQUILIBRIUM OF RIGHTS OF PROPORTIONATE 
SIGNIFICANCE can be a factor in the justification of 
homicide, and thus the burden of proof rests on those who 
would justify homicide because of such an alleged conflict 
of rights. 
The last presumption of commensurate importance to the 
foregoing has been suggested by the discussion of law and 
Gospel in Chapter 1. There it was proposed that there is a 
dual reality in the Christian moral character. The 
Christian believer is a new creature, in the sense of having 
profound possibilities and potentialities for free choice, 
and the same person is also a sinner, who is inclined at 
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times to make the wrong choices and wreak havoc on his/her 
fellow creatures. Thus the Christian needs general 
normative standards, for the sinner's sake, and also 
requires ultimate freedom of conscience, to liberate the 
saint to make the innovative and dangerous choices which are 
part of the responsibility for creation which is expected of 
human beings. This duality suggests what Wogaman calls a 
polar presumption: one which calls the ethicist to taKe 
account of two complementary and opposite truths. Not on]J" 
the methodology of, but also the judgements formed within 
the ethics of homicide should be influenced by a presumption 
for both FREEDOM AND OBEDIENCE--freedom of the Christian to 
follow his/her conscience to the end, and enough moral 
guidance to guard, as far as is possible within the 
limitations imposed by realism, against casual 
justifications of morally serious acts. 
Apart from the primary and secondary presumptions, 
there is a third group of presumptions that appear to arise 
from the theoretical considerations of the first two 
chapters of this thesis. The presumptions at this tertiary 
level might be termed "linguistic", as they primarily 
address matter~ of language and logic. 
A presumption will operate in the proceeding analysis 
against QUANTIFICATION OF COMPLEX CONCEPTS. As seen in 
Chapter 2, there have been attempts to decide dilemmas by 
seeking to quantify love. According to such a method, if a 
choice has to be made between the death of one person and 
the deaths of two people, it would be the one that must die. 
Since such an easy solution is both suspiciously attractive 
and oversimplistic, quantifiable solutions will bear a 
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special burden of proving that they are the appropriate 
solution. 
There will similarly be presumptions against A:BSTRACT 
AND ABSOLUTE GENERALISATIONS. Supposed solutions that seek 
to resolve issues by vague appeals to such concepts as "the 
cross" or "love" will bear a special burden of proof, as 
will solutions which ignore complexities by, for example, 
seeing issues narrowly as homicide issues rather than as 
issues which involve homicide as well as other difficult 
ethical matters. (This cautionary presupposition emerges 
from the discussion of statements contained in the 
Introduction to this thesis. It need hardly be added, given 
the title and focus of this thesis, that attempts to evade 
the issue of homicide, as in certain other statements 
addressed in the Introduction, will also fall foul of this 
presupposition~) 
Similarly, there will be presumptions against: 
* The so-called "slippery slope"--and so the concretely 
likely effects of acts will be considered more relevant than 
the possibly experiential influences of the justification of 
those acts 1 ; 
*Universal solutions--situations are unique, and no 
solution to a concrete problem will be considered 
necessarily applicable to other situations2 ; 
*Supposedly objective solutions to subjective problems 
(facts do not "speak for themselves" but have to be 
1 See pp. 53ff. above. 
2
see pp. 44f. above. 
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interpreted, so, while an objective attitude can helpfully 
be assumed for the sake of discipline, allegedly factual or 
objective solutions to ethical dilemmas should bear a heavy 
burden of proof, as will solutions that are supposed to rest 
upon "accepted norms" of society~ 1 ; 
On the other hand, given what has been said above2 
about the central role of the Bible for Christian theology, 
there will be a presumption FOR any truths or values which 
seem to emerge as reasonably consistent in the scriptural 
witnesses. (This will not, of course, serve to give 
authority to individual texts.) Proposals which seem to 
weigh in against these values will bear a burden of proof. 
To conclude this foreword to the second part of the 
thesis, it is appropriate to summarise these various 
presumptions which will operate in deciding the burdens of 
proof for the ethics of homicide with particular reference 
to abortion and revolutionary violence.3 
TID5 PRESERVATION OF HUMAN LIFE is the desirable end of 
all moral decisions, and any proposal to the contrary will 
1 See pp. 45ff. above. 
2 See pp. 36ff. above. 
3 I do not intend to labour each of these eleven 
presumptions in turn whenever a question is discussed in the 
following chapters. The primary presumption is clearly the 
raison d'etre for the analysis as a whole, and hardly needs 
to be mentioned again until the time comes (in Chapter 5) to 
draw some general conclusions about the conditions under 
which it can be outweighed by calculations of the greater 
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bear the burden of proof. 
2. Secondary pre.sum_:pt~ons. 
2.1 AGAINST SELF-INTEREST: The justification of an act 
of homicide which is in the interests of the actor will bear 
an additional burden of proof. 
2.2 FOR THE POWERLESS: The justification of an act of 
homicide in which the person/group killed seems to have 
access to less social or economic power than the ki:tler(s), 
will bear an additional burden of proof. 
2.3 ON CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS: Where the justification 
of an act of homicide rests on a conflict of rights, there 
will be an additional burden of proving that the conflict 
amounts to an extreme disequilibrium of rights of 
proportionate significance. 
2.4 FREEDOM AND OBEDIENCE: The justification of an act 
of homicide must bear a special burden of proof if it 
declines to take account of both the need for adequate 
good. As for the linguistic presumptions, these will need 
to be borne in mind while conducting all of the discussions 
below, and the reader will quickly notice if I fail to do 
so. It is, then, mainly the SECONDARY presumptions which 
will be referred to explicitly in Part 2 of this 
thesis--wherever I recognise an issue to which one or more 
of these presumptions have special relevance. For example, 
it is obvious that Presumption 2.2 (which calls for a burden 
of proof against killings of the less powerful) could pose a 
special challenge to a "pro-choice" position on abortion, 
but be of less relevance to a revolutionary uprising of 
those who are depriYed of political and economic power. The 
presumptions will, then, be addressed as and when they 
suggest themselves to be significant challenges to a 
position of argument under discussion. 
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general standards of Christian moral behaviour, and the 
freedom of conscience of the Christian person. 
3. Lingu,_is.ti.c presumptions. 
A special burden of proof will operate against any 
argument which appeals to: 
3.1 quantifiable considerations; 
3~2 abstract and absolute generalisations, and 
3~3 "objective" or "factual" solutions to dilemmas, or 
"generally accepted" norms. 
Furthermore: 
3.4 Direct consequences of actions will be presumed to 
have more relevance than alleged long-term effects of the 
acceptance of those actions as legitimate. 
3.5 Situations will be presumed to be unique, so a 
- .. -
special burden of proof will _b.~ar on allegedly "universal" 
solutions to dilemmas. 
3.6 If clear and consistent values can be shown to 
emerge from the Canon of Scripture, then a special burden of 
proof will rest on any proposal that appears to contradict 
those values~ 
CHAPTER 3 
REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE 
3.1 The problem defined 
Revolutionary violence is the first of two ethical issues 
to which the methodological presumptions about the sanctity 
of life will be applied. In this instance (unlike, as I 
shall show, the issue of abortion) there is no need to debate 
whether or not one is faced here with a question of the sanctity 
of life and the ethics of homicide. Homicides may be assumed 
to be an inevitable component of revolutionary violence. 
However, before one can seriously examine the matter from 
the perspective of homicide, one must recognise the force 
of an argument which would, by clear implication, put a question 
mark against any examination of revolution in this context. 
Gill1 has argued that revolutionaries are not faced 
with a choice between violence and non-violence. Their choice 
is between FORMS OF COERCION. All political groups use 
coercion to promote their interests, and the ethics of violence 
should be seen within the true context of the morality of 
1 . 
David M. Gill, Power, violence, and social change (World 
Council of Chuches, n.d.) 
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political coercion--which is part of the ethics of the use 
of power, rather than having anything to·do particularly 
with the sanctity of life. Here it becomes important to 
define certain terms which are central to the subject of 
this chapter, the meanings of which .constitute a rather complex 
problem. The most important terms are "power", "force", 
"coercion", "violence", and "non-violence". 
POWER is rightly and simply defined by Rollo May as 
the "ability to cause or prevent change". 1 By that definition, 
power is, of course, an essential dimension of what it means 
to be a human being in a free, dynamic relationship with 
one's environment. Power is ethically neutral: it can be 
used for good or evil purposes. Types and aspects of power 
range from mere influence over others or over one's environment 
to control over them. 
FORCE is a form of power, and the word is sometimes 
used simply to describe some considerable degree of power. 
However, the most usual and helpful usage is as a way of 
specifying either physical power (the most common association) 
or other forms of power which have the potential of eliminating 
or which seek to eliminate another party's choice, compelling 
that party to do as the possessor of force requires. COERCION 
is closely related to, and sometimes synonymous with, force. 
/As opposed to persuasion, coercion can be defined as the 
use of force to constrain or restrain any person or group. 
(That is, force is the potential which is used in coercion.) 
1Rollo May, Power and innocence: A search for the sources 
of violence (New York: William Norton, 1972), p. 99. 
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The coercive use of force can be direct (when the force is 
actually applied against the coerced party) or indirect (when 
its use is explicitly or implicitly threatened, and thus 
a factor in achieving compliance). It would probably be 
true to say that force and coercion are indispensable to 
social life. The law, for example, has to be backed up by 
coercive power. Thus, like power, force and coercion are 
neutral: they are capable of being used for good or evil purposes. 
VIOLENCE traditionally refers to physical force which 
causes actual harm. Dictionary definitions tend to refer 
to these two aspects: the exercise of physical force, and 
the consequence of injury to persons or damage to property. 
The word is commonly eppsiaered to include not only physically 
but psychologically or morally harmful effects. The existence 
o.f what is often called structural or institutional violence 
is now generally recognised by moralists--David Russell 
finds this to be "no longer at issue", though he offers no 
clear definition of this type of violence. Instead, while 
admitting that "no single definition of violence is entirely 
satisfactory", he suggests a broad definition of violence 
as "the serious abuse of power" 1 . Under this heading he 
includes, for example, the legal destruction of family life, 
and forced removals of people to areas of starvation. 
Russell is indisputably right to describe the latter 
1David Russell, "A theological critique of the Christian 
pacifist perspective, with special reference to the position 
of John Howard Yoder" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Cape Town, 1984), pp. 10-11. 
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things as serious abuses of power, and I think (for reasons 
that will become clear in a moment) that he is right also 
to describe them as violence. But his definition of violence 
as the "serious abuse of power" is unhelpful, for two reasons. 
First, in using the word "abuse", which is by definition 
a negative judgement (meaning literally "bad use"), Russell 
would here seem to prejudge the whole issue of violence by 
saying it is always bad (which is, if the meaning of violence 
is anywhere near its normal range of usage, precisely what 
Russell does not wish to dot). Rather (and Russell clearly 
agrees with this), violence is in itself (as I have already 
acknowledged to be true of homicide) something that can be 
necessary. Not only force and coercion in general but physical 
force has always provided a direct and indirect means of 
law-enforcement for society. To some extent, then, violence, 
like force and coercion in general, is ethically neutral--or 
at least a necessary evil--rather than definitively a "bad 
use" of power. 
The second reason why Russell's "serious abuse" definition 
is unhelpful, is that it is far too broad. For example, 
a Cabinet Minister who makes a huge personal profit out 
of awarding a government contract, would normally be considered 
to have seriously abused his or her power. But this is not 
violence in the normal sense of the word. It is hard to 
see what is wrong with the traditional definition of violence 
as the use of physical force to cause or threaten injury 
or damage (whether or not actual harm is intended). So long 
as "injury" is not defined so narrowly as to exclude economic 
and psychological harm, harm to family life, and so forth, 
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that definition seems adequate. In other words, violence 
is the physical form of force or coercion. (This definition 
will, of course, allow the designation of certain types of 
injustice as structural violence--a term which is, as J.G. 
1 Davies argues, a useful way of describing grave systemic 
injustice which relies on the use or threat of force.) 
In view of the definition I have just accepted, NON-VIOLENCE 
(a term which is not always defined in a s~raightforward 
way) is simply the absence of physical force. As will become 
clear later, this definition would not satisfy certain advocates 
of non-violence as a philosophy of life, such as Gandhi, 
Tolstoy and Yoder. They would want a more positive definition, 
but the question must be asked why in that case they choose 
to describe their philosophy in terms of a negative prefix. 
Rather, as I have found nothing wrong with a straighforward 
definition of violence for the purposes of this study, I 
shall adopt the straightforward definition of non-violence 
as a description not of a philosophy but of certain types 
of activity or strategy--that is, those which do not involve 
the direct or indirect use of physical force or coercion. 
My prime concern is to deal with the ethics of homicide. 
Homicide is a form of violence, which is in turn a form of 
force or coercion, and thus of power. Killings on a large 
scale are without doubt a morally serious aspect of war and 
revolutionary violence, and I have already shown that a primary 
presupposition of Christian ethics must be the intrinsic 
value of human life. Thus it is not only legitimate but 
1J.G. Davies, Christian, politics, and violent revolution 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1976), pp. 130-136. 
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essential to deal with war and revolutionary violence squarely 
in the context of the ethics of homicide, rather than (however 
much more comfortable we might find it) as an aspect of the 
ethics of coercion or power in the broader sense. (This 
is, of course, also in line with the presumption I have identified--
as number 3.2--against linguistic abstractions.) 
Finally, I must define what I mean by REVOLUTIONARY 
violence. If revolution is the overturning of a government, 
form of government or socio-economic system by means of force 
(whether this force is violent or non-violent), then revolutionary 
violence is the application of physical power in order to 
force either a change in government or more fundamental social 
change. It is a particular form of war (WAR is "a contest 
between states, or between parties within a state •.. , 
carried on by arms" 1), and while it has special ethical features 
not typical of wars in general, the analysis must begin with 
the broader question of the ethics of war. 
War as a special problem 
Special features should be recognised at the outset 
when the ethics of homicide turns its attention to the problem 
of war. In war, homicide is promoted from the sphere of 
the isolated incident to the sphere of the norm: killing 
becomes, for the duration of the war, a way of life. Because 
of the normalisation of killings in war, society has come 
to accept war as a prima facie justification for homicide. 
What has happened, in effect, is that the ethics of homicide 
has been turned on its head. Instead of seeing war as a 
1Chambers 20th Century Dictionary. 
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particularly serious moral problem because of the number 
of homicides involved, people have tended to think of killings 
as an unfortunate but necessary fact of life in wartime, 
and of war as having nothing at all to do with the morality 
of homicide. 
As will become clear later in this chapter, the popular 
assumption that war can legitimate homicide, rather than 
homicide rendering war illegitimate, has often been reflected 
in the writings of Christian theologians (at least since 
the time of s:t°~Augustine). It was Karl Barth who most dramatically 
turned the focus back onto the issue of killing. Barth, 
as I have shown, 1 was not a pacifist. It would have been 
impossible for him to be an "-ist" of any kind, since his 
radical ethic of obedience to God alone left him no room 
for absolute obedience to any abstract principle. Yet, 
as Yoder points out, Barth was 
the only European theologian of his stature in modern 
times to have gone as far as he did towards the position 
(pacifism) he criticises. He declares the the pacifist 
case to be "almost overpowering", even though he cannot 
accept it fully. 2 
Yoder describes Barth's analysis of war as 
a merciless critique of the complacency with which traditional 
theology has always justified war.3 
Indeed, Barth himself has written on the strength of the 
1 See p. 98 abcve. 
2Jchn H. Yoder, Karl Barth and the problem of war (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1970), p. 51. 
3Ibid., p. 37. 
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the pacifist position: 
If Tolstoy and Gandhi were wrong, they were a hundred 
times nearer the truth than the primitive gospel of 
the mailed fist and all the doctrines which have tried 
to blunt the edge of (Jesus'} sayings (against self-defence} 
by the sophistical distinction between a sphere in which 
they are valid and another in which they are not. And 
it would have been far better if history had known more 
of the exaggeration of Tolstoy and Gandhi than the opposite. 1 
In declaring that homicide in war was not more excusable 
but more morally problema~ic than in peacetime, Barth was 
responsible for a "revolution" in the theological ethics 
of war. 2 Barth gave three reasons for this declaration. 
First, war involves everyone in the nation both in the process 
of inflicting suffering and in being victims of suffering. 
Second, killers in war are acting under orders, and their 
victims are other people who are acting under orders. And 
third, apart from hbmicide, war demands that "almost everything 
God has forbidden be done on a broad front"--soldier~ and 
their leaders must steal, destroy property and nature, lie 
and deceive, slander, and "unfortunately to a large extent 
fornicate". For these reasons, Barth held that a Grenzfall3 
in the case of war could only be conceived with even greater 
reluctance than in any other cases involving homicide. 
Geoffrey Turner, a Christian pacifist, has explained 
with admirable conciseness the special problem of war. War 
has no rules except its own. It is impossible to conduct 
1Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III, part 4 (Edinburgh: 
T and T Clark, 1961), p. 430. 
2 Yoder, Karl Barth, p. 38. 
3see pp. 63-65 above. 
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a war along lines of general morality--victory is won at 
the cost of dispensing with scruples: 
A state cannot go to war with reservations, unless, 
that is, it goes to war saying "we would rather be 
defeated than do ••. " Such a view is impossibly romantic 
and nineteenth-century. War is not a matter of morality; 
it is a matter of calculation. Once you have admitt~d 
the allowability of war, you must accept any step which 
that implies. 1 
Moreover, as Burtchaell points out, in war "the level 
of savagery is always determined by the more ruthless party." 
While some countries might abide by war conventions--"in 
a word, they agree not to use certain types of cruelty only 
because they would rather not suffer them in return"--in 
any war, one party determines how far any given type of terror 
> 2 
will extend, and the other must respond in kind, or lose. 
All, as the saying goes, is fair in war, at least! Winston 
Churchill, expressing the British national mood for harsh 
retaliation agains_t the German Blitz, made this clear:, "There 
are no sacrifices we will not make, no lengths of violence 
to which we will not go .•• " to achieve victory.3 (And 
the fire-bombing of non-industrial civilian centres like 
1Geoffrey E. Turner, "The necessity of Christian pacifism," 
The Churchman 92, 2:152-153. 
2James Tunstead Burtchaell, C.S.C., Philemon's problem: 
The daily dilemma of the Christian (Chicago: ACTA Foundation, 
1973), p. 115. 
3Albert Marrin (ed.), War and the Christian conscience: 
From Augustine to Martin Luther King, Jr (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1971), p. 147. 
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Dresden proved he meant it.) 
How may Christians respond to a moral problem of such 
magnitude? The Mennonite scholar John Howard Yoder (without 
whose analysis of war and Christian social ethics in general 
no study of these subjects today would be complete) suggests 
that there are four possible responses. First, there is 
the possibility of outright rejection of war--this we 
call pacifism (and it is Yoder's chosen option). Second, 
there is the possibility of sanctification, the opposite 
of pacifism. The sanctifying option holds that war, or at 
least a particular war, is not only right but blessed and 
holy. (This response was typified by the Crusades, but is 
seldom expressed today.) A third possibility is the view 
which, in effect, gives a blank cheque to the ruler of a 
state. According to this view, if a legitimate authority 
declares war, the Christian has a duty to participate in 
the war--"my country, right or wrong" .. (This response is 
common to the orthodoxies of both Protestantism and Catholicism.) 
The fourth and final possibility is the response of restraint. 
In this view, a war can be classified as either just or unjust, 
and only a just war can demand Christian participation. 1 
Yoder suggests convincingly that the just-war theory 
is the one accepted explicitly or implicitly by most modern 
Christians of all persuasions. As such, it will be examined 
carefully later in this chapter. First, however, it is 
1John Howard Yoder, "A critical evaluation of traditional 
Western moral thought on war and violence" (occasional paper, 
publisher unknown), pp. 1-4. 
134 
necessary to attempt to gain some understanding of how the 
just-war approach came to achieve its prominence. 
3.2 Towards the just war 
Ideally, any survey of Judeo-Christian attitudes to 
participation in war and political violence should begin 
with the positions taken by biblical witnesses. However, 
·there is no evidence that any Old Testament or New Testament 
writers were interested in debating the ethics of war. As 
was shown in the biblical survey undertaken on the Sanctity-of-Life 
Principle in Chapter 2, 1 no firm conclusion about the ethics 
of homicide can be considered as having biblical support. 
In the absence of specific guidance on the matter, some have 
drawn conclusions from the relatively neutral references 
to soldiers by John the Baptist, Jesus, and the writer of 
the letter to the Hebrews (Luke 3:14; Matt. 8:10; Acts lO:lff; 
Heb. 11:32), but the fact that most clearly emerges from 
the New Testament and other early sources is that soldiering 
was simply one profession among many, rather than a special 
moral dilemma, in the apostolic age. 
This should not come as a surprise, as Cadoux points 
out. Jews and slaves--from among the number of whom most 
of the earliest Christians came--were exempt from military 
service under Roman rule, and the few converted soldiers 
were hardly likely to come to a sudden realisation that their 
religion was in conflict with their profession. 2 
1on biblical attitudes to war, see especially pp. 90-91 above. 
2cecil John Cadoux, The early church and the world: 
A history of the Christian attitude to pagan society down 
to the time of Constantine (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1925), p. 116 
135 
What happened in the first four centuries after the 
time of Christ is difficult to say, because of a lack of 
evidence concerning the Christian attitude to war. Some, 
such as Cadoux, hold that it was not long before a clear 
antipathy towards war began to .emerge. Such historians point 
to one of the earliest Christian apologists, Justin, who 
wrote in no uncertain terms that Christians were people who 
had turned away from war and were now "sociable, and pray 
for their enemies". 1 According to Cadoux, this awareness 
of a conflict between the Gospel and participation in war 
grew in the period of the great early theologians, until 
the middle of the third century. St Cyprian condemned the 
horror of wars, wr~ting that 
homicide is a crime when individuals commit it (but) 
it is called a virtue when it is carried on publicly. 
Not the method cf innocence, but the magnitude of savagery, 
procures impunity for crimes. 2 
Tertullian wrote that the fruits of truth, gentleness and 
justice could not imaginably be produced by the sword--rather, 
"deceit, harshness and injustice" were the product and the 
"proper business" of battles. 3 Christian teaching was therefore 
that the adherent's duty was to be killed sooner than to 
kill. 4 
This commonly-held view of a uniformly pacifist early 
1Ibid. ' p. 273. 
2Ibid., p. 405. 
3 Ibid., p. 404. 
4Ibid. , p. 425. 
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church is strongly disputed by Helgeland, Daly and Burns. 
They acknowledge that in this era military service was problematic 
for Christians, but they argue that this had nothing to do 
with war or pacifism. Rather, the religious aspects of Roman 
military life constituted the main problem. Soldiers were 
expected to take part in cultic procedures that were incompatible 
with monotheistic Christianity. They were also required 
to carry out savage entertainments, as well as capital punishment. 
It was these religious, social and civil aspects of military 
life that caused Christians to have conscientious problems 
with soldiering, according to Helgeland and his colleagues. 
They find no evidence to support a view that even Tertullian 
was a pacifist. 1 
In the same period, Hippolytus included military service 
in his list of crafts and professions forbidden to--or at 
least discouraged among--Christians. Helgeland, Daly and 
Burns consider this to represent mainly a concern about the 
cultic duties of soldiers rather than their homicidal duties. 
They point out, for example, that secular schoolteaching 
is also on the forbidden list. 2 But Jean-Michel Hornus is 
convinced that Hippolytus's work is an important part of 
a pacifist early Christian tradition, and that antimilitarism 
on the basis of the wrongness of homicide was an official 
and unanimous attitude among the earliest Christians--an 
attitude that was doomed to be watered down by compromise 
until it withered away almost entirely in later Christian 
history. According to Hornus, "the basic disciplinary law 
1John Helgeland, Robert J. Daly, and J. Patout Burns, 
Christians and the military: the early experience, ed. Robert 
J. Daly (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 21-29. 
2 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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of the primitive church which was in force from the first 
years of the third century_until well into the fifth century, 
in Rome as well as in Syria and Egypt" stipulated that: 
(1) Christians and.catachumens were forbidden to join 
the army, 
(2) "anyone who had been a soldier at the time of his 
conversion and who is an ordinary ranker may if necessary 
remain one, but only on condition that he neither becomes 
involved in warfare nor becomes guilty of homicide", 
and 
(3) soldiers of higher rank must give up their positions 
in order to become Christiarts. 1 
Origen was clearly an important early voi'Ce for Christian. 
pacifism. Writing in 248 A.D~, he held that Christ had "made 
homicide absolutely forbidden. He . • . taught that his 
disciples were never justified in taking such action against 
a man even if he were the great'est, wrongdoer." At the same 
time, Origen was able to say (whether or not with his apologist 
tongue in cheek we cannot know) that Christians supported 
2 by their prayers "those who are fighting in a righteous cause•" 
It would appear that for Origeh, at least, the Christian 
ideal was never to take part directly in killing. Writing 
shortly afterwards, Lactantius, too, was unequivocal~ all 
kinds of ~illing, whether legal or illegal, were prohibited 
1Jean-Michel Hornus, It is not lawful for me to fight: 
Early Christian attitudes towards war, violence and the state 
(Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1980), pp. 161-170 . 
. 
2Against Celsus, 3.8 and 8.73, quoted by Helgeland, p. 42. 
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were rooted in a pacifism considered basic to Christ's teachings. 
Alistair Kee is probably mistakenly assuming that kind of 
pacifism when he holds that Constantine (whom he characterises 
as an "anti-Christian Messiah") held an un-Christian position 
in regard to war: 
The Constantinian reversal on violence could not have 
been more radical: as far as Constantine was concerned, 
victories of faith henceforth would not be won by shedding 
blood in martyrdom, but in drawing blood by the sword. 1 
But with the interpretation of Helgeland, the lack of any 
hint of controversy over serving in Constantine's armies 
is no surprise. Christian soldiers would now, for the first 
time, be able to practise their religion freely, and refrain 
from pagan cult. Indeed, the Christian cross now became 
an imperial military emblem, and St Athanasius declared 
that it was not only permissible but praiseworthy to kill 
enemies in battle. 2 The last traces of official ecclesiastical 
hostility to military service now disappeared. Ambrose and 
his fellow bishops went out of their way to support the eastern 
emperor Theodosius in his war against the western pagan rebel 
Eugenius, and saw the latter's defeat as a victory of Christ.3 
By the time Augustine came on the scene in the early 
fifth century, it was already true that, as far as most Christian 
leaders were concerned, to participate in war was nearly 
always a Christian civic duty. To one questioning this, 
1Alistair Kee, Constantine versus Christ (London: SCM 
Press, 1982), p. 125. 
2cadoux, pp. 588-589. 
3 Helgeland, pp. 74~75. 
/ 
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Augustine wrote: 
What, indeed, is wrong with war? That people die who 
will eventually die anyway so that those who survive 
may be subdued in peace? A coward complains of this,. 
but it does not bother religious people. No, the true 
evils in warfare are the desire to inflict damage, the 
cruelty of revenge, disquiet and implacability of spirit, 
the savagery of rebellion, the lust for domination, 
and other such things. Indeed, often enough good men 
are commanded by God or a lawful ruler to wage war precisely 
in order to punish these things in the face of violent 
resistance. In the course of human affairs, proper 
order sometimes forces the good either to command this 
. 1 
sort of thing or to obey such a command. 
The just war was now an idea whose time had come, and 
it was Augustine who was the first Christian theologian to 
"really work • • • his way through the whole problem of violence 
and war." 2 His just-war theories were developed by St Thomas 
Aquinas, and the notion became part of both Catholic and 
Protestant orthodoxy.3 To the content and contribution of 
these theories I shall return below. Here it is sufficient 
to note that the acceptance by mainstream Christian orthodoxy 
1Against Faustus, 22.74, quoted by Helgeland, pp. 81-82. 
2Trond Bakkevig, "The doctrine on just war: relevance 
and applicability," Studia Theologica 37 (1983): 126. 
3Participation in just wars under lawful authority is 
unequivocally affirmed in the (Lutheran) Augsburg Confession 
of 1530 (Article 16), the (Anglican) Thirty-Nine Articles 
of 1571 (Article 37), the (Irish Episcopal) Articles of Religion 
of 1615 (Article 62), and the (Presbyterian) .Westminster 
Confession of 1647 (Article 22). Marrin (p. 94) comments 
that these statements place the Reformed confessions "squarely 
in the centre of the Catholic tradition as regards war." 
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of the morality of some wars marked an epoch in the history 
of doctrine. Nevertheless, I am inclined to accept Helgeland's 
view that the significance of this development should not 
be overstated as a re.wersa.1 of an allegedly pristine Christian 
pacifism. In fact, the Helgeland study of the first four 
Christian centuries concludes that "the destruction of human 
life and property does not seem to have been a significant 
consideration for either Christian ._qn' pagan" when considering 
military service. Rather, Christians were ready to accept 
warfare as a fact of life in a sinful world, and seemingly 
agreed with pagans in attributing military successes to divine 
intervention. 1 
The contributions made by Origen and others who were 
truly hostile to war on the grounds of the wrongness of homicide 
should not, however, be dismissed as mere aberrations. The 
history of Christian doctrine in this, iiS in many other fields, 
has not taken the form of linear development (or regression, 
as pacifists would prefer) from the time of Jesus to the 
present day. Rather, as Jacques Ellul shows, there have 
existed in the church almost from the beginning diverse opinions 
on this matter, ranging from conscientious non-violence through 
selective participation (in just wars) to legitimation of 
violence against the state. In some periods, a certain shade 
of opinion has been dominant and respectable within the church, 
only to be :olr~rshadow~d;:_by-.-as:otb~r~"type·::ar~.~th:igking:: :in: i:L :...' 
lHelgeland, pp. 89-90 
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later stage of history. 1 Ellul could be right again when 
he suggests that the various attitudes presumably appeal 
to various types of personality, although he descends to 
stereotypical nonsense when he seeks to characterise these 
personality types: 
{Compromise on the matter of violence appeals to) reasonable 
. Christians who • • . promote the values of moderation 
and temperance. 
(Non-violence appeals to people who might be described 
as) "sufferers" ... acutely conscious of the scandalous 
gaps between Christian affirmation and the behaviour 
of our society. . • • They are marked by true charity, 
a spirit of sweetness, and, often, great humility. 
(Legitimation of violence appeals to people of) 
passionate temperament, men and women who are uncompromising, 
hard, incapable of dialogue or moderation. 1 
Ellul clearly regards himself as falling within the second 
group (and one must thus smile at the reference to humility). 
He has no patience with the third. Thus he fails to note 
that historical circumstances, probably more significantly 
than personality types, influence the dominance of one or 
another mode of thought in various periods and places. To 
the nature of that influence I shall return later in this 
chapter. 
Before leaving this brief historical survey, it must 
be noted that the pacifist option, while still not dominant, 
has in recent years experienced a strong revival. Since 
the "war to end all wars" ended in 1918 without any hope 
of producing a lasting peace, the appeal of non-violence 
1Jacques Ellul, Violence: Reflections from a Christian 
perspective, tr. Cecilia Gaul Kings (New York: The Seabury 
Press, 1969), pp. 23-24. 
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has presented an important challenge to traditional ethics. 
The forms in which modern theologians have given expression 
to the new pacifism have been dealt with at some length in 
Chapter 2. 1 Here, three general historical statements should 
be made. First, like the just-war theory, the contribution 
of pacifism and the legitimacy of conscientious objection 
to war have been accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm 
within all the mainstream churches--Catholic and Protestant. 
While an important theological impetus has come from the 
historic "peace churches" (especially the Mennonites), Christian 
pacifists are today to be found across the board, and are 
gaining ground., 
Second, this phenomenon is by no means found only in 
Christian circles. It would probably be fair to say that 
Christian pacifism is to an impressive extent an echo of 
a secular mood which is inclined to say of war and wars, 
"thus far and no further"--or, in the words of a 1933 Oxford 
Union resolution: "This house will in no circumstances fight 
for its king and country." As in the church, so in the world 
at large, however, the pacifist voice remains a minority 
voice, though one which commands increasing attention and 
respect. 
Third, "the" social ethical dialogue of the current 
period may well eventually emerge to have been the dialogue 
among political radicals between pacifists on the one hand 
(those who seek revolutionary change by non-violent means) 
and those who justify violence on the other. It is that 
1
see pp. 104-110 above. 
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dialogue which occupies this chapter, and thus it is necessary 
now to turn to the question of the Christian ethical attitude 
towards the authority of government. 
3.3 The authority of the State 
To recapitulate Yoder's classification above, there 
are not two but four possible Christian positions on war. 
The Christian is not confronted with a choice between a blanket 
rejection of war and an uncritical acceptance of all wars. 
Rather, there are the possibilities of sanctification (the 
"holy war" position), pacifism, restraint (the just-war 
position), and that ethical stance which regards obedience 
of the civil authorities as an absolute good. Since the 
"holy war" is now a concept associated mainly with non-Christian 
religions, especially Islam, and since the pacifist position 
has already been spelled out and criticised in Chapter 2, 
the present chapter will give critical attention to the third 
and fourth positions--beginning with the last. 
It is possible to accept all the theological arguments 
against war, and yet argue for Christian participation in 
war, on the basis of a prior duty to obey lawful authority. 
Since relatively unconditional obedience towards lawful authority--
certainly with regard to submitting to military service 1--is 
promoted by Catholic and Protestant authorities alike, this 
position cannot be lightly brushed aside. 
A. presumption has been established for this study to 
the effect that the interests of the less powerful elements 
within society should be given special weight in considering 
1see p. 140 above. 
145 
conflicts of duties (Presumption 2.2). This would seem to 
suggest that the State--which has to be numbered among the 
most powerful elements in any society--hardly deserves special 
protection in regard to moral choices regarding homicide. 
Indeed, where the State, in which all political power is 
focused, calls for the Christian to commit homicide, the 
effect of Presumption 2.2 should be to encourage the option 
of civil disobedience. The burden of proof, then rests agai~~t 
the argument for participation in war based on the State's 
prerogative. However, the issue of conscientious objection 
is not directly relevant here: I am concerned with the other 
side of the coin, the question of violence directed against 
the State. Presumption 2.2 is not strictly. relevant to that 
question. 
Does the Bible demand unconditional civil obedience, 
as some Christians appear to believe? The most frequently-
cited proof text for this position is Romans 13:1-7, in which 
Paul, never as concerned with overturning existing cultural 
norms as with preparing his readers for the eschatological 
life "in Christ", cautions the church at Rome not to be diverted 
from its central concerns by unnecessary tension vis-A-vis 
the State. Nevertheless, Paul places firm qualifications 
on the State's authority in verses 3-5: "Government, a terror 
to crime, has no terrors for good behaviour." The obligation 
to submit is imposed not only by fear of punishment but by 
conscience. This is far from an easy passage to interpret, 
and while it is clear that Paul wanted the Roman Christians to 
avoid trouble with the authorities if possible, some exegetes 
have come up with radically different interpretations from 
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what one might expect. W. Schulze suggests that the term 
"God's servant" in verse 4 implies "the right to resist when 
the auth0rit.ti.e.s exceed their God-given mandate and turn away 
from the clearly articulated commandments of God." 1 Certainly 
it cannot be forgotten that the writer of the letter, whatever 
he meant at the time of writing, would one day find himself 
in Rome, a prisoner of the civil authorities, and, according 
to tradition, on Death Row as a prisoner of Christian conscience. 
Other Christians draw the conclusion of unconditional 
obedience from Jesus' "Render unto Caesar the things that 
are Caesar's" saying in Mark 12:13-17. Such an interpretation 
ignores the second part of the saying: "· •• and to God 
the things that are God's." If the saying has any political 
significance, Davies is right in insisting that it lies in 
Jesus' affirmation of people's duty to God as something that 
need not contradict their legitimate duties to the State, 
"and at the same time, it is implied that if there is a clash 
of obedience, the divine will must have priority." 2 In any 
event, the context makes it clear that Jesus' purpose was 
to say, in effect: "Stop trying to trip me up with such trivia: 
pay your taxes by all means, but obedience to God is what 
always comes first." Yoder has rightly pointed out that 
such a trick question would scarcely have been offered to 
Jesus "unless Jesus' repudiation of the Roman occupation 
were taken for granted, so that he would be expected to give 
1Quoted by Brian Brown et. al., Divine or civil obedience? 
(Johannesburg: Christian Institute, 1973), p. 10. For a 
similar argument, see Davies, pp. 46-48. 
2Davies, p. 46. 
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an answer which would enable them to denounce him." 1 The 
same could also be said about the Romans 13 passage and others 
like it (1 Tim. 2:2-3; l·Pet. 2:13-15): they surely would 
not arise at all except in the context of a perceived tension 
between church and state which resulted from the nature of 
the early Christians' beliefs and practices. 
Contrary, then, to what a naive reading of certain 
allegedly key texts may suggest, there is no clear statement 
in the Canon on the relationship between church and state. 
Rather, certain tensions emerge. On the one hand, there 
is an accepted need for Christians to offer reasonable allegiance 
to the State. On the other, there is no shortage of evidence 
to show that the biblical witnesses understood God's word 
as hostile to such aspects of government policy as would 
result in injustice and oppression. No one seriously disputes 
that both these values are affirmed at various places in 
the two Testaments. Nor does anyone seriously dispute the 
existence in the New .Testament especially of a tension between 
the high ethic of submission (to the spouse, to the State, 
to the slave-owner, to the slave, and generally to the neighbour), 
and the higher ethic of radical obedience of God's will. 
The same ambiguity can be found in much of the Christian 
theological tradition. Since the patristic period, the State 
has frequently been seen as divinely appointed--but often 
in a rather negative sense, as a remedy for the human tendency 
to sin. Thus Irenaeus: 
1John H .. Yoder, The politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdman, 1972), p. 53. 
148 
Earthly rule has been appointed by God for the benefit 
of the'nations • so that under the fear of human 
rule men may not eat each other up like fishes, but 
that, by means of the establishment of laws, they may 
keep down an excess of wickedness among the nations. 1 
Villa-Vicencio has neatly identified a number of significant 
eras in the history of church-state doctrine. 2 The earliest 
years constituted "the age of the martyrs", when the radically 
m.onotheistic· early Christians were confronted with an un-Christian 
Caesar, and thus perceived an unavoidable (and often fatal) 
distinction between divine and human authority. This period 
ended with Constantine's Edict of Milan in 312 A.D., granting 
freedom of worship. Suddenly Caesar was ~{allegedly) a Christian: 
the church and the State were one, and radical monotheism 
found itself displaced by the idea that political rule had 
divine authority not in the purely negative sense noted by 
Irenaeus, but in a most positive sense of human rulers being 
perceived as actually carrying out the divine will for society. 
When Rome was sacked in 410, St Augustine felt obliged to 
develop a new distinction between God and Caesar--between 
the city of God and the political realm. The two· were not 
identical, he taught, but interrelated. Implicitly, the 
possibility now arose for the church to be critical of the 
State. St Thomas Aquinas built on Augustine's foundation, 
holding that political life was grounded in the law of nature 
1Adv. Haer 5.23.2, quoted by Davies, p. 49. 
2charles Villa-Vicencio, Between Christ and Caesar: 
Classic and contemporary texts on church and state (Grand 
Rapids: William P. Eerdmans, 1986). 
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and would ultimately be perfected by God's grace. Tyranny, 
while contrary to natural and divine law, was generally preferable 
to the chaos which would result from resistance. 
The two-kingdoms doctrine of Augustine and Aquinas 
survived the Reformation, and was adopted by both Luther 
and Calvin who, partly because of their different historical 
perspectives, differed in terms of the emphasis placed on 
either the independence of the two realms each from the other 
(Luther) or the necessary submission of both realms to Christ's 
rule (Calvin). 
The last great era in the background to modern church-state 
thinking is described by Villa-Vicencio as the "Radical Reformation 
Here certain Protestant groups found the two kingdoms to 
be actually opposed to each other, leading to political ethics 
of nonparticipation (the Anabaptists), reform (the English 
Puritans), or even rebellion (the Scottish Presbyterians). 
When one looks at the modern church through the spe~tacles 
provided by the historical perspective, one can see that 
all these doctrines and more are presently being followed 
by various Christians around the world. For some, religion 
and politics are separate, independent realms, while for 
others the church has a mission to change the political order. 
For others still, Christians are called to withdraw entirely 
from the political order and provide an alternative community, 
while for yet another group the Gospel demands revolutionary 
change. 
But one option has almost entirely disappeared from 
modern Christian theology. This is the unconditional civil 
obedience associated with the Constantinian era. The interests 
150 
of Christ and Caesar are no longer perceived to be necessarily 
identical. In relatively free and relatively just societies, 
most Christians understand good citizenship to involve a 
generally obedient attitude towards legislation and law enforcement. 
In other, less free and less just societies, there are pressing 
moral issues which seem to outweigh the general ~esirability 
of civil obedience under certain circumstances. Where tyranny 
is being resisted by Christians, not the edicts of the State 
but the revolution is seen to be God's will. 
Not suprisingly, in view of his total separation of 
the civil and religious realms, Martin Luther totally ruled 
out the revolutionary option. Marrin has summarised Luther's 
view on this matter as follows: 
When oppressed, the Christian had no alternative but 
to pray and hope for better times. If they came, fine; 
but if not, God's w~ll be done. The Christian's motto, 
Luther affirmed~ must be Leiden, leiden, Kreuz, kreuz, 
ist der Christen Recht: das und kein anderes! ("Suffering, 
suffering, cross, cross; there is nothing else in the 
Christian law.") 1 
In his Harsh book against the peasants, Luther urged the 
German princes--to whom, modern scholars agree, Luther was 
loyal beyond his own best theological instincts--to "smite, 
slay and stab, secretly and openly" the "mad dog" revolting 
peasants. The revolt accordingly crushed, Luther was accused 
of encouraging brutality, and he defended himself with a 
statement on rebellion's inherent injustice. There was no 
question of mercy here, he argued. The peasants had not 
been interested in mercy, but in "raging, smiting, robbing, 
burning and plundering" for "rights, rights, rights". What 
lM . 
.arrin, p. 101. 
151 
follows is of crucial relevance to the theological question 
of the authority of the State. Mercy, says Luther, is a 
scriptural message to the kingdom o.f God, but not to the 
kingdom of the world: 
It is a Christian's duty not only to be merciful, but 
also to endure every kind of suffering--robbery, arson, 
murder, devil, and hell. It goes without saying that 
he is not to strike, kill, or take revenge on anyone. 
But the kingdom of the world, which is nothing else 
than the servant of God's wrath upon the wicked and 
is a real precursor of hell and everlasting death, should 
not be merciful, but strict, severe, and wrathful in 
fulfillings its work and duty. 1 
This classical Lutheran two-kingdoms argument is the 
crudely-stated but logical basis for the point of view still 
held by many Christians that even an unjust government must 
be offered respect and obedience by Christians. It is not 
the Constantinian position that identifies the government's 
interests with those of God, but rather a position which 
distinguishes between the parameters and possibilities of 
the divine will in the kingdom of heaven on the one hand 
and in earthly society on the other. To the modern question 
of whom should be obeyed when the will of the State appears 
to be in conflict with the divine will, Luther would have 
said: "Nonsense! How can you speak of God's will in the 
kingdom of the world? The State is God's agent in this evil 
kingdom, and that is the only will we can know!" 
It is useless to speculate on what Luther's reaction 
1
"An open letter on the Harsh book against the peasants" 
in The works of Martin Luther, vol. 47 (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1967), quoted by Marrin, War, pp. 103-104. 
152 
would have been to seeing how useful his doctrine was to 
the "German Christian" Lutherans in Hitler's day. But Bonhoeffer 
and his fellow "Confessing Christians", while following Lutheran 
doctrine in other areas, moved away from the two-kingdoms 
idea and held that the church's task vis-a-vis totalitarianism 
is not one of self-preservation but one of radical obedience 
to God. This remains the important question to be settled 
in regard to the theology of rebellion, whether violent or 
1 
non-violent. ~hough the two-kingdoms notion is helpful 
in pointing to the tension between ideal and actual, divine 
and temporal, history has convinced many Christian believers 
that it is possible for the State to be in rebellion against 
God, and that when that judgement is made, the unavoidable 
consequence for a Christian in that situation is to obey 
God and disobey the State. 
In my view, the matter of the State's authority has 
been sufficiently clarified by theology to allow for the 
possibility of rebellion. The authority of the State is 
not an evil per se, but it is also not an absolute good. 
Rather, Christians should offer allegiance to government, 
in the interests of order and peace, as a matter of principle, 
but not in an absolute sense. Where the State does not serve 
but subverts justice and peace in a serious way, Christians 
are called upon to consider whether or not, in the terminology 
preferred by Barth, a Grenzfall has not arisen which calls 
for radical obedience of God rather than normal civil obedience. 
Could this obedience involve violent revolution? This 
1 Turner, p. 149. 
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is a question never considered by Barth, and seldom considered 
in mainstream Protestant or Catholic orthodoxies. However, 
it is a question that is enlightened by the broader issue 
of the morality of war, to the orthodox theology of which 
it is now time to turn. 
3.4 The just-war theory 
To speak of a just war--or of just revolutions--is to 
speak of justified homicides on a grand scale. There is 
an impressive Christian tradition which does precisely that. 
It was created first by St Augustine (based on the ideas 
of the fourth-century bishop, Ambrose) and developed in detail 
by St Thomas Aquinas. 
Aquinas proposed three elements of the just war. In 
other words, three criteria must be met if a war is to be 
considered just (and thus something participated in by a 
Christian). First, the war. must be waged by the authority 
of the sovereign to whom care of the commonweal is committed. 
Second, it must be waged with just cause: here, Aquinas cites 
Augustine's assertion that a just war is one which avenges 
wrongs. And third, the war must be waged with the right 
intention, which is always to promote good and avoid evil. 
Once again, St Augustine is cited, in a passage quoted in 
Chapter 2 above: the intention of a just war is always to 
achieve peace. 1 
The theory has undergone great development since the 
time of Aquinas, and it has become part not only of Catholic 
1st Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae (London: 
Blackfriars, 1975), p. 83. 
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but also of Protestant orthodoxy. (The latter, especially 
influenced by the two-kingdoms doctrine, has tended to place 
special· emphasis on the authority of the State to require· 
a citizen's participation in war.) According to Yoder 1, 
the theory was too seldom stated with.consistent elements 
to suggest a standard form, but five criteria were common 
to most medieval versions. These five criteria are also 
the ones that appear most often in modern restatements of 
the just-war idea. They are: 
(a) INTENTION. The violence must be transitional, 
and always a means to peace. 
(b) JUST CAUSE. The war must be waged over a significant 
issue, rather than out of arbitrary whim or mere 
vengeance. 
(c) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY. Not the private citizen, 
nor the church, but only the government may initiate 
a just war. 
(d) JUST MEANS. The m~ans of war should be in proportion 
to the cause. The damage done should be no greater 
than the damage to be prevented or righted. As 
an exception to the general immorality of killing, 
war does not nullify all morality .. so, for example, 
to lie or steal or ravage in war is wrong. 
' (e) MOTIVATION. The inner motivation for waging war 
is also to be scrutinised (as one might expect 
of an age in which the Confessional was the 
1Yoder, Critical evaluation, pp. 5-7. 
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in for a fellow clergyperson in conducting a "chaplain's 
period" for Anglican national servicemen in a South African 
army camp. I asked this group of young white men: . "How do 
you justify killing other young South Africans in the civil 
war you are being trained to fight?" I did not record or 
write down their answers verbatim, but the following is a 
summary of what I recalled later: 
(a) "It is the only way to maintain order (or peace, 
or stability) in this country." 
(b) "The terrorists started it. They are killing 
innocent people. They threaten us and our families." 
(c) hour government has ordered us to do it, and we 
must obey." 
(d) "We are only defending our borders. Unlike the 
terrorists, we don't commit atrocities. In fact, 
while we are fighting we are building up the educationa: 
and health services in the operational areas." 
(e) "This is a war for Christianity against communism, 
and communism is the Antichrist." 
In the order in which I have arranged them, these arguments 
(the truth or fallaciousness of each of which is not of concern 
here) tally exactly with the medieval formulation summarised 
above. 
Not only from the point of view of those fighting on 
the side of a government, but also in the case of rebels, 
these criteria are not far from the common mind. Robert 
C. Freysinger has shown that "modern Christian rebels have 
self-consciously borrowed from the logic of the traditional 
just-war theory when trying to come to grips with their 
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own participation in political violence." "Just cause" 
is identified in institutional--or overt--violence on the 
part of the regime: enforced ignorance, malnutrition, centralisatio 
of power and wealth, and so on. The "intention" of revolutionary 
violence is greater justice and shared access to power and 
wealth. The "motivation" often embraces the love of God 
by, and for, the poor and oppressed. And "just means" and 
"legitimate authority" become--as they arguably must always 
become in the modern age--ethical qu~stions, rather than 
statements. 1 
Nor are these modern radicals guilty of an arbitrary 
hermeneutical leap in appropriating just-war theory to the 
revolutionary cause. Yoder tells how Aquinas left open the 
possibility of "non-seditious rebellion against immoral authori ty'1 • 
According to Davies, the theory has been applied to civil 
or internal war since the sixteenth century: 
Rebellion against a tyrant was regarded as justified 
whenever it fulfilled at least three of the requirements 
of a just war. It had to be undertaken at the command 
of a legitimate authority, it had to have a just cause, 
and its means were to be just. In effect, the first 
of these conditions was variously interpreted .... 
Calvin, for example, defended legitimate authority as 
the magistracy, while John Knox declared that every 
1Robert Charles Freysinger, "The problems of resistance 
of the contemporary Christian radical movement" (Ph.D. diss-
ertation, University of Massachusetts, J977)~ pp. 143-15~. 
2Yoder, Critical evaluation, p. 12. 
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citizen had the right to instigate an uprising against 
1 
an unjust government. 
Davies goes on to apply traditional just-war criteria in 
an attempt to specify the circumstances under which a contemporary 
revolution might be justified. He suggests that legitimate 
authority reverts to the people when a government "behaves 
in a totally unjust manner", and this authority can be enjoyed 
by a resistance movement which has "the confidence of a sizeable 
proportion of the people." Just cause is found in governmental 
tyranny, societal failure and large-scale violence against 
the oppressed. The intention or goals of the revolution 
must be not only to suppress disorder and evil but also to 
"ensure peaceful conditions in which what is good and righteous 
may flourish." Moreover just means must be used: force must 
not go unrestrained, and such acts as terrorist bombings, 
torture and hijackings are unjustifiable, as well as being 
probably counterproductive. Using other medieval driteria, 
Davies insists upon violence being the last resort, and says 
there must be a prospect of likely success--both of which 
are central concepts in the modern debate, to which I shall 
return later in this chapter. 
The problem with the just-war theory, then, is not that 
it is out of date, nor that it cannot be adapted and applied 
to modern situations like revolutionary warfare. The theory 
has been found helpful by those justifying violence in a wide 
variety of situations right up to the present time. In my 
opinion, the main trouble with the doctrine lies precisely 
in that it is discovered to be so helpful by th~se seeking 
1 
~Davies, p. 167. 
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to justify their actions (either in participating in 
or in refusing to partipate in a given conflict). The 
purpose of the theory is not to justify decisions already 
taken , but to help Christians resolve moral dilemmas. 
It seems to me that each of the various criteria is simply 
unable to fulfill that lofty purpose, for the following 
reasons. 
(a) INTENTION. It is doubtful that war can be 
fairly described as an effective means to 
peace, or justice, or true stability. This 
is so because of the inherent long-term and 
short-term consequences of violence (a topic 
to which I shall return towards the end of 
this chapter). In the South African context, 
as even military leaders admit, the solution 
to the country's problems will be not military 
solutions but political ones. It is even 
possible that having a strong army (and/or 
a strong revolutionary force) in the field 
actually provides reason to delay the serious 
search for political solutions. There is 
no reason to think this situation is unique 
to South Africa, but every reason to think 
that war is often too easily grasped at as 
the remedy to a problem, rather thantruly 
as a last resort. 
(b) JUST CAUSE. Here again, the question is whether 
the likely results of war will be to replace 
present conditions with better conditions 
(only if the answer is yes will the condition 
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of proportionality be satisfied). To focus 
attention on on the present horrors (of oppression) 
may be too simple a way of justifying the 
future horrors of war. As Yoder asks, is 
it possible to measure evil quantitatively? 1 
The cause for war is seldom so destructive 
as war itself--or, at least, such calculations 
are too imponderable to be helpful in resolving 
a dilemma in a situation. 
(c) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY. It was easier in the 
Middle Ages than today to make unambiguous 
statements about legitimacy. In those days, 
no one had sufficient historical perspective 
for comparison. Today one must ask a number 
of questions athat are probably impossible 
to answer objectively. What constitutes legitimate 
authority? In how many countries today are 
governments democratically elected--and why 
should democratic election necessarily provide 
sufficient legitimacy for homicides on a grand 
scale? On the other hand, does any government 
which is not democratically elected automatically 
fail the test of legitimacy, and thus not 
only lose its right to declare a just war 
but also become an object for a just revolution? 
Legitimacy could be described as the extent 
to which a government or movement represents 
1Yoder, Critical evaluation, p. 8. 
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the general will of the people, but how is 
the general will to be ascertained? Will 
a Gallup poll do the trick? And finally: 
should the general will of one people justify 
an attempt to decide the fate of another nation 
--as always happens when a nation goes to 
war? 
(d) JUST MEANS. This is the most problematic 
element of all--especially when the matter 
of war is appreciated from the proper perspective 
of the ethics of homicide. Wars can be waged 
with the best of intentions, causes and legitimacy 
of authority, and perhaps even motivation, 
but war is war, and people at war behave abominably. 
As I have noted earlier, people do consider 
that all is fair, and just, in war, if it 
leads to victory, and it is difficult to imagine 
a war in which this were not the prevailing 
mindset. 
The inevitable homicidal and other horrors 
attached to war are a central feature in many 
modern people's objections to war. Davies, 
however, puts up a powerful argument against 
this type of objection. He insists that the 
very worst thing Christian morality can do 
is to write off all wars because of distaste 
for the methods involved. The result would 
be the opposite of that intended: the view 
would be promoted among those who feel obliged 
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to use violence that since all means are repreh~nsible, 
all means are equally justifiable in a necessary 
conflict: 
Although ends, to a certain extent, justify 
means, they do not, pace certain Marxists, 
justify any means. Morality does not 
go on holiday when armed conflict breaks 
out. To engage in a revolution is not 
to say that anything goes. Force may 
be called for, if there is just cause, 
e.g. defence of neighbour, but the elementary 
.rules of humanity have to be observed. 
Even in the very act of using force, 
{force itself) must be questioned ••• 
Consequently, it should be recognised 
that there has to be a proportionality 
of means to end and also a discrimination 
between means. If force is allowed to 
go unrestrained, it can go beyond its 
specific military purposes. 1 
"Force may be called for . • • but the 
elementary rules of humanity have to be observed." 
Therein lies the fallacy in Davies's use of 
the just-war concept. Not only is there a 
natural and inevitable tendency not to observe 
the "elementary rules of humanity" in a war 
situation (or at least, not in respect of 
the enemy) but one wonders what these elementary 
rules can possibly be if they do not include 
a rule against wholesale homicide. Later 
on in this chapter, I shall concede the force 
1Davies, pp. 173-174. 
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of an argument that says there is "no space" 
left in which to argue about violence and 
non-violence.in some situations, such as South 
Africa today. But if that is true, it is 
even more true that when a group ha~ actually 
turned to large-scale violence, there is little 
"space" left indeed in which to debate just 
means! Rage, when finally turned loose after 
much repression, does not stop at acts which 
break Davies's "elementary rules". Such acts 
include not only premeditated actions like 
those Davies condemns (urban bom~ings, hijackings) 
but also spontaneous, uncontrollable outpourings 
of revenge upon those who (with or without 
truth) are identified as collaborators or 
perpetrators of systemic injustice. It has 
to be baldly stated: revolutions are not conducted 
only by calculating, well-disciplined cadres, 
but also by enraged mobs. And once turned 
loose and allowed to fight their wars, neither 
military leaders nor angry crowds (nor even, 
as I have indicated above, the stately Lords 
of Britain) have tended to show much patience 
with debating the justice or injustice of 
the available means to achieving victory. 
(e) MOTIVATION. Here one is confronted with a 
question well outside of the sphere of the 
calculable. The inner motivation or true 
goals which lie behind any action are out 
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of the critic's reach (and often unfathomable even 
to( 1rthe actor). One may assume the best, 
or assume the worst, but beyond assumptions 
one cannot assess the morality of participating 
in wars on the basis of imponderables. 
The medieval just-war criteria arose out of the 
best of intentions on the part of the scholars who developed 
them. The criteria served a useful purpose in the history 
of social ethics. They opened the way for Christians 
to discriminate between wars. Before the just-war theory, 
the Christian was either a pacifist or one who participated 
uncritically in all wars waged by the people of his or 
her community. Now there was a third option of critical 
reflection. Tha~ option--to reflect critically on the 
nature of a war in order to decide about participating 
in it--remains the prevailing one for modern Christians. 
But I doubt that the actual criteria of the just-war 
theories proposed in various forms were ever very useful 
as a tool of analysis before the fact of moral decisions. 
Probably the answers to all the questions were always 
largely instinctive: YES in regard to wars waged by a 
group to which one owed loyalty; NO in regard to wars 
waged by the enemy. 
As is true in most modern studies, I shall not, 
therefore, attempt to answer the traditional just-war 
questions in terms of the justifiability of revolutionary 
violence. Instead, I shall proceed directly to attempt 
an analysis of the concrete, contemporary arguments for 
Christian participation in revolutionary violence, weighing 
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these arguments against the methodological presumptions 
I have identified concern;ing ~·the s·anc'tity ·of I:ife. 
3. 5 Ass'essing the act 6f 'revolution 
The. broad ·thrust i."of the' $arictity-·6r•Life ·Principle 
- . 
has given' rise to the--primary presumption of this thesis: 
""·.· """-- ··~ - '"""'·, ... ) ... , -- ---···.. . that the burden of !)"roof must -weigh;, ·against .cthe moral 
,. I I J. ~ .,. '* ,; - . ,.-.. ·. ; \.. ... justification of homicide. In other words, those who 
'ti'. J .. j.·.·~ .".,·~~ .... ":;;.'.:·..... . ..... j .. 
would justify.~an .:act •of, homic:itj.e m.us~ · prm~e that .the 
act is iikely-'td result in the greater good.· I have 
" '' 
shown that the traditional just-war questions are unhelpful 
l 1' - - .• .. ~ • 
" ...... .. ~ 
as a means of justifying any kind of war, and that includes 
the re~olutiona~y tybe~of~conflict; ~here a~e, however, 
' ,.·_ 
other types of argument available to those ··who justify 
I --' - > • ' fr t . .j 
revolutionary violence, and,. :the_se. mus~,now be assessed. 
Some of these arguments have their· roots in the traditional 
. .. . · "',,.,, ~ .. • : , .. · r: r •. ..., .... c . . : . just-war f:ormulations, but are expressed in different 
• .~ ~ ' . . 'j i- ' .. J ,,. - 1" . , ~ ,. .. ! - - ' ' • ~ 
ways,:and ways which are less open to sweeping rejection. 
An appropriate':Starting point is that form of legitimation 
. '; . "'\ . ! ·-
which is encountered perhaps mo.st frequently today". This 
: ) • .." -~ ~' _ • ...., .- '>" '~-~- ., • ·t ~~~· ,t 
is the argument_ .that_ j us.tifJ_es .violen__ge. ~n r a particular 
. " .• -
situation by. stating· that· non~violent ·means have been 
. ' • ' • }~ -i ,· ' .' ~ .... ' : - f" 
tried, and have failed~ and that violence is the only 
·~·, .i._..,..:..",. ~ ·,; .. • ·•' .,;~ .. !"° ."'1 ', ~ ·~,i1h j•· ··:"'tr ;,., 1 ~ 
recourse left for the people to gai_n J,y.st1:9~e. Certain 
theoretical difficulties are associated w1th this form 
of argument,- aricf 'heed to 'be considered- ·carefulty. Following 
these considerations, I shall address the debate between 
revolutionaries arid radical pacifists.concernfhg violent 
r,. • t 1 • " "!. • "· ... .,, i ~ • 
and non-violent means of revo'.'liiti'on .· Finally; I shall 
move on to the utilitarian task of assessing the chances 
r . . 
I. 
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*necessity (violence as the only means available), 
* the immorality of the regime (making opposing 
acts morally right), and 
* the need to destroy the present political regime. 
Rather more simply, Swomley 1 cites Eric Fromm's identification 
of two broad types of revolutionary violence: 
* reactive violence (in.which those threatened are 
willing to kill and destroy in order to protect 
themselves and their group), and 
* revengeful violence (in which specifically the 
lower-middle class is the focus of desire for vengeance, 
whether along racial or nationalist lines). 
However the types of argument for revolutionary 
violence may be classified, there are clearly two important 
themes. First, there is the element of reaction. The 
oppressed do not initiate violence but respond to it 
with the only means available to them. And second, there 
is the desire for change. Revolution is seldom if ever 
simply a matte of wanting to "do to others as they have 
done to you". 2 Rather, there is a real need to remove 
the prevailing political and/or economic powers and replace 
them with something better.3 
It is essential to recognise the agony out of which 
1John M. Swomley, Jr., Liberation ethics (New York: 
Macmillan, 1972), p. 169. 
2Ibid., p. 177 (see especially the Malcolm X quotation 
on that page). 
3Note how the two quotations on page 166 above illustrate 
these two elements of reaction and change. 
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reaction to oppression and desire for change lead some 
to argue for the necessity of violence. Surely there 
is an intuitive quality about the "violence of the poor"--a 
sacrificial quality, and a tinge of desperation--which 
distinguishes it from the violence of regimes in defence 
of their power. However, the presumptions of this thesis 
make it necessary that this intuitive respect for the 
motives behind revolutionary violence be subjected to 
critical analysis of the same seriousness as would be 
the case for any other justification of homicide. In 
the remainder of this section, I shall address certain 
theoretical problems associated with the "when all else 
fails" type of argument. Hopefully, within all the "cold" 
assessments which will need to be undertaken in this 
section and the following ones, the pain which underlies 
the adoption of violence by the poor will be remembered, 
and taken account of. 1 
However, it must also be noted that two other themes 
1
rt is also worth mentioning--because these days 
it is often forgotten--that the violent overthrow of 
gross oppression is a right and duty defended not only 
by revolutionaries of the far left but also by conservative 
and traditional sources, such as the American Declaration 
of Independence. The same elements of reaction and desire 
for change are present in that document, as witness the 
following quotation: 
. . . All experience hath shown that mankind are 
more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, 
than to right themselves by abolishing the forms 
(of government) to which they are accustomed. But 
when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing 
invariably the same object, evinces a desire to 
reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their 
right, it is their duty, to throw off such government 
and to provide new guards for their future security. 
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which are essential for an ethic of violence are usually 
missing from revolutionary rhetoric. The first is the 
element of counting the cost of violence. There is, 
in fact, frequently an awareness of the blood of the 
activists which will be spilled in the cause of justice, 
but usually not of the deaths and suffering which will 
inevitably occur among the masses of people as a whole, 
not only during the period of uprising but afterwards, 
as the spiral of violence continues. (I shall return 
to this point.) 
The second missing element is any attempt to justify 
homicide morally. This is true of all the arguments 
cited in works referred to in this thesis. The arguments 
speak of "violence" and "liberation", not of "killing". 
For example, Fanon's book1, which is entirely devoted 
to a defence of revolutionary violence, is almost totally 
concerned with the evils of colonialism, and never once 
speaks about the reality of killing people. 
The reactive element and the desire fo~ change seem, 
then, to blind some revolutionary leaders to both the 
practical. consequences of reactive violence and the moral 
problem concerning homicide. This must be considered 
significant when the arguments used focus precisely on 
the immorality of those who are responsible for oppressive 
or institutional violence. 
Perhaps, after all, violence is seldom if ever a 
self-consciously moral act, even if the language of 
1Frantz Fanon, Towards the African revolution: Political 
essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). 
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morality is used to rationalise it. Perhaps violence 
is rather a pre-rational expression of anger and despair. 
No ethical treatise could do anything towards avoiding 
or affecting that! Indeed, can one not hear the frustration 
and despair which is shrieked by that pervasive phrase, 
"when all else fails "? . . . . It is a cry not from the 
mind, source of moral reflection, but from the heart. 
That cry rings out in many Christian responses to 
revolutionary situations. A 1966 conference,~nofuveaed:in 
Ge~evi~bj the World Council of Churches, held that while 
non-violence was always to be preferred, violence was 
a reality, and responsive violence_ was justified as an 
"ultimate recourse" in extreme situations. nwhen all 
else fails" was also the position taken by the World 
Council's Notting Hill consultation on racism in 1969. 1 
In his last letter to the Colombians, Camillo Torres 
~rote that the people knew that all democratic and legal 
recourse had been exhausted: th~re was no option but 
to prepare for the armed struggle. 2 The Bishop of Crateus 
in Brazil, Mgr Fragoso, was quoted in 19703 as calling 
for dialogue, but recognising that at times, when dialogue 
has produced nothing, "violence is the only way of liberating 
man from an established, permanent and grievous violence." 
The problem with this line of argument--for all 
1see Gill, passim. 
2When all else fails, p. 223. 
3Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
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its intuitive force for those who see or feel the evil 
in oppressive systems--is that it is impossible to test 
it. As Yoder has pointed out, Barth himself failed in 
his writings to test this requirement for a Grenzfall 
in regard to the war of his own day, the Second World 
War (which he justified from the Allied viewpoint as 
a Grenzfall). 1 And how.£..§:!:!. one ever say without fear 
of contradiction that the hour has come, nothing else will 
work, ariother day of waiting would be wasted, the time 
for negotiation and protest and sanctions and strikes 
is over: now is the hour for using bullets. It is, in 
a way, a self-fulfilling argument, because once the war 
has begun there is indeed no more place for non-violence, 
and no hope of a relatively peaceful settlement. 
One difficulty with the last-resort argument, then, 
is the difficulty of identifying the time when alternative 
methods can be accurately said to have finally and totally 
failed. Broadly speaking, that is a problem that exists 
with all teleology: the difficuly of foreseeing what 
tomorrow will hold if the present strategy is maintained, 
and what it will hold if a new strategy is tried. To 
that enormous problem of ignorance of the future, I shall 
return below. Meanwhile, there are other significant 
obstacles standing in the way of the last-resort argument. 
Apart from the driving force of this thesis's primary 
presumption (for the preservation of life), there is 
1 . Maeng Yong Gil, The command of God: A study of 
Karl Barth's theological ethics (Ph.D. thesis, Emory 
University, 1974), - p. 213. 
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also a secondary presumption (number 2.1) that makes 
it critically important to subject the last-resort argument 
to scrupulous analysis. I refer to the burden of proof 
which weighs against all acts of homicide which are carried 
out in the interests of the actors themselves. Though 
it is, perhaps, a little distasteful to mention it, when 
the oppressed rise up to take power they ~ acting in 
their own interests rather than in the interests of a 
third party. For this reason, those impatient with slow 
progress towards achieving their own rights, which they 
see as fundamental and for which they yearn with self-evident 
passion, are not likely to form a disinterested impression 
on whether "all else" has failed--or even been attempted. 
The question here is: who decides that all else has indeed 
failed? Obviously, the answer is always that those decide 
who are considering for themselves the adoption of the 
violent alternative. And the problem raised by that 
answer is that they are in a poor position to undertake 
the kind of analysis needed to make such a decision, 
because of the very pain and passion out of which they 
feel drawn towards it. So the last-resort argument, 
however appealing it may be, is to some extent a surrender 
of morality to emotive factors which may or may not have 
anything to do with morality at all. 
In a courageous and forthright paper already cited, 
Frank Chikane persuasively turns the latter problem on 
its head. Yes, he says, the poor in South Africa are in no 
position to make moral decisions about violence. In 
fact,, they are in no position even to indulge in the 
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moral debate concerning violence and non-violence, because 
there is no longer any "space" available to them in which 
the debate can take place. This is so for three reasons. 
First, the violence/non-violence debate cannot take 
place among participants in a war. To be able to have 
the space to indulge in such a debate is a "state of 
privilege: in fact the people in the townships consider 
it a luxury that they have been deprived of." 
Second, the space which some do find for engaging 
in arguments about violence is of necessity a space created 
~ violence: 
Mast white people in South Africa, and some privileged 
blacks • • • express their abhorrence of violence 
in general as if they were not involved in violence 
themselves. The fact of the matter is that this 
class of people is "protected" by violence (that 
is, by the power of the security forces}, and without 
this "~rotection" they would n6t be able to engage 
in any debate about violence and nonviolence. While 
they are debating, the security forces are "protecting" 
t~em • . • : this is a privilege the ordinary person 
in Soweto does not have. 
Third, Chikane holds that for the oppressed people 
of South Africa the space for debate of this kind has 
been eliminated by law. Meetings are prohibited, discussions 
about non-violent strategies are outlawed, peaceful protests 
and most strikes and boycotts are forbidden by law. "Hit 
squads" and vigilantes join security forces in creating 
war zones in the townships, leaving no space for the 
violence/non-violence debate. "Faced with this reality," 
Chikane comments, "one can either run for one's life 
or fight back to defend oneself." 
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The force of Chikane's argument on this lack of 
debating space has to be conceded. 1 For the person who 
is utterly downtrodden and embittered, the discussion 
about violence is an irrelevancy of the first order. 
But precisely for that reason, the discussion about violence 
does not, on the whole, take place among such persons. 
It takes place where other people, who do feel they have 
a certain amount of space within which to decide (however 
that space may have been created), are agonising about 
their role in, and response to, the revolutionary situation. 
It is in his perception of this debate where it is to 
be found (rather than where some would wish it to be 
found: among those who, in despair and uncontrollable 
rage, turn to killing because they indeed have no space 
in which to think about that any longer, no alternative 
means of expressing their anger and aspirations), that 
Chikane's arguments are faulty. He is at his bluntest 
when he discusses the legitimacy of the State, a legitimacy 
he apparently thinks is recognised by those who advocate 
non-violence. Here he states explicitly the hermeneutic 
suspicion which up to this point in his paper he has 
1Chikane's paper, incidentally, provides an excellent 
example of what I have referred to in numerous places 
above: the reluctance of those who defend homicide in 
the "grey areas" to confront the issue of homicide head-on. 
In a paper devoted to defending those who are forced 
to turn to violence, he never once uses words like "kill", 
"Homicide", "death", "injury", and so on. He is understandably 
more comfortable with blander phrases like "armed struggle", 
"violent means", "self-defence", and the like. 
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only hinted at: his suspicion that a privileged person's 
ideas about such things as violence and non-violence 
are necessarily the product of, and entirely reflect 
the interests of, privilege: 
Someone who starts from the heat of the struggle 
in Soweto will. always come to a different conclusion 
from someone who starts from the luxury of a privileged 
suburb of Johannesburg.· As Leonardo Bolt has said, 
they will perceive reality in a way that corresponds 
to their social condition or class. 
In pursuing this line of argument, Chikane echoes 
the thinking of certain practitioners of the sociology 
of knowledge, especially Karl Mannheim. Mannheim held 
that the situation of a group necessarily determines 
the political and economic ideologies that arise in the 
history of that group. Ideas, he said, are socially 
influenced not only in their form but in their content. 1 
More moderate sociologists of knowledge, like Weber and 
Scheler, believed that Marx and Mannheim erred in identifying 
the origin of ideas definitively with the interests of 
social classes. All these moderates would concede was 
that social realities (including class interests) influence 
the conditions under which ideas make their appearance 
in history, and meet with some degree of social acceptability 
1Karl Mannheim, Essays in the sociology of knowledge 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 134-190; 
cf. Jacques Maquet, The sociology of knowledge: Its structure 
and its relation to the philosophy of knowledge: A critical 
analysis of the systems of Karl Mannheim and Pitri~ A. 
Sorokin (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 
ch. 3. 
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within a certain grouping or groupings. Thus, for example, 
Weber set out to prove that the ideologies of Protestantism 
and Communism were not products of, but rather found 
a "home" within, the proletariat and capitalist classes 
. 1 
respectively. 
Just how such ideas take shape is beyond the scope 
of the present study. 2 What is important here is the 
demonstrable truth that people with ideas can and do 
move among social groupings. Neither Marx nor Engels, 
for example, were members of the proletariat. Rather, 
they found a home for their ideas--and for themselves--in 
the workers' movement. So an ideology may take root 
in a social grouping that is "ready" for it or "needs" 
it, notwithstanding that its origins may lie outside 
of that grouping. Maquet, criticising Mannheim, correctly 
points out that a clear affinity between an idea and 
the interests of a particular social class "is not equivalent 
to a necessary and sufficient condition" for that idea 
to spring to life and develop. It is valid to posit 
social reality X as "one of the factors" underlying idea 
Y, but "we must call in other factors" if the extrinsic 
context is to be complete. These other factors include 
both socio-psychological elements and factors immanent 
1werner Stark, The sociology of knowledge: An essay 
in aid of a deeper understanding of the history of ideas 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 246-272. 
2see ibid., and: P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, The 
social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology 
of knowledge (London: Penguin, 1971). 
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within the idea itself. 1 Moreover, as Stark insists, 
ideas can influence instititions: it is not always the 
other way around. 2 
Thus the social context does not necessarily determine 
ideas, but may well be a factor in the formation of ideas--a 
factor which the .holder of ideas should be willing to 
recognise. Mannheim himself argued that by recognising 
his or her perspectives a thinker can attain some measure 
of objectivity. 3 Certainly it is only to the extent 
that one recognises the interests of one's milieu that 
one can be somewhat critical of--or at least detached 
from--the theoretical frameworks popular within that 
milieu. Knowledge is always knowledge within a social 
J 
position, but it remains possible for this knowledge to 
reflect truth in some measure. Though the social context 
is relevant to the nature of an idea, the idea has to 
be debated and analysed with no less vigour than any 
other idea if its true worth is to be assessed, rather 
than simply being dismissed bacause it may seem to promote 
. 4 
the interests of a particular social grouping. 
Thus it is one thing for Chikane and others to show 
1Maquet, p. 55. 
2 Stark, p. 244. 
3Mannheim, p. 266. 
4The epistemological debate on the concept of truth 
is furious, fascinating and complex, but not strictly 
relevant here. Stark, pp. 323-346, provides a good summary. 
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that it is naive to expect a rational and ethical discussion 
; 
of violence among those who, out of frustration and despair, 
are led to striking back at their oppressors. But it 
is another thing entirely to suggest that because some 
do find "space" for agonising over whether or not to 
kill in the cause of justice, that privilege necessarily 
determines and therefore invalidates the moral conclusions 
that will be drawn in that context. As members of the 
bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels were privileged to have 
the space in which to reflect on the class struggle. 
The products of their reflections, however, neither promoted 
the interests a:f:'their class nor found a home within it. 
~ Similar comments could be made about the lawyer Gandhi 
and the preacher Martin Luther King, Jr. The violence/non-
violence debate cannot be wished away any more than can 
injustice and war: the debate is important simply because 
it involves people--people who do have the freedom and 
capacity, and therefore the responsibility, to pursue 
it; people who are faced with a choice to make about 
homicide, and cannot evade the choice one way or another. 
Having said all this, however, it must be acknowledged 
that in principle, there must come a time when "all else" 
has failed, and the perception of this failure is not 
limited to those who are for any reason predisposed to 
recognise the failure of non-violent strategies. In 
that situation, assuming that the regime's oppressive 
acts are causing appreciably more suffering than would 
any likely consequences of revolution, it is hard to 
deny that some killings would be justified. The broad 
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force of the last-resort theory has to be accepted. But 
the caveats noted in accepting this principle require 
close attention. Before the burdens of proof operating 
against all homicide--and especially against homicide 
in the interests of the self--can be satisfied, certain 
essential questions have to be answered. Above all, 
as I have shown, the lingering doubt has to be resolved 
over whether indeed homicide is the last resort (that 
is, have non-violent strategies indeed been seriously 
tried, and failed?). Moreover, the matter of proportion 
(the extent of the present suffering over against the 
likely extent of suffering caused by the revolutionary 
violence) must be addressed. 
A further question that has to be faced is the extent 
to which violence may actually be attractive to human 
beings. If there are inherent attractions in violence, 
then people would be prone to say that "all else has 
failed" long before much else has truly been tried. The 
use of the last-resort argument to justify violence would 
then have to be regarded with particular suspicion. 
Rollo May, a psychoanalyst, points out that the 
"attractive, alluring and fascinating" elements of violence 
tend to be overlooked. It is uncomfortable to become 
conscious of the fact that people tend to be fascinated 
by violence, and get an emotional charge out of witnessing 
or participating in such acts. Thus, May suggests, those 
involved in any kind of rebellion (he tends to draw his 
illustrations from campus uprisings at American colleges) 
tend to find ways of extending the life of the rebellion 
even once the original aims have been achieved: 
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For many, the goal of the rebellion now becomes 
the ecstacy itself rather than the original conditions. 
The rebellion has become the high point in the lives 
of many of the rebels, and they seem dimly aware 
that they'll never have that much sense of significance 
again. 1 
The seductive elements of violence and war, says May, 
include the exhiliration of extreme danger, the unique 
comradeship of the ranks, and the luxury of being a member 
of an organisation which relieves a person of individual 
responsibility and guilt. 2 
One can certainly recognise some truth in May's 
observations, though it must be recognised that he seems 
to draw more on his own observations of classic literature 
and of college rebellions than on any psychological research 
among soldiers and revolutionaries. Television footage 
and eye-witness accounts of mobs turning on and burning 
alive supposed collaborators lend some weight to to May's 
use of the word "ecstacy" in this context. But he may 
also have made the mistake of identifying as attractions 
of violence some of the factors that would apply to any 
corporate action in a great cause--whether violent or 
non-violent. The rewards of cameraderie and the exhiliration 
of taking great risks are also experienced by those who 
get involved in non-violent confrontations •. It is revealing 
that M~y's chapter on this subject closes with a reference 
to the "boredom" experienced by some who return to civilian 
1 May, p. 169. 
2 Ibid., pp. 172-178. 
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1 life after participation in wars. That phenomenon is 
2 by no means confined to those who have known violence. 
May's error in identifying certain ecstacies as attractions 
specifically of violence is not a particularly serious 
mistake in the context of his book, which is more concerned 
with the use of power in general than especially about 
violence. But it would probably be a serious mistake 
for this thesis to lay too much emphasis on the attractiveness 
of violence in exploring the way in which, and reasons 
for which, people turn to homicide in the revolutionary 
setting. 
The overall thrust of May's book is, however, valid 
and relevant. May, who is somewhat more concerned with 
the individual's psychological reasons for recourse to 
violence than with group violence as such, argues that 
violence is both inevitable and desirable when one is 
otherwise unable to escape powerlessness. If a person 
(or group) is denied "the power to be", or freedom to 
be significant, that person heeds to seek what is denied 
him or her, by means of self-affirmation. If self-affirmation 
fails, self-assertion, building to aggression, may be 
1 May, pp. 178-179. 
2I am irresistably tempted to mention in this regard 
my cwn experience as one presently living in free, but 
politically dull and u...i!demahdirig,Canada, after having 
dealt with vital issues and taken some risks in playing 
a small role in South Africa's anti-apartheid opposition--even 
though that role was totally non-violent. Life often 
seems dull, and I yearn for the risky challenges of times past. 
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necessary. And "if the other phases of behavior are 
blocked, then explosion into violence may be the only 
way individuals or groups can get release from unbearable 
tension and achieve a sense of significance." 1 Here 
May is expressing in psychological terms precisely what 
is expressed politically or ethically as the necessity 
for violence "when all else fails". The psychological 
principle seems irrefutable. May points out how the 
well-meaning observer will smile when a woman who has 
been dominated and submissive all her life breaks free 
in an overflowing of rage. This is a "life-giving" form 
of violence in which suppressed emotions are finally 
released. 2 Violence in moderation can be good for you! 
Whether violence as a group exercise can be as cleansing 
for a nation--and whether it is a medicine that can possibly 
be taken in a limited dose--is the question to be faced 
in the rest of this chapter. Firstly, however, the "all 
else", the possible alternatives to violence as a means 
to overcome tyranny, must be assessed. 
(2) Violence and non-violence 
Against the arguments of "impossible", "impractical", 
"unfeasible" and "when all else fails", the voice of 
Mahondas Gandhi rings out. Gandhi turned these arguments 
around. It was violence, he said, that was the impractical 
means of achieving good ends, because the inevitable 
consequence of violence was incalculable suffering. . 
1 May, p. 44. 
2 Ibid., pp. 191-195. 
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In contrast, according to Gandhi's argument, non-violent 
resistance destroys evil by converting the evildoer. 
The choice is not violence versus cowardice (Gandhi said 
he preferred the former!), but between the crude response 
of violence and punishment, on the one hand, and the 
superior response of non-violence and forgiveness. In 
Satiyagraha, weapons and armed force are not aids but 
hindrances. Instead, the power of the soul is expressed, 
to pit against tyranny not merely the body but the whole 
person. The result is that instead of a momentary triumph, 
an enduring victory can be won. 1 
Perhaps Gandhi could be scoffed at as a spiritualiser 
and a starry-eyed idealist if it were not for the apparent 
success of Satiyagraha in liberating India from colonial 
rule. As it is, the force of non-violence has, at least 
since that epochal event, become a matter to be reckoned 
with by advocates of violent revolution. 
Some point to more recent successes for non-violent 
revolutionary strategies, though these cannot be described 
as well-documented. I have heard a veteran of Malawi's 
anti-colonialist struggle speak of the pacifist strategies 
adopted there, and there have been short-term victories 
in non-violent battles fought by peace activists in Europe 
and America. The 1986 ov~rthrow of the Marcos regime 
in the Phillipines was the result of an intense, and 
largely non-violent, struggle, but the significance of 
1Mahondas K. Gandhi, Young India (Madras: S. Ganesan, 
1922); see also Marrin, pp. 216-220. 
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this may be exaggerated. Eknath Easwaran, a disciple 
of Gandhi, thinks of the Phillipines' "people power" 
revolution less as an example of the potency of non-violence 
than as a successful non-violent action which has provided 
an opportunity for the development of non-violence as 
such. This point is an example of what I pointed to 
earlier in this chapter: the fact that for the advocates 
of non-violence, the term denotes not a negative thing--the 
absence of violence--but something rather more spiritual 
or even mystical. Easwaran explains that Gandhian non-violence 
is more than an event or a strategy: it is a way of life. 
Non-violent actions can produce "impressive short-term 
gains", 'but in the end they.fail!if'non-violence is·not rightly 
understood and properly prepared for. This is a painstaking 
process. According to Easwaran, Gandhi spent far more 
time "teaching us the disciplines of non-violence than 
leading us in non-violent campaigns", and "often, it 
seemed, Gandhi chastised us more than he did our oppressors". 1 
For Gandhi and his disciples, non-violence is seemingly 
more a religious than a political matter, and whatever 
the results of the strategies, these are never as important 
as the internal state of mind of the activist. Of course, 
it must be borne in mind that the independent India "created" 
by Gandhi has never been without a standing army, and 
the non-violent state of mind did not deter Gandhi's closest 
disciple, Nehru, from using force as a weapon of statecraft. 
1 ' Eknath Easwaran, "Mahondas Gandhi's lesson for 
the Phillipines," Christian Science Monitor, world edition, 
December 22 1986, p. 34. 
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Easwaran's point is nevertheless well taken: the relatively 
easy revolution in the Phillipines (which has not yet 
proven itself) does not of itself provide a major item 
of evidence for the potency of the self-sacrificial type 
of movement which can sustain its non-violence over many 
years of being crushed by violence--and ultimately win. 
The latter is the type of movement which Gandhi envisaged, 
and which would be required in most situations where 
an alternative to violent revolution ~s sought. 
It must also be recognised that for all Gandhi's 
indisputable greatness, his achievement has often been 
exaggerated or even mythologised. J.G. Davies is right 
to remind his readers that not only Satiyagraha but also 
violence played a part in achieving Indian independence 
. and the British withdrawal was the result 
of a whole host of different factors and would almost 
certainly have taken place eventually if Gandhi 
, had not appeared on the scene. Above all, such 
success as Gandhi did have was due to the fact that 
the British had a conscience. Put him in the Rome 
of 1925 or the Berlin of 1933 and not only would 
he have been arrested but no more would ever have 
been heard of him. 1 
On the other hand, according to Walter Wink, non-pacifist 
Christians tend to forget or ignore non-violent successes 
against brutal, non-democratic regimes. He claims a 
number of such successes: 
The Solidarity movement has irreversibly mobilised 
popular sentiment against the puppet Communist regime 
in Poland, where an entire clandestine culture, 
literature and spirituality have come to birth outside 
1Davies, p. 156. 
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the authority of official society. This happened 
despite the oft-repeated claim that what Gandhi 
did in India or Martin Luther King, Jr. did in the 
U.S. South would never work under a brutal, Soviet-sponsored 
government. 
Elsewhere, nonviolent general strikes have 
overthrown at least seven Latin America dictators: 
..• Campo of Brazil (1931), •.. Morales of Cuba 
(1933), .•. Castaneda of Guatemala (1944), •.• 
Lescot of Haiti (1946), ... Arias of Panama (1951), 
Megloire of Haiti (1956), and ••. Pinilla of Colombia 
(1957). Gene Sharp, the nonviolent theorist, has 
itemised 198 different types of nonviolent actions 
that are a part of the historical record. Yet our 
history books seldom mention any of them, so preoccupied 
are they with power politics and wars. 
For some reason, many people tend to dismiss 
these historical instances of nonviolence as exceptions 
and of no pertinence to their situation, which is, 
of course, always unique. 1 
In any event, it has become clear in recent years 
that non-violent doctrine does not speak of a passive 
acceptance but an active resistance, bringing one's political, 
social, psychological and even physical resources to 
bear , non-violently, in the cause of revolution. So 
the issue resolves itself eventually into a debate between 
so-called idealistic pacifism and so-called revolutionary 
realism. Nowhere has this issue been more clearly exposed 
than in the debate between John Howard Yoder's "worldly 
idealism" and Reinhold Niebuhr's "worldly realism". 
1Walter Wink, "Entering the fire: Violence and nonviolence 
in South Africa", Sojourners, January 1987, p. 27. 
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In an essay entitled "Why the Christian church is 
not pacifist," first published in 1939, Reinhold Niebuhr 
applied his "worldly realism" to the question of political 
violence, from a distinctly Christian viewpoint. The 
Gospel and Christianity, he argued, cannot be simply 
identified with a law of love or a principle of non-resistance. 
Christianity measures human existence not only in terms 
of love, the finalnormof conduct, but also in terms 
of sin. The Gospel is not primarily a challenge to obey, 
but good news which deals with the reality of disobedience. 1 
Jesus' ethic is absolute, uncompromising, perfectionist, 
and in no way directly applicable to presnt-day activity. 
It enjoins not merely non-violence, but non-resistance. 
The real distinction is not between these, but between 
the ethics of the kingdom of God--which makes no concession 
to human sin--and all relative political strategies, 
violent and non-violent, which assume sin and seek peace 
among selfish and sinful people. The New Testament teaches 
that sin is a reality until the end of time, and so the 
. 2 kingdom is a divine, rather than a human, possibility. 
What, then, is the relevance for Niebuhr of kingdom 
ethics? The law of love enunciated there is a principle 
of criticism, by which various forms of justice, all 
of them imperfect, may be distinguished and criticised. 
For Niebuhr, religion is a way of interpreting human 
1Reinhold Niebuhr, "Why the Christian church is 
not pacifist," in Christianity and power politics (Archon 
Books, 1969), pp. 301-302. 
2 Ibid., pp. 305-307. 
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experience, rather than an excuse to ignore it. It is 
human experience that gives the lie to perfectionist 
ethics, including pacifism. True religion, as expressed 
in the New Testament, refuses to be idealistic and optimistic 
about people. Thus all political controversies are disputes 
among sinners, rather than between sinners and righteous 
people. Kingdom ethics can thus never be translated 
directly into strategies for present-day political goals. 
Rather, Christian social ethics should strive for realistic 
approximations, such as an independent judiciary, balance 
of power (without which love becomes a screen behind 
which to hide injustice), and power structures which 
respond to people's needs and aspirations. If approximate 
strategies are to be realistic, they cannot take perfectionist 
stands against, for example, violence. 1 
Before attempt'ing to demolish Niebuhr's views, Yoder 
provides a good summary of his pervading themes. These 
are: 
* that individuals are selfish, 
* that there are multiple and conflicting claims 
on any individual's love, and 
* that groups are less moral and more selfish than 
individuals. 
For Yoder, it is Niebuhr's recognition of these 
realities which leads him to rule that methods of pure 
love are doomed to be ineffective in the world, and to 
find that even the cross of Christ, "symbol of love triumphant 
1 . 
Ibid., pp. 304-311. 
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in its own integrity (was) not triumphant in the world 
and society." 1 
In response, Yoder found several important points 
of agreement between his own views and those of Niebuhr, 
including: 
* that non-resisting love, rather than simply non-violence, 
is the true New Testament norm; 
* that compromise always endangers the achievement of 
good ends; 
* that both sides are inevitably selfish in such 
activities as politics and war; 
* that some pacifists, especially between the two 
world wars, were over-optimistic about solutions 
to international problems; and 
* that Christians, who have access to special spiritual 
resources, cannot expect of societies as a whole 
a Christ-like degree of unselfish love. 
However, Yoder holds that there is both a factual and 
a moral error in the argument that war is a "lesser 
evil" than, for example, tyranny. Factually, Yoder argues 
that war is no less harmful to civilisation and moral 
values than is tyranny. And morally, tyranny may be 
"more unpleasant for me" than war, but "in war the sin 
is mine, in slavery it is not." 2 He proceeds to criticise 
three of Niebuhr's key assumptions. 
1John H. Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian oacifism 
(Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1968), pp. 10-13. 
2 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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First, there is the notion of "impossibility". A 
thing can be impossible in the sense t~at one does not 
have sufficient fa1th or courage or information or willingness 
to make the required sacrifices, says Yoder, or it can 
be impossible because of the nature of a world over which 
one has no control. The first kind of impossibility 
implies moral guilt, while the second does not, and "ethics 
is not interested in what is, but what ought to be". 
In this light, non-violent resistance is not impossible. 
in the true sense. 
Second, there is the notion of "necessity". Nothing 
is intrinsically necessary. Things are instrumentally 
necessary. It is not "nece~sary" to abandon love "unles~ 
something more important than love stands to be lost. 
This is in turn only possible if there is a higher moral 
absolute than love, and for a Christian such an absolute 
is difficult to imagine." 
Finally, Yoder takes issue with Niebuhr's notion 
~ 
of "responsibility". He says Niebuhr is wrong to imply 
that responsibility is an obligation to take charge of 
the social order by means dictated by the social order 
itself, rather than by love. This would make responsibility 
a morally autonomous absolute, whereas for the Christian 
pacifist responsibility is a derivative of love. 1 
Yoder holds that ethics should not be derived from 
the fact of sin, as Niebuhr seems to think, but from 
the fact of redemption. It is not the "failure" of the 
1Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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cross alone but the cross and resurrection which point 
to the lifestyle that is consistent with being a· Christian. 
All are sinners, but to derive from that an ethic of 
"therefore sin" is to lose sight of the new possibilities 
of new-born life which is offered by the Holy Spirit's 
power. Moreover, the community of the Holy Spirit, the 
church, is an exception to Niebuhr's rule about societies 
being less moral and more selfish than their ihdividual 
members. The church is the body of Christ, against which 
the greatest offence takes place when Christians kill 
other Christians. By starting from the reality of sin, 
Niebuhr arrives at conclusions which could justify any 
social or foreign policy, and in effect lead to a pluralism 
which identifies moral goodness with the interests of 
a particular group, making social ethics ultimately meaningless. 1 
In my opinion, both Yoder and Niebuhr score significant 
points in this theoretical debate. 2 First, three points 
may be identified for the arguments of pacifism. 
Yoder must be correct in insisting that the pacifist 
option is not "impossible" in the absolute sense but 
rather in the sense that it requires considerably more 
moral endurance than violence. There is, as I have shown 
above, at least enough historical evidence to make that 
clear. 
1 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
2It must be remembered that since they lived in 
different generations, Niebuhr never had an opportunity 
to respond to Yoder's critique. 
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Moreover, Niebuhr must be wrong to insist that ~ 
the ethics of the kingdom of God have nothing to contribute 
to contemporary social ethics other than broad principles 
of criticism. What is the meaning of a principle of 
criticism if it cannot lead to a concrete judgement--say, 
that the use of violence in a particular situation is 
wrong, or right. (I do not mean to suggest here a legalistic 
reading of Jesus' sayings, but rather some degree of 
openness to being· influenced by the criticism of self-interest 
which, as I have shown, is a broad thrust of many of 
tnose sayings.) 
The final point scored by Yoder in the debate is 
his rejection of the moral autonomy of "realism". He 
asks the· question, Is there anything for which it is 
worth sacrificing love? Niebuhr would respond that the 
question misses the point, since even war can be a necessary 
way to achieve a loving solution. But Niebuhr's "realistic 
approximations" are based on self-interest, in which 
socially-constructed norms define what is practicable. 
Yoder rightly insists that there can be no sense in speaking 
of ethics unless moral goodness is defined by something 
other than the interests of groups. 
I think Niebuhr's critique of pacifism also scores 
three points. 
First, as much as a pacifist may with meaning criticise 
Niebuhr's world-view as morbid and pessimistic, Yoder's 
can be seen as wildly idealistic. If the church were, 
in fact, as spiritually powerful in vanquishing sin as 
Yoder sees it, this would have become obvious long ago. 
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Rather, the church consists of individual Christians 
who are, as Luther contended, simultaneously sinners 
and saints--imperfect people with enormous potential. 
Christians can and do obstruct the work of the Holy Spirit, 
and this is possible both for individuals and for the 
Christian community as a whole. 
Second, it appears that religious non-resistance 
depends to a certain extent on an another-wordly concept 
of avoiding the guilt of sin. Yoder speaks a great deal 
about what is "my guilt" and what is not, saying, for 
example, that it is better to be a slave than a soldier 
since the soldier bears the guilt for his or her actions. 
This seems to imply, that the consequences of a person's 
actions do not matter in themselves, so long as the person 
does not personally have to bear the guilt for his or 
her actions--or failure to act. 
Finally, Niebuhr is right to reject the assumption 
that religion is in conflict with human experience .. 
Religion is part of human experience. If they say, "this 
is right and to hell with experience," pacifists would 
seem to be saying that God does not reveal himself within 
experience--in which case, where does he do so? It.is 
equally wrong, as I have already pointed out, for Niebuhr 
to draw a rigid line between the kingdoms of God and 
of the world. 1 The point is that revelation and experience, 
ideal and reality, are not in total conflict. A helpful 
ideal will, sooner or later, be borne out by experience: 
1
see also Turner, p. 146, on Thielicke's critique 
of pacifism. 
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otherwise there would be no way to test ideals, and, 
with all due respect to Yoder (and a great deal is due!), 
religious and moral pluralism would result just as certainly 
as if ethics were identified with interests. 
Three points each, then, but the nature of the points 
for each position should be noticed. The merits of the 
pacifist position do not necessarily qu·alify it as the 
only possible option for Christians, as most pacifists 
seem to consider it. Rather, the pacifist argument is 
recognisably strong, and thus constitutes an important 
critique of justifications of violence. Violence, in 
this light, is not necessarily the more realistic alternative, 
and the religious values contained in Jesus' teachings 
are at least as relevant as the fabt of groupst self-interest 
in choosing moral positions. On the other hand, the 
points for the possibility of a violent option are no 
more than that: pointers to a possible choice for violent 
means in some circumstances. Hopefulness concerning 
the church's potential, and healthy concern about sin 
and guilt, are without doubt essential elements of Christian 
spirituality, but must be tempered in ethics by cool 
analysis of the relevant social forces, and enlightened 
by faith in a God who is discernable not only in Scripture 
and theology but in the world he created. 
Ultimately, then, when weighing the value of individual 
human lives against an urgent need for social change, 
what is most important is a consideration of what can 
be achieved by violence and non-violence respectively. 
To reiterate the utilitarian method adopted for this 
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thesis, "the moral presumption will prevail unless it 
can be shown that greater good will result from the exceptional 
stance than from following the leading of the presumption," 
so the burden of proof remains on those who argue for 
revolutionary violence, to show that such violence may 
indeed be a more effective way than non-violence to achieve 
desirable political ends. If a positive answer to that 
question is produced, then the assessment of the pacifist 
critique just completed would indicate that the case 
for revolutionary violence in such an instance would 
be proven. 
(3) Counterproductive or productive? 
So far in this chapter, certain arguments for revolutionary 
violence have had to be weighed not only against the 
primary presumption for the preservation of life, but 
also against s:ec.ondarypresumptions against self-interest 
and for the less powerful. Now a third presumption 
comes into play. It would appear that if anything is 
to justify homicide in a revolutionary context, it will 
be a matter of desirable ends justifying undesirable 
means. In considering the effects of violence, then, 
we have to bear in mind the need for proportionality--that 
the ends achieved must be sufficiently desirable to outweigh 
the right to life of those killed in the process of achieving 
those ends. The difficulty of such a calculation will 
be recognised in due course, but the empirical question 
must be asked: Is it possible that to some extent revolutionary 
violence, far from achieving justice and peace, tends 
to be counterproductive in terms of these ends, rather 
producing greater injustice and continuing strife? 
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possessed political and economic power and abused it. 
But the bishops were clearly also worried about the counter-
productivity of violence as a means of liberating the 
poor. 
The argument becomes, then, one of whether the consequences 
of violence are better than the consequences of non-violent 
strategies for change. I have conceded the force of 
the argument that non-violence can in some situations 
favour the continuation of oppression, but it remains 
necessary to question the assumption that violence can 
in a realistic sense be more effective than non-violent 
methods as a way of bringing about constructive social 
change. 
The basic utilitarian argument in favour of violence 
is di.fficult to dispute. Even with life supreme' on a 
scale of values, few would say that it would be wrong 
to take a life if there were a good chance that by doing 
so, one would save, say, a hundred lives--or to take 
a hundred to save a thousand. In practice, though, that 
kind of arithmetical projection is difficult to make. 
In respect to revolutionary violence, it should be enlightening 
to take a look at the history of post-revolutionary societies 
and ask whether the structures in these societies have 
in fact been transformed in such a way as to end, or 
mitigate, oppression. Unlike an election, after all, 
a revolution concerns more than simply changing the party 
in power. AsSwomley says, "the oppressive system inherited 
from the old order must be replaced or transformed into 
new and liberating structures" if the revolution is to 
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succeed. 1 
In other words, even if one accepts, with Joseph 
Fletcher, that the end justifies the means, always and 
absolutely, one has to recognise that "the end to a considerable 
degree is conditioned by the means." 2 Simone Weil has 
called attention to the way in which the use of violence 
leaves its mark not only on the victim but on the perpetrator: 
Force is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, 
or thinks he does, as it is to its victims. The 
second it crushes, the first it intoxicates. The 
truth is: no one really possesses it.3 
Swomley has studied the empirical effects of revolutionary 
force in a number of societies after armed uprisings. 
He claims to have identified five hazards of revolutionary 
violence: 
* The danger to the resisting group. 
* The threat to the economic life of the country 
and its existing values. 
1swomley, p. 80. 
2Ibid., p. 104. The argument over ends and means 
is often unhelpfully abstract. Davies, p. 163, rightly 
warns of two common errors: pacifists (and others) are 
inclined to absolutise means, while Communists (and others) 
tend to absolutise ends. It is better, as Davies says, 
to recognise that "if certain means are contrary to a 
moral guideline, only a very special end would be held 
to justify themh--and then, I would add, only if there 
is a good chance of achieving that end, rather than, 
perhaps, merely a wistful hope. 
3simone Weil, The Iliad, or the poem of force, tr. 
Mary McCarthy (Wallingford, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill, 1986), p. 11. 
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* The difficulty of controlling violence, which 
so easily becomes a competition in inhumanity. 
* The danger of negating the purpose of the revolution 
by emphasising aims over against persons. 
* The difficulty of providing and maintaining new 
structures in a non-violent way after power has 
been seized (in other=words, the difficulty of renouncing 
' 
violence after it has achieved its primary aim. 1 
Most modern revolutions have aimed at transforming 
structures; decentralising power and wealth; and establishing 
justice, peace and participatory democracy. How nearly 
have these aims been achieved after the revolutionary 
dust has been settled?, Swomley's study of violent revolutions 
persuades him that in each of these situations there 
were "serious problems following the use of armed violence 
that seemed to stand in the way of revolution." 2 Such 
problems included the followingi 
Maintenance of power. As a result of ideological 
and strategic differences as well as personal ambition, 
one group within the revolutionary movement tended to 
seize power and maintain structures to hold on to it 
rather than sharing it with the people as a whole. According 
to Swomley, this tendency might be expected in view of 
the "habit of conspiring and the use of armed force rather 
than open campaigning for control."3 
1 Swomley, p. 167. 
2Ibid., p. 81. 
3 Ibid., p. 89. 
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Centralisation of power. A central power base is 
a requirement of violent revolution. After the take-overs 
studied by Swomley, there was no perceived need to "change 
a successful organisation", and the party tended to remain 
organised along centralised, military lines. Moreover, 
the fear of counter-revolution was persistent, rooted 
in the violent seizure of power ("what one group can 
do can presumably be done by others") as opposed to reliance 
on the popular demand and its non-physical force. Swomley 
quotes Kenneth Kaunda: 
History shows several times that the method you 
use in obtaining your objective is very often the 
method used by other people to try to throw you 
out of power. 
The result of this tendency was that revolution became· 
. 1 institutionalised along totalitarian lines. 
Foreign hostility. Possibly because of the threat 
to neighbouring rulers constituted by the revolutionary 
example, and possibly because of revolutionaries' reputation 
for being zealous in exporting violent change, the new 
regimes in Swomley's sample tended to find themselves 
in situations of international tension. 2 
Damage to the economy. Violence on a large scale, 
such as occurred in Russia, China and Algeria 
is damaging to agriculture and industry. It breeds 
further violence through starvation, labour camps, 
rapid industrialisation and other measures unique 
to each country. 
1Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
2Ibid., p. 97. 
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But Swomley conceded that this consequence was usually 
a short-term one. In the long-term, some revolutionary 
nations have made significant material advances, and 
starvation was eliminated both in Russia and China. 1 
Overall, Swomley found that in each of the nations 
he studied, 
a very small group continues to determine the destiny 
of ~~millions because human as well as material resources 
are subject to state planning •• Each of the 
nations continues to develop its military machine 
.•• and each has conscription. The ruling elite 
is willing to restrict, intimidate and manipulate 
people with the result that certain freedoms, to 
organise, to propagandise, to publish, to travel, 
are denied. There are no independent labour unions, 
no independent judiciary and no right to participate 
in decision-making. 2 
Swomley is certain--and argues convincingly--that such 
developments are the direct result of the authoritarian 
and military type of political organisation which is 
required of necessity for the violent seizure of power: 
The fact of violence does not necessarily guarantee 
the failure of a revolution. It is possible, for 
example, eventually to overcome the economic damage 
caused by civil war; it is also possible to erase 
the hostility of other nations by successful diplomacy. 
It is far more difficult, however, to move from 
a highly centralised organisational control of the 
state or to abandon the use of violence against 
recalcitrant people. The reason is this: the violence 
required for an armed seizure of power in a modern 
1 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
2Ibid., p. 103. 
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industrial state or even in a large semi-industrialised 
nation is usually of such a magnitude that it adversely 
conditions the organisation that must both seize 
power and manage the revolution thereafter. There 
seems to be a carry-over not only into the political 
structure that the revolution builds, but also into 
the relationships of those who control the new organisation 
1 
of society. 
One must recognise that no two researchers into 
the subject chosen by Swomley would have come up with 
identical results. Although he was looking at empirical 
effects, his interpretation of the data, and especially 
of causalities, was his own, and the force of those interpretations 
is thus only relative. 
It must also be recognised that revolutionary thinkers 
are far from blind to the probable negative effects of 
the violent means they are driven to. I have already 
shown that the violent response has to be seen primarily 
in the context of desperation rather than of calculation. 
In that context, it is understandable that revolutionary 
leaders, confronted by the prospects of negative side-effects 
of their struggle, tend to answer that they will cross 
that bridge when they come to it. 
It is also difficult to refute the response to Swomley's 
findings that says, in effect, that even if the post-revolutionary 
societies tend to leave much to be desired, they are 
in better shape than they were before. Nevertheless, 
the purpose of both Swomley's study and this chapter 
is to examine the effects of violent revolution. Swomley's 
1Ibid., p. 104. 
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arguments point specifically to the probable consequences 
of armed struggle--consequences that would possibly (and 
one would intuitively say, in the case of some of these 
consequences, quite probably) not arise in the case of 
non-violent revolutions. 
Another possible response to Swomley's findings 
is to point to the need for historical distance in assessing 
the long-term effects of epochal events. A revolutionary 
may well say something to the effect of: "Give us time: 
you would have us put up with oppression for hundreds 
of years--don't condemn the new structures because they 
are not perfected overnight." Yet most of Swomley's 
research was conducted in well-established revolutionary 
nations like the Soviet Union, China and Algeria, which 
do not yet show signs of significant openness to democratisation 
or decentralisation· of power. This immediately suggests 
another common response, which says: "Ah, but in Africa 
(or South Africa, or Latin America, or wherever) we are 
different: things will turn out differently here, because 
of such-and-such ••. ". That response is, of course, 
too general to refute, but thus far there is no evidence 
to suggest that Africans or anyone else are significantly 
different from other people in terms of the negative 
effects upon them of violence. 
Swomley cites Lawrence Stone's finding that violence 
leads to bitter cleavages in society on an escalating 
scale, and that therefore "the very use of violence creates 
·a new situation demanding a new solution." 1 This solution 
1Ibid., p. 97 
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should, of course, involve progress towards reconciliation 
among groups who were estranged during the revolutionary 
process. "But revolutionary thinking based on violence 
increasingly views the enemy as someone to be subjugated 
or destroyed", making later reconciliation almost impossible. 1 
While in theory, then, homicide can be justified 
in revolutionary situations by reference to the tyranny 
being overcome and the new society being created, in 
practice the consequences of violence frequently fail 
to produce the desired results. At this point, it would 
probably be difficult for a revolutionary thinker to 
produce any persuasive historical examples of violent 
revolutions so productive that they make a compelling 
case against a preference for non-violent strategies. 
The presumption for the preservation of life, coupled 
with the presumption for proportionate reason, thus indicate 
a burden of proof that is not outweighed by the evidence 
of the productivity of violence. 
3.6 Case closed? 
The most immediately apparent conclusion suggested 
by the arguments presnted in this chapter is that the 
case for violence fails on the grounds that it does not 
provide compelling and proportional evidence to support 
homicide in the cause of revolution. However, that is 
only a prima facie conclusion. It must be recognised 
that in the end, what has been said above applies, if 
anything, to "revolutions in general". Nothing here 
1Ibid.' p. 97. 
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can ultimately refute what was recognised in the beginning: 
that in theory, a tyranny may be so oppressive, so violent, 
so homicidal itself, that an insurrection, no matter 
what the consequences, could produce only better prospects 
for the society in question. The trouble is: hQw. may 
such a tyranny be recognised? The truthful, though unsatisfactory, 
answer is probably that what is involved is a ttgut-level" 
intuition--no less subjective, indeed, than Barth's Grenzfall--
in the situation. Hopefully, a Christian struggling 
to make such a decision would·doso with more humility, 
self-criticism, and caution if enlightened by such warnings 
as have been named above. 
As I have conceded, this is not a satisfactory answer. 
But can a better one be produced within the limits imposed 
by Christian theology, which demands both obedience to 
general standards and freedom of conscience? Indeed, 
given what has been discovered above about the limits 
of revolutionary violence, could any more definite answer 
possibly satisfy the fourth seconday presumption, which 
calls for a balance between these twin values of obedience 
and freedom? 
In the end, this whole chapter on revolutionary 
violence has come down, by a process of logical eliminations, 
to one question: Is it worth the cost? If the likely 
costs are correctly understood, that question can be 
answered only within the situation, and only tentatively. 
at that. A plausible universal answer is impossible. 
The only thing that can be hoped for is that a Christian 
might make a better guess at his or her answer if informed 
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by valid presumptions, factual assessments, and reas9ned 
analysis, than otherwise. There is never a sure way 
of knowing what will happen if one does X as opposed 
to what will happen if one does Y; how many lives will 
be lost if one acts in one way, and how many in another; 
how many if we fail to act or wait a while; how many 
social freedoms will be credited to the revolution's 
account and how many debited, and what the value of each 
is in terms of the value of human lives. Ferguson has 
suggested that no one ever achieves precisely the "results" 
they expect. 1 Suffering cannot be calculated, and cannot 
be avoided, whatever one does or fails to do. Peter 
Berger has referred to this sobering realisation as the 
"postulate of ignorance" 2 
Does the lack of a basis for calculation mean that 
one must simply opt out of a conclusion on this matter, 
and simply sing along, "what will be, will be"? Ferguson 
says no: 
We can make some partial judgements. It is a simple 
fact that non-violent methods do not add to the 
sum of destruction. It is also a simple fact that 
violence tends to provoke counter-violence . . • 
We may not always see the creative effects of non-violence. 
The destructive effects of violence are plain for 
all to see.3 
This is a bad overstatement. Sopmetimes, the creative 
1Ferguson, pp. 105-106. 
2Peter Berger, Pyramids of sacrifice (Garden City: 
Anchor Books, 1976), p. xiii, also 138, etc. 
3Ferguson, p. 106. 
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effects of violence are plain to see. Modern Germany 
is perhaps an example, as are some promising signs--despite 
other ominous signs--in Zimbabwe and presumably many 
other nations. Ferguson also neglects the possibility 
that non-violent methods, if ineffective, may indeed 
add to the sum of destruction, by delaying the end of 
tyranny, and thus allowing the present degree of suffering 
to endure. 
Nevertheless, it is true that in.the late twentieth 
century Christian activists are confronted by a growing 
movement within the church (as well as outside of it), 
demanding that non-violent methods be given a serious 
trial. As Villa-Vicencio puts it: 
Simple sanity suggests that there may come a moment 
when an oppressed or violated people can do no other 
than take up arms against the aggressor. Honest 
reflection, in turn, tells us that few Christians 
have with planned consistency explored the options 
of direct non-violent action as an alternative~ 1 
Given the negative effects of counter-violence, those 
inclined to throw their weight behind violence would 
be irresponsible not to ask whether all other alternatives 
have been tried. Massive, strategic, meticulously prepared 
and planned non-violent action is an alternative that 
calls for moral stamina, concerted leadership, great 
courage, much patience, and spiritual strength. It has 
not often been tried, but--if only because· it dramatically 
reduces the number of homicides that must be carried 
out in the cause of revolution (if not necessarily in 
1Villa-Vicencio, Between Christ, p. xxiii. 
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the course of its suppression)--it should not be lightly 
dismissed, or readily relinquished when half-hearted 
"dialogue" or "working within the system" (neither of 
which is the essence of direct non-violent action) ends 
in inevitable failure. 
"When all else fails," perhaps after all, armed· 
struggle is the recourse which is inevitable, pre-rational, 
and probably even moral.ly justified. But in no instance 
in recent history has the "all else" cited in order to 
justify revolutionary violence included properly-planned 
and massively-supported passive resistance. 
Conclusion 
The wise man, said St Augustine, will wage a war 
if compelled to do so, and if his purpose is peace. 1 
The Christian prince, said Desiderius Erasmus, will first 
question his own right to wage war--since everyone automatically 
assumes that he or she is in the right--and will then 
"carefully consider whether it should be maintained by 
means of catastrophes to the whole world." 2 
I have questioned whether war can lead to peace, 
and whether violence can bring about true revolution. 
I have further questioned whether the catastrophe of 
homicide en masse is as easily justified as some revolutionary 
moralists would suggest. And I have suggested that 
1
st Augustine of Hippo, The city of God against 
the pagans, tr. W.C. Greene, vol. VI (London: William 
Heinemann, 1969), pp. 151, 163. 
2The education of a Christian prince, in Marrin, p. 157. 
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the prospects of non-violent revolution are, in principle, 
more attractive than those of violence. On the other 
hand, I have also recognised the seriousness of the call 
to work for justice and against tyranny, and the agony 
out of which some Christians have been led to adopt: 
violent strategies in pursuing these legitimate and essential 
goals. This tension should not lead to the strange conclusions 
drawn by Jacques Ellul, who responded as a Christian radical 
pacifist to the dual imperative of justice and the sanctity 
of human life. The dual imperative, he argued, should 
lead one not only to understand the "explosions" of the 
poor against injustice, but even to approve of them, 
in the sense that the poor must use the only way available 
to them of "protesting their human right to live." Yet 
Ellul cannot condone any Christian participation in or 
affirmation of these acts of violence. Rather, the Christian 
is called upon to take up the "most thankless position 
anyone can take": to be "on the side of·the oppressed 
and at the same time to have to tell them that their 
explosions of violence are futile and will bring no real 
change." 1 This ambiguity leads Ellul to a rather bizarre 
call for Christians to join revolutionary movements without 
themselves participating in violence: 
If the Christian, because of his solidarity with 
the poor and the oppressed, joins their movement 
of redress, stands with them in their revolt, he 
may never use violence himself, nor even unreservedly 
endorse their violence. The Christian may not 
1 Ellul, p. 69. 
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conunit murder or arson even to defend the poor. 1 
Ellul seems to consider it more important that Christians' 
hands be clean and their consciences clear than whether 
or not violence is done and lives lost. He also apparently 
fails to countenance the possibility that one can be 
both a Christian (who thus may never participate in violence) 
and poor (and thus quite justified in "exploding"). Rather, 
Ellul seems concerned to find a way for Christians who 
are not poor but are troubled by social consciences, 
to have their place in the revolutionary movement while 
washing their hands of killings. The fact that so important 
a thinker can arrive at so wistful a conclusion should 
be a warning that in.the complex and hazardous ethics 
of violence the tempting, longed-for via media is a seductive 
illusion. 
Violence cannot simply be ruled out as an "un-Christian" 
act or ethical impossibility. It is, in principle, 
neither. Though the calculus of conflicting rights may 
be ultimately inconceivable, and the arithmetic of 
possible consequences certainly impossible, the calculation 
cannot be avoided, and the answer which appears to be 
"less wrong" must be grasped hopefully, with due awe 
for the seriousness of the choice being made. Certainly, 
violent action against gross injustice on the scale evident 
in South Africa and elsewhere is "less wrong" than either 
inaction or ineffective action. According to Walter 
Wink, Gandhi himself "continually reiterated" that 
1Ibid.' p. 135. 
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violence was far preferable to submission, if non-violent 
action were for some reason impossible: "Where there 
is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would 
advise violence," he quotes Gandhi as saying. 1 To argue 
against violence and then do nothing (or confine oneself 
to ineffective token gestures) is to try to opt out· of 
the one thing that the ethical person simply cannot avoid: 
the imperative to make a choice. Moral dilemmas are 
by definition difficult choices, but they cannot be wished 
away. This point is repeatedly emphasised by Burtchaell, 
who says the most significant_ difference is not that 
between the "warrior" and the'bbjector", but that between 
the person who makes a conscientious choice and the one 
who merely follows his or her impulses. The person who 
conscientiously chooses either for violence or for non-violence 
is a '"hero", for that person has bravely made a terrible 
decision: 
Both the conscientious warrior and the conscientious 
objector ... are comrades. Both have chosen a 
pathway of service to walk upon: both are willing 
to follow it to the death. Together, they stand 
in almost equal opposition to the ordinary warrior, 
who is lost in his fury, and to the ordinary objector, 
who declines equally to take up arms for his neighbor 
or to suffer imprisonment or death as a witness 
to him. It requires similarly superhuman virtue 
to be a conscientious warrior or to be a conscientious 
objector. Either choice must be made with deep 
regard for one's own self, and with disregard for 
self in service of one's brothers. Each should 
regard his gift to his brothers as invaluable, yet 
1
wink, p. 29. 
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incomplete. Both will be held in some public contempt, 
unrecognised in their respective heroism. Perhaps 
only the one could understand the other. 1 
Having said this, the last word in a chapter that 
is less about the need for revolution than about the 
ethics of homicide, has to be a word reiterating the 
seriousness of the act of killing--always and everywhere. 
Christian social ethics can never throw its weight unambiguously 
behind homicide. As Davies concedes, a terrible choice 
is always involved in revolutionary violence. He characterises 
it as a choice between love for the oppressed and love 
for the oppressor: 
There is a denial of love if I have to kill an oppressor. 
It is vain to suggest that such an act can reveal 
my love towards him. , • ,. • I have to accept the guilt 
without cowering behind the pretence that it has 
not been incu"red. 2 
/ 
Even while recognising the possibility of the ultimate 
emergency act of denying life, Christian ethics must 
remain a force which tends to encourage and facilitate 
the exploration of non-violent and effective methods 
of working for revolutionary change. 
A final consequence of the ethical concern for human 
life is probably the most significant, given the validity 
of Chikane's statement that once things reach a certain 
point in a society's history, there is little or no space 
left for debating violence and non-violence. If human 
1Burtchaell, pp. 171-172. 
2Davies, p. 158. 
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life is sacred, then the best thing that can be done 
is to remove the tensions that produce homicide. The 
number of those free to make meaningful decisions about 
violence and non-violence is limited by the revolutionary 
situation itself. In those societies that have not yet 
reached the revolutionary stage, or where there is still 
some chance of avoiding that explosion when few can find 
or even seek the space in which to make moral decisions 
about strategy, the ethical concern about human life 
will be above all a concern to preserve and extend that 
essential space in which the sanctity of life can inspire 
moral decisions. .This point is eloquently made by Rollo 
May: 
Violence is a symptom. The disease is variously 
powerlessness, insigni.ficance, inj ustice--in short, 
a conviction that I am homeless in the world. . 
\ To strike the disease at its core requires that 
we deal with the impotence. We must find ways of 
sharing and distributing power so that every person, 
in whatever realm of our bureaucratic society, can 
feel that he too counts, that he too makes a difference 
to his fellows and is not cast out on the dunghill 
of indifference as a nonperson. 1 
The problem of violence must be recognised as one 
that arises mainly when things have moved beyond the 
reach of moral suasion. This fact should move Christians 
to foster with increasing zeal social justice, political 
and economic power-sharing, and communication between 
opposing~ groups in society. In that way, the hideous 
1 May, p. 24 3. 
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problem of violence--a problem to which, as I have shown, 
there is no satisfactory solution--can perhaps sometimes 
be avoided altogether. 
CHAPTER 4 
ABORTION 
In addressing the arguments about abortion, roughly 
the same approach will be used as in the preceding chapter 
about revolutionary violence. First, the problem will 
be defined--under which heading the question must be 
asked: Is abortion indeed homicide? Then a survey of 
scriptural and historical theological attitudes will 
be attempted. That will be followed by an analysis, 
in the light of this study's methodo.logical presumptions, 
of the various circumstances under which, and reasons 
for which, abortions are carried out. Finally, some 
conclusions will be drawn. 
However, this chapter will not follow exactly the 
structure of the previous one, because in two important 
respects the issues differ fundamentally. The definition 
of the problem ("is abortion homicide?") is a lengthy 
and complex undertaking. And while there is no need 
here for an excursus into such prior issues as the authority 
of the State, there does seem to be a need, after contextually 
analysing the circumstances of abortion, to address the 
questions of who is responsible for making decisions 
about this act (is it the doctor, or the patient, or 
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the State . ?). 
During the course of this chapter, I shall make 
repeated reference to the report of a Southern African 
Anglican commission on abortion.1 I must explain why 
this will be done. An essential dimension of ethical 
contextuality is, as was shown in Chapter 1, critical 
attention to the prevailing wisdom of the group within 
which one finds oneself. The alternative is to lose sight of 
the influences (positive and negative) of the group's 
interests and norms upon the development of one's own 
attitudes. Moreover, if one did not pay attention to 
what the church--and especially that part of the church 
in which one finds oneself--is teaching currently, the 
value to the church of theological ethical reflection 
would be limited. Being myself a member of the denomination 
for which the abortion commission's report was published, 
I have decided to use the report as a reference point 
for Protestant orthodoxy on the matter, since I think 
it is a fair representative of prevailing Protestant 
wisdom on abortion. This prevailing wisdom encompasses 
1The commission was appointed by the Episcopal Synod 
of the Church of the Province of Southern Africa (CPSA), 
and included five clergy and three laity, two of the 
latter being medical doctors. After a year. of deliberations 
ending in September 1977, the group produced a 48-page 
report (plus appendices) which contained judgements on 
on the status of the human foetus, on various possible 
indications for abortion, and on relevant South African 
legislation. The Anglican bishops released the report 
for general distribution 
is no publication date). 
it as the "CPSA Report", 
a few years after its finalisation (there 
In this chapter I refer to 
by paragraph number for convenience. 
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a fairly wide range of positions, but byandlarge it 
is fair to say that the mainstream Protestant churches' 
"official" teaching (to the extent that there is any 
such thing) could be characterised as "middle-of-the-road" 
on abortion, a position also adopted by the CPSA Report. 
It will become clear that I find the arguments generally 
produced to support this position wanting in several 
important respects. 
4.1 The problem defined: 
Is abortion homicide? 
Is this unborn being, growing within the mother, 
a human life? . . . Judge it to be a mass of cells, 
a piece of meat?--then vote for abortion-on-demand. 
Judge it to be a human life?--then join us in fighting 
for his right to live, with all the resources at 
your command. 
Dr and Mrs J.C. Willke 1 
The Willkes' polemical stile is appropriate to their 
fervent opposition to abortion (which I shall assess 
below), but the basic point they are making in the above 
quotation, however crudely it may be staied, is valid. 
To form a judgement on the justifiability of an abortion, 
one must first form a judgement on the status of the 
foetus. The question, "is abortion homicide?" (that 
is, does abortion involve the killing of a human being?), 
clearly depends on some kind of ontological definition 
of the foetus. 
Some would argue that the answer to that question 
1Dr and Mrs J.C. Willke, Handbook on abortion (Cincinatti, 
Ohio: Hiltz Publishing Co., 1971), p. 8. 
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lies in the biology of pregnancy and birth. For reasons 
that will become clear shortly, I disagree, and in any 
event this is not a proper place for a detailed summary 
1 
of that physical process. It is enough here to draw 
attention to t~e fact that whatever gaps may exist in 
the scientific understanding of pregnancy, all are agreed 
that the "first nine months of human life" (if such 
it is--an open question at this point) constitute a continuous, 
gradual and steady process of development from conception, 
through establishment of the genotype, through the blastocyst 
stage, through the development of the embryo/foetus, 
and finally to birth. 2 This development can be interrupted 
by natural or artificial events, leading to miscarriages 
or abortions, or retarded within the womb, leading to 
deformities either through genetic imperfections or 
diseases. In some cases, natural events in the early 
stages lead to multiple foetuses arising out of a single 
conception. 
Artificially induced abortions interrupt the normal 
process of development, generally in one of four ways: 
dilation and curettage ("D&C"), vacuum aspiration, saline 
1The reader who seeks such a summary would do well 
to consult Gordon Bourne, Pregnancy (London: Pan Books, 
1976), ch. 4. A more concise treatment is found in Harmon 
L. Smith, Ethics and the new medicine (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1970), pp. 18-19. 
2In this study, as in most moral treatments of the 
subject, the term "foetus" is used as a generic term 
of convenience for zygote, blastocyst, embryo, etc., 
but where it is necessary to distinguish between the 
various stages, the neutral generic term "conceptus" is used. 
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injection, and hysterotomy. The first two methods are 
the most common, and, like the third, effect the death 
of the foetus within the womb. A "D&C" is usually performed 
after either the second or the third type of operation, 
for the sake of the mother's health. Hysterotomy is 
a surgical opening of the womb, the live foetus being 
extracted and usually left to die. Opinion is divided 
on the effects of abortion on the mother. Physical problems 
after hospital abortions--especially in the first twelve 
weeks of pregnancy--are rare, but such complications 
are more frequent in the case of illegal abortions (known 
in the prevailing debating jargon as "back-street" operations). 1 
There is considerable disagreement on the psychological 
effects of abortions on the mother. Elizabeth Smith's 
survey of the literature leads her to conclude that the 
incidence of serious psychological problems is small, 
but Larsen mentions reports of a more diverse nature, 
including one which found as high as twenty-three percent 
incidence of severe guilt feeling. 2 Larsen comments 
that such a range of opinion is to be expected: 
The danger of interpreting results to fit one's 
own preconceptions is obviously very great when 
dealing with such intangibles as mental sequelae.3 
1
see Willke, pp. 27-28; Smith, p. 20; Larsen in 
CPSA Report, appendix B, pp. 51-53. 
2Elizabeth M. Smith, "A follow-up study of women 
who request abortion," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 
43, 4 (July 1973): 575-580; Larsen in CPSA Report, pp. 64-65. 
3Larsen in CPSA Report, p. 64 
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None of the foregoing indicate~ anything about the 
status of the foetus. That is a moral question, and/or 
a metaphysical one, not a biological one. It is true 
that biology takes ·as its presupposition that life begins 
long before birth, but in the purely biological view 
life is a cycle of continuity, so the origins of a human 
life not only precede birth but conception as well. The 
question that has to be settled here is: At what stage, 
in a continuous biological process, should one determine 
that a human person has come into being? 1 The objective 
biologist would say, quite rightly, that the question 
involves speculation belonging in the human sciences, 
rather than in the field of his or her expertise. 
On the other hand, Oliver O'Donovan has attempted 
to show that genetic science provides an answer to the 
question of the beginning of an individual life in the 
literal sense. For O'Donovan, to speak of a person is 
to speak of an indentity, which he defines as "that which 
.•• makes us beings with histories and names". All 
"qualitative" descriptions of personhood--such as those 
relying on concepts like "mind" and "soul"--are inadequate 
and inconsistent with traditional teaching, he says. 
·Rather, the history of the doctrine of man focusses attention 
on the concept of individual identity. And "we must 
learn from what scientists can tell us about where the 
1 Beverley Harrison, "Continuing the discussion--how 
' to argue about abortion II;" Christianity and crisis 37 
(26 December 1977): 311-313. 
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story of each individual begins." 1 O'Donovan points 
to the fact that each fertilised ovum has from the moment 
of conception its own unique genetic structure, and this 
"new genome" controls the new being's future development 
(to the full extent that this ,:development is controlled 
by genetic factors as opposed to the environment): 
We cannot ignore the fact that such science as we 
have today speaks of this point of new beginning 
at conception. Anyone who is dissatisfied with 
the conclusiveness of this science might properly 
do as Roman Catholic thought does--declare ignorance 
about the beginnings of personal existence and then 
protect the child from conception on a play-safe 
basis. Anyone, on the other hand, who is going 
to be wiser than this science, ought to offer an 
alternative account which will be sufficiently conclusive 
to render the appeal to genetics irrelevant. 2 
O'Donovan himself is careful to concede that genetic 
science does not prove the matter of personal human identity 
from conception, but only "seems to provide an indication"3 
of this--prima facie evidence, we might say. But is 
it in fact evidence of anything at all, apart from the 
rather obvious fact that the fertilised ovum is something 
or someone distinct from either sperm or egg or anything 
or anyone else? Patrick O'Mahoney, writing seven years 
be fore 0' Donovan, had con ceded that the human embryo, 
10liver O'Donovan, Begotten or made? (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), pp. 49-64. 
2 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
3Ibid., p. 56. 
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from its earliest stages, can be distinguished from any 
. 1 
other entity. The same could be said for the-embryo 
of a dog. The question is not so much whether the fertilised 
ovum is a distinct entity, but whether that identity 
is appropriately characterised as that of a human person, 
as opposed, perhaps to a potential human person, which 
is something else. This is a philosophical question, 
and it is not, and cannot be, answered by biology. I 
shall now survey critically some of the answers that have 
been attempted by theologians and philsophers. 
(1) The argument from potential 
Few thinkers take a firm stand on the status of 
the foetus. Roman Catholic thinking, for example, currently 
holds that the foetus should be treated as if it were 
human. The church avoids saying that at every stage 
it is actually a human person. Most mainstream Protestant 
churches confess readily to uncertainty about what constitutes 
the beginning of a human life. The CPSA Report, for 
instance, states that this question is of "paramount" 
importance, but fails to arrive at a clear answer. The 
report does, however, implicitly reject one option: 
that the foetus is a morally neutral collection of cells 
that the mother should therefore be free to have removed 
without moral concern, as if it were a tumour. Drawing 
attention to the fact that ~he genotype is established 
at conception, and the process from that point onwards 
1Patrick O'Mahoney, "Where human life begins," The 
month 10, 12 (December 1977): 400-404. 
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is gradual but steady, the commissioners continue: 
What we know scientifically of the foetus and its 
origins must make us reverence it as, at the very 
least, potential human life, to be removed only 
if greater values are to be assessed by the Christian 
in the light of the nature of man and his relationship 
to God . 
In a real sense, from conception onwards the 
foetus has begun to participate in a process of 
"humanisation" which, if not interrupted, will lead 
to maturity as a human personality. This foetus 
may be spoken of as "potentially human", provided 
it is understood to be no mere collection of cells 
but human life-in-the-making. The process of growth 
should continue all through life and through the 
grave to resurrection_ ... 1 
In speaking of "potential" humanity, the report is at 
best stating the obvious and at worst trying unsuccessfully 
to avoid the issue. The reliance on potential is a mistake 
made frequently in the abortion debate. In a sense, 
it is true that, born or not-yet-born, everyone is potentially 
human, in terms of being involved in a process of growing 
and maturing which should, as the CPSA Report says, "continue 
all through life and through the grave to resurrection," 
but this is not the point at issue. The question is: 
Is there a difference between the foetus and the born 
person--a difference significant enough to affect the 
ethics of killing the foetus? In terms of this question, 
there is a world of difference between the judgement 
"potentially human" and the judgement "human". No one 
can seriously argue about_ the fact that, given favourable 
1
cPSA Report, §5.1-2 (italics mine). 
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conditions, the foetus will develop into what is indisputably 
a person. For that matter, given certain conditions--that is, 
contact with an ovum under the right circumstances--the 
same could be said of a spermatazoon. The logical fallacy 
lies in assuming that since the foetus is undeniably 
potentially human, it necessarily has the moral characteristics 
and privileges which pertain to one who is already a 
human perls.Qn.. As Kluge has shown, to say that a potential 
X necessarily has the the same qualities as an X is to 
say that an acorn has the same qualities as an oak tree, 
which is absurd. If one wishes to say that the foetus 
has the rights and privileges of a human being--which 
is not ±n principle absurd--one cannot conclude this 
from the statement that it is a potential human perso:rJ., 
but only from the statement that it is a human person. 
The only thing that could be concluded from the statement 
that the foetus is a potential human being, is that the 
foetus has the rights and privileges of a potential human 
being, and the rights of a potential human being may 
or may not arguably include a right to be bornt 1 
But if it is not as a potential human person that 
a foetus has a moral status which includes a right to 
live, at what stage in the development of fertilised 
ovum to baby does such a status begin? When is it possible 
to begin speaking not of a potential human person but 
of a person? 
1 
. Eike-Henner W. Kluge, The practice of death (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 13-19. 
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(2) The argument from birth 
Fletcher states categorically that a foetus becomes 
a human being at birth. As a foetus, it has none of 
the qualities which he associates with human beings: 
self-development, freedom, rationality. It is just a 
"part of the mother," therefore to be legitimately excised 
for any good reason. 1 But the Willkes correctly point -
out that birth is a very minor change in the bodily development 
of a foetus/baby: "The child is no different before 
birth than after, except that he has changed his method 
of feeding and obtaining oxygen." 2 In no sense can a 
newly-born infant be described as having substantially 
more freedom, self-development or rationality than a 
foetus. Such qualities begin to emerge to view much 
later in the life of a human person. Birth itself seems 
an arbitrary line of distinction. 
(3) The argument from animation 
Some, in the tradition of St Augustine and St Thomas 
Aquinas, argue that abortion i& homicide if the foetal 
body possesses a soul, while an unanimated (soulless) 
foetus is not a human person. Those adopting this approach 
today fall into two broad camps. 
The first of these groups begins from the viewpoint 
that a human being--as distinct from other types of animal--has 
a capacity for rational thought. This is the Thomistic 
presupposition, and from it proceeds Aquinas's theory 
1 Fletcher, pp. 39-41. 
2Willke, p. 24. 
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of hylomorphism. Curran summarises this line of thought 
as follows. 
According to the Thomistic theory, the soul is the 
substantial form of the body, but a substantial 
form can be present only in matter capable of receiving 
it. Thus the fertilised ovum or early embryo cannot 
have a human soul. Man's spiritual faculties have 
no organs of their own, but the activity .of "cognitive 
power" presupposes that the brain be fully developed, 
that the cortex be ready. (In the view of John 
Donceel) the least we may ask before admitting the 
presence of a human soul is the availability of 
these organs: the senses, the nervous system, the 
brain, and especially the cortex. Since these organs 
are not ready during early pregnancy, he feels that 
there is no human person until several weeks have 
elapsed. 1 
An additional argument in favour of the significance 
of the cortex may be the fact.that modern medicine tests 
for death by irreversible loss of brain functioning. 
It seems a reasonable rule of convenience to test for 
the beginning of personal life in terms of the beginning 
of the same function. Bernard Haring (a Catholic writer 
like Curran) produces a third argument for the same criterion, 
this time based on anthropology: 
According to important paleontological and anthropological 
findings, a tremendous leap in the development of 
the cerebral cortex, which distinguishes man from 
the animals, was the decisive moment of hominization. 
Without it, no manifestation of specifically human 
1Charles E. Curran, New perspectives in moral theology 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1974), pp. 186-187. 
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personal attributes or activity is conceivable. 1 
According to this approach, then, if the human being 
is distinguished from the animals by possessing a soul, 
which in turn requires a capability for rational thought, 
then the cerebral cortex is a necessary element in humanity. 
Thus a foetus without a cerebral cortex cannot be described 
as a human person. 
The second group of theologians who argue from the 
presence of a soul understand the soul rather differently. 
For them, the soul is associated with individuality rather 
than rationality. For this group, the decisive moment 
of development is not the moment when the cerebral cortex 
becomes present, but the fourteenth day after conception. 
Until the fourteenth day, the fertilised ovum is capable 
of twinning. Since before this stage the zygote and 
then the blastocyst may become one, two or more persons, 
the zygote or blastocyst cannot be considered to be a 
human person. Against this latter group, it must be 
said that science does not yet fully understand why twinning 
sometimes takes place and not at other times. It is 
conceivable (but totally unverifiable at this stage, 
and admittedly unlikely) that it is the genotype, established 
at conception, which determines whether or not the early 
embryo will twin, and therefore that, for a short time, 
two or more "persons" might share a single fertilised 
1Bernard Haring, Medical ethics (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
Fides Publishers, 1973), p. 82. 
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ovum/zygote. 1 
Both groups of theologians who speculate on the 
origins of the soul beg a central theological question. 
The problem with "soul-talk" is that it is by nature 
highly speculative. The soul is not, of course, an 
indentifiable substance. It is an abstract concept which 
describes the value of a human being and his/her relationship 
with the divine reality. To speak of a body without 
a soul, or a soul without a body, is to indulge in difficult 
metaphysics. A human being in traditional Christian 
thought is an intricate and inseparable combination of 
"biological organism and responsible self". 2 To try 
to separate the two at any stage is to enter the realm 
of pseudo-scientific guesswork, the conclusions of which 
are neither verifiable nor particularly helpful.3 It 
is possible to say no more than what seems probable about 
1 . Curran, p. 188; C. Henry Peschke, Christian ethics, 
vol. 2 (Alcester and Dublin: C. Goodliffe Neale, 1978), 
pp. 354-355. According to O'Mahoney, pp. 401-402, Fesearch 
also indicates the possibility of twins being re-fused 
into one shortly after they have split. O'Mahoney is 
convinced by the data that "one cannot say anymore with 
certainty that the conceptus is a human being from the 
time of fertilisation." 
2 Harmon L. Smith, p. 50. 
3The same could be said, of course, about speculation 
concerning the fate of the human person after death. And 
precisely for the same reasons as are outlined above, I would 
argue against basing ethical arguments on speculation about 
life after death. This is not to say categorically that 
there is no personal life after death, or before conception, 
but rather that speculation on these cannot help ethically. 
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the beginning of human personhood in terms of the soul!s 
rationality and/or individuality. That concept of probability 
is not in itself insignificant, and I shall return to 
it below. Meanwhile, however, it is appropriate to turn 
to proposals which are more accessible to the tools of 
earthly logic. 
(4) The argument from rationality 
To reject the formula which equates personhood with 
soul-possession does not altogether dispose of the argument 
that a human person must of necessity have the capacity 
to function rationally. Kluge, an analytical philosopher 
who rejects "soul-talk" in no uncertain terms, nevertheless 
comes to the same ontological conclusion as did Donceel, 
Ruff and Haring: the foetus is to be considered a person 
when it possesses a developed cortex. There is a certain 
integrity in arguing that rational capacity makes people 
persons, but this, too, cannot be asserted dogmatically. 
Is not rationality simply an arbitrary line of distinction? 
The development of the brain is significant only if it 
is presupposed that rationality distinguishes homo sapiens 
from other animals, but how is this verifiable? Would 
a dolphin be categorised as human if it were shown that 
in some sense dolphins have the capacity for rational 
thought? Do human beings demonstrably think more clearly 
than dolphins? And even if so, why pick on rationality 
as "the" mark of personhood? What would this say about 
the personhood of people who are grossly mentally retarded? 
It seems to me that while the concept of rationality 
is hard to exclude from a range of factors which should 
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be taken into account when considering the probabilities 
concerning human personhood, in itself it suggests more 
questions than it answers. 
(6) The argument from viability 
In the criminal law of many countries, and in much 
popular medical practice, a distinction is made between 
early and later periods of foetal development on the 
basis of viability. It is often held that the foetus 
is not viable--that is, incapable of life outside the 
womb--until the pregnancy has reached its twenty-sixth 
or twenty-eighth week (though sometimes doctors attempt 
deliveries as early as the twentieth week). Peschke 
notes that one usually refers to miscarriages in the 
earlier periods of pregnancy, and to premature births 
when the stage of theoretical viability is reached, even 
if in both cases the foetus is born dead. 1 
There are no doubt good reasons for medicine to 
have such a rule of thumb to delineate between deliveries 
in early and late pregnancy, but for moral purposes it 
seems arbitrary in the extreme. No doubt medical science 
will continue to produce surprising technologies in maintaining 
the lives of prematurely born infants, so that a non-viable 
foetus in the 1980s may be viable to in the 1990s. To 
argue that such a foetus is not a person today, but 
would be a person if a certain technology were developed, 
would, of course, be absurd in an ontological sense. 
In more fundamental terms, too, how viable is a new-born 
baby? It is still totally dependent upon others for 
1 Peschke, p. 353. 
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sustenance, clothing; and life itself. 1 As Hiring points 
out, "the fact that (the foetus) cannot survive outside 
its natural habitat does not allow one to deprive it 
of the life-saving environment" 2--any more than the non-viability 
of an adult in space would make it permissible to deprive 
an astronaut of his/her space-suit! 
The argument from viability, then, presents yet 
another ~seemingly arbitrary line of distinction as to 
the presence of human personhood in the foetus. Nevertheless, 
the fact of physical dependence on the mother is by no 
means morally insignificant. No human being is viable 
in an absolute sense. Everyone--including adults: and 
children as well as babies and foetuses--is dependent 
on others. The "others" include society at large as 
well as people with a more immediate and intimate responsibility 
for one's welfare. Babies are particularly dependent 
on adults. But a foetus is uniquely dependent on one 
particular person, its mother. A baby is viable in a 
relarive sense as compared with a foetus, in that the 
foetus, before a certain stage of pregnancy, will die 
if it ceases -~to receive support from its mother, whereas 
the later foetus and the baby can be cared for by another 
person, and survive. This special dependency cannot 
be ignored when the time comes to assess the pregnant 
1
see Willke, p. 22; Kluge, p. 31; John T. Noonan, 
The morality of abortion (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), ch. 1. 
2H" i 97 ar ng, p. • 
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mother's special ethical responsibilities. The significance 
of this point will become clear later. 
(6) An uncertain humanity 
After completing a brief analysis of all these proposals 
about the beginning of human personhood, one remains 
as uncertain as ever. On this question, it seems to 
me, everyone should be willing to confess to some doubt. 
No one can prove an answer, and there is not even an 
authoritative answer to be found in Scripture or tradition 
(see below). But the nature of this doubt is important. 
It is not the same kind of doubt as is to be found, for 
example, in questions like "is it right to kill in the 
cause of revolution?" or "is it a sin to smoke?". It 
is not an ethical doubt, but an ontological doubt. The 
problem is that ethical reflection on the.matter of abortion 
is useless without some tentative decision, at least, 
on this ontological question of what a foetus is. 
I have attempted to show the fallacies contained 
in the various popular arguments for locating the origins 
of personhood sometime after conception. But it does 
not follow that it is unfallacious to state that the 
fertilised __ -ovum is from the beginning a person. Indeed, 
that solution seems extremely implausible, if only because 
of the data I have mentioned concerning the splitting 
of the blastocyst into multiple concepti. Even the concept 
of a person who does not have a cerebral cortex is rather 
improbable. 
How, then, does one deal with doubt on this level? 
The matter of doubt and probabilities is one to which 
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Catholic moralists have given detailed attention for 
centuries, and it may be enlightening to explore the 
various systems they have developed for resolving the 
problem. 
Traditionally, the question is framed in terms of 
"law" and "liberty". If doubt exists, when should the 
opinion for law be followed (that is, the option which 
would safely riot contravene any moral rule), and when 
should the opinion for liberty prevail (allowing action 
which could possibly be wrong). F.J. Connell summarises 
the general answer as follows: 
When a person is in doubt about the morality of 
performing (or of omitting) an action, he must either 
follow the opinion for law or settle the doubt with 
practical certainty in favour of liberty before 
he performs (or omits) the action. 1 
On that, most Catholic scholars agree. Where they would 
diverge is on the meaning of "practical certainty". In 
other words, as Connell himself puts it, "theologians 
differ as to the degree of probability required before 
one may follow the opinion for liberty." 2 
There are seven easily distinguished "moral systems" 
of probability, tanging from rigorism to laxism. Rigorism 
holds that wherever there is doubt, whatever the probabilities 
involved, the opinion for law must be followed. Laxism 
holds the opposite: that even the smallest probability 
1New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967 ed., s.v. "Doubt, 
moral~" by F.J. Connell. 
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will justify liberty. The most commonly followed systems 
today, however, are those of probabilism and equiprobabilism. 
Probabilism holds that, in the words of the sixteenth-century 
Dominican Bartholomew Medina, "if there is a probable 
opinion, it is lawful to follow it, even though the opposite 
is more probable." Equiprobabilism is a more moderate 
system, developed by St Alphonsus Liguori in the eighteenth 
century. It holds that an opinion for liberty may be 
followed if it seems equally probable to the opinion 
for law, but where the opinion for law is more probable, 
the latter should be followed. 1 But (and this is a crucial 
"but") these considerations of probability are generally 
held to fall away when there is a danger of inflicting 
physical harm or spiritual harm to oneself or to others. 2 
In such a case, the opinion for law must be followed, 
however much greater may be the probability for liberty. 
1New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967 ed., s.v. "Morality, 
systems of," by F.J. Connell. Bernard H§ring, Free and 
faithful in Christ: Moral theology for priests and laity, 
vol. 1: "General moral theology" (Middlegreen: St Paul 
Publications, 1978), pp. 284-294, has shown that the 
development of probabilism {in which general category 
he includes St Alphonsus's modifications) was a great 
advance over rigorist tendencies, in that Catholics were 
now allowed a fair amount of freedom to take the moral 
risk of following their consciences in cases of doubt. 
2
considerations of probability also fall away when 
there is a danger to the validity of a sacrament, but 
that is not of concern here. 
3New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Morality, systems of." 
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In short, the generally accepted Catholic teaching 
is that where there is doubt, Christians are free to 
follow the promptings of their conscience based on their 
intuitions concerning a balance of probabilities. But 
where there is a danger of bodily or spiritual harm being 
inflicted on a person, the safest course of action (that 
is, the course that will not contravene a moral rule) 
is always the right one. 
Clearly, the current Roman Catholic teaching on 
abortion is based on this tradition. The Roman magisterium 
has conspicuously avoided dogmatic assertions about the 
point at which human personhood begins, leaving open 
the question whether the foetus possesses a soul from 
conception or from some later moment. Instead, a practical 
rule is laid down, and rigidly applied: Christians should 
behave as if human life were present in the conceptus 
from the beginning. 1 Canon 747 thus requires that the 
live foetus--however young--be baptised in the event 
of an artificial or natural abortion. In effect, this 
approach gives life the "benefit of the doubt". 2 In 
other words, the magisterium implicitly acknowledges 
that there is doubt about whether the conceptus is human 
· from the beginning, but holds that because of the risk 
that a human person may be in danger, this is not a matter 
for probabilistic analysis, but rather for strict application 
of law. Thus the "DeGlaration on Abortion" of the Sacred 
1 ' Harmon L. Smith, p. 29; O'Mahoney, p. 400. 
2 Willke, p. 14. 
238 
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith: 
From a moral point of view this is certain: even 
if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit 
of conception is already a human person, it is objectively 
a grave sin to dare to risk murder. 1 
In view of all the doubts that have been revealed 
in the survey of theories with which this chapter began, 
and in view of what has been said about the seriousness 
of the act of homicide in general, this "safety first" 
approach seems a reasonable one. But Carol A. Tauer 
has questioned the validity of dismissing probabilistic 
considerations in the case of abortion. She shows convincingly 
that the Sacred Congregation's declaration proceeds from 
an uncertain position on ensoulment to a certain moral 
conclusion, and says this is not within the tradition 
' 
ori probabilism because the doubt concerns a theoretical, 
rather than a factual, matter. 2 According to Tauer, 
the tradition of taking the safest course where there 
is danger of harm occurring, is one which is normally 
applied to cases of factual doubt. For example, if a 
hunter is uncertain about whether a movement in the bushes 
was made by the hunted animal or by a fellow hunter, 
he should not shoot. Even if it is considerably more 
· probable that the movements were made by an animal, the 
safest course is not to shoot before making certain. 
1
carol A. Tauer, "The tradition of probabilism and 
the moral status of the early embryo," Theological Studies 
45, 1: 9. 
2 Ibid., p. 14. 
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But that is not analagous to the nature of the doubt 
in the matter of the status of the foetus. In the latter 
matter, the doubt is not factual, but theoretical, since 
it cannot be resolved even in principle by empirical 
investigation, but is rather a question of philosophical 
speculation. Tauer argues that theoretical doubt is 
logically far closer to the concept "doubt of law" than 
to the concept "doubt of fact", and thus the moral doubt 
about abortion lends itself to being solved in the manner 
in which doubts of law have traditionally been, and should 
be, resolved--by probabilistic methods. Since there 
are strong reasons (which I have already mentioned) why 
. 
the probability of personhood is slight for the early 
embryo, the theoretical doubt concerning abortion in 
the early stages of a pregnancy should be resolved in 
favour of liberty--that is, for the option of abortion. 1 
This is an audacious claim for a Catholic theologian: 
that traditional Catholic approaches to resolving moral 
doubt would, if consistently pursued, contradict current 
dogma by permitting abortions in early pregnancy. Responding 
to Tauer's article a year later, Lisa Sowle Cahill questions 
the idea of equating the concept "theoretical doubt" 
with the concept of "doubt of law"~ After all, she 
writes, "ontological assertions are claims about what 
'really' is the case, even if not immediately confirmable." 2 
1 Ibid., pp. 3-33. 
2Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Notes on moral theology," Theological 
Studies 46, 1: 74. 
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Cahill would prefer a more direct challenge to the narrow 
traditional (empirical) conception of a "fact", and to 
the "absolute prohibition on resolving a doubt of fact 
regarding life in favour of a solidly probable (or even 
more probable) negative hypothesis." 1 
Regardless of whether Tauer or Cahill is correct, 
the dispute over probabilism helps to clarify the nature 
of the primary doubt facing the ethics of abortion. Quite 
clearly, the initial instinct which says "better safe 
than sorry" concerning this doubt, is superficial. This 
is not a matter like the hunter in the bushes. Everyone 
knows what is "in the bushes" in this case: it is a foetus, 
and everyone knows what a foetus is. What we do not 
know for certain is what to make of the foetus--how to 
interpret its existence. The hunter can solve his or 
her puzzle by waiting and seeing what emerges from the 
bushes (even if, unfortunately for the hunter, the beast 
might get away as a result of the caut~onary zeal). The 
rest of us cannot resolve our puzzle by exploration 
or by waiting: the mystery of the foetus will endure. 
The official Roman Catholic teaching is to recognise 
the doubt and then ignore the doubt in counselling action. 
That seems an untenable position, where the consequences 
of the "safety first" course can include anguish and 
even death for the mother. Moreover, as Dr Glanville 
Williams has shown, no one consistently behaves as if 
the conceptus is always a person: 
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We do not regard a miscarriage, when it occurs naturally, 
as the death of a human being--even as an accidental 
death. This attitude is reflected in the law. A 
foetus that is spontaneously aborted before the 
end of the seventh month can be buried in the back 
garden or put into a hospital incinerator. No statutory 
notice of birth need be given. There are no obsequies. 
Even the Roman Catholics, who now generally maintain 
that this foetus has a soul, do not perform a funeral 
service • 1 
More appropriate than ignoring the doubt would be 
a method of balancing the probabilities in decision-making 
about abortion. For example, a case could far easier 
be made for aborting a two-day-old pregnancy than one 
which is in its sixth month, if there were a sound reason 
for the act. However unverifiable the various arguments 
about rationality, ensoulment and individuality might 
be , together they provide enough doubt concerning the 
early embryo to allow for probabilistic considerations 
to be a factor in the moral decision--which would mean 
distinguishing between abortions in the various stages 
of pregnancy, in balancing the negative act of ending 
a pregnancy against other conflicting values. 2 
1John A.T. Robinson, Christian freedom in a permissive 
society (London: SCM Press, 1970), p. 54. 
2r am reluctant to be more precise about the developments 
of the pre-natal being, as that could lead to my proposals 
being misunderstood as an attempt at some kind of positivistic 
formula. I am proposing something rather more complex 
than that--and admittedly more subjective. The balancing 
of probabilities should be one component aspect of decision-making 
about abortion. However, it may be wise to give some 
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The degree of uncertainty over the nature of pre-natal 
life should also be remembered when contemplating charac-
terisations of abortion as murder or infanticide (which 
are rather frequent among the "right-to-life groups). If 
kind of idea of the time frame that I perceive to be 
relevant--especially as it is somewhat shorter than might 
otherwise be supposed by a reader unfamiliar with the 
pace of development of the conceptus: 
(1) In the first two weeks of pregnancy, the probability 
of personhood is very slight, as the zygote and the blastocyst 
do not, for reasons I have explained,.have any likely 
claim to individuation, which must be a basic aspect 
of personhood. 
(2) The development of the cerebral cortex begins 
between the fifteenth day and the twenty-fifth day, and 
is usually complete by the fortieth day. It could therefore 
be deduced that--if one attaches great significance to 
the capacity for rationality as a quality of human personhood--
there is a relatively low probability of personhood in 
the first month of pregnancy. 
(3) After that initial month, the probability of 
personhood in my view becomes very rapidly higher. There 
will be those, however, who will attach greater significance 
than seems apparent to me to the viability factor, and 
this would for them become a third variable. Those who 
follow this line of argument would disagree about the 
definition of viability--varying between twenty and twenty-eight 
weeks as the cut-off point. 
To put it as plainly as I dare, given my readily 
conceded lack of qualifications to be discussing these 
anatomical matters, I find it hard to foresee instances 
where doubt over the probability of personhood would 
be a significant factor in decision-making after the 
first month of pregnancy, and even within that first 
month the probability would increase dramatically after 
the first fourteen days. This certainly means that, 
given the usual delay in ascertaining the fact of pregnancy, 
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one cannot be sure that the foetus is a human person, 
then it is surely unacceptable to condemn so dogmatically 
those who take an opposite opinion concerning the "right 
to life" of that nascent being. 1 On the other hand, 
the uncertainty is also sufficient to ensure that the 
abortionist will never be able to be morally sanguine 
about his or her act. Whether or not the foetus is a 
person is so inaccessible a question that the act must 
be preceded by serious ethical self~examination. And 
the more developed the foetus is, the more probable it 
becomes that abortion is, in fact, homicide. 
Could it be that Bonhoeffer is right to suggest 
that the whole argument is irrelevant anyway? It is 
not, he writes, a question of whether or not the foetus 
is already human, but rather a matter of the divine intent. 
God intends a human life, and "this nascent being has 
been deprived of the right to life. And that is nothing 
short of murder." 2 Similarly the Jesuit John R. Connery 
states that not animation or humanisation but the destiny 
of the foetus as a human being is at stake in the church's 
it is going to be relatively rare for the probability 
factor to be a significant consideration in concrete 
cases of abortion-related dilemmas (although some useful 
applications are named below). (For a moralist's analysis 
of the stages of pregnancy, see Haring, pp. 75-85.) 
1 Curran, p. 173. 
2Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (London: SCM Press, 
1955), p. 150. 
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teaching. 1 But this idea of determining God's intent 
by simple observation of natural processes and "not interfering" 
does not commend itself. All exercising of human responsibility 
is to some extent or another an interference in what 
God may be thought to either intend or not intend. Who 
can know what the destiny of any living person or thing 
is, or what God intends about life and death? Doctors 
interfere with the natural process every time they save 
a life--or even spare a person pain. Possibly even in 
some instances God intends that a pregnancy should be 
terminated, so that an endangered mother should live, 
or so that a gruesomely deformed foetus may be spared 
the pain of life, perhaps--in the same way that in popular 
spirituality God is often said to have spared a dying 
person further suffering by speeding his or her death? 
I suggest that the most reasonable conclusion abou~ 
the moral status of the foetus is that there is a prima 
facie case for treating it as if it were a human being--but 
only a prima facie case. From the very earliest to the 
latest stage of pregnancy, the being in the womb has 
important deficiencies in the quality of its life, and 
is in a significantly different position vis-a-vis its 
mother as compared with an infant, child or adult. Moreover, 
the less advanced the stage of pregnancy, the less probable 
it is that the foetus can be a human person in the sense 
of having individuality, rational capacity and/or viability. 
On the other hand, because of the ontological uncertainties 
1John R. Connery, S.J.~ "Notes: Abortion and the 
duty to preserve life," Theological Studies 40, 2: 319-320. 
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involved, the only proper context for assessing the case 
for abortion in any instance must be the ethics of homicide--
even though within those ethics there must now be found 
a place for a unique process of balancing probabilities 
concerning the human personhood of the victim. 
4.2 A cautionary heritage 
It is now clear that a study of abortion has to 
take place within the context of the ethics of homicide--even 
if the ethics of abortion will have certain distinct 
methodological features (concerning probability) within 
that framework. This chapter on abortion is therefore 
subject to the methodological restraints that apply to 
other forms of homicide, and one of the linguistic presumptions 
that must thus be taken into account (number 3.6) prevents 
any further discussion on the matter without a survey 
of biblical and traditional theological principles. I 
have already shown that the Canon contains a bias against 
homicide in general, but upholds no absolute right to 
life. However, the question must be asked whether the 
Bible reveals a more absolute ethic regarding pre-natal 
life and death. 
The answer is no. There is only one direct biblical 
reference to the termination of pregnancy, and that refers 
not to intentional abortions but to accidentally induced 
miscarriages. Exodus 21:22-25 applies the lex talionis 
to cases where a woman comes between fighting men and 
miscarries as a result--but only where this results in 
harm to the woman (the foetus's welfare is clearly not 
an issue). If the woman survives the miscarriage without 
further injury, the rule of eye-for-eye, life-for-life 
does not apply, although the guilty party is fined. 
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Ettlinger points out, however, that in the Septuagint 
version of the text, there is a shift of focus towards 
the foetus.1 In any event, neither editorial version 
amounts to an authoritative norm given the predisposition 
in this study against isolated texts. Haring suggests 
that Paul's reference to pharmakeia2 in Galatians 5:20 
as one of the fruits of self-indulgence could include 
abortion·along with "any other use of drugs with magical 
and inimical intentions," 3 but there is no evidence 
to suggest Paul intended to include abortion under that 
heading. 
Where Christians have purported to find a special 
biblical concern for pre-natal life, they have pointed 
to less direct references. The CPSA Report, for example, 
states that a number of texts give Christians cause "to 
have real concern for the status of the foetus even in 
its earliest stages." 4 The commissioners cite Matthew 
1:20 and Luke 1:15 (on the nascent life of Jesus and 
of John the Baptist), as well as Psalms 139:12-16 and 
Jeremiah 1:5. These texts do appear to indicate something 
of a divine plan for nascent life, and the Jeremiah text 
goes one step further back from conception: "Before I 
1Gerard H. Ettlinger, S.J., "The value of human 
life in Judaeo-Christian perspective," in Human life: 
Problems of birth, of living 2 and of dying (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1977), p. 10. 
2Pharmakeia is usually translated as "sorcery" or 
"witchcraft": compare Rev. 9:21; 18:23; 21:8; 22:15. 
3Haring, p. 99. 4 CPSA Report, §5.0. 
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formed you in the womb, I knew you; before you were born, 
I consecrated you." 1 The Hebrew parallelism clearly 
indicates that the divine plan precedes even the genotype! 
Were such texts to be given ethical authority, not just 
abortion but also contraception (artificial and "natural") 
would have to be seen as potential disruptors of God's 
plan for a person's life. But the context of the texts 
is spiritual, not ethical, and they should not be stretched 
too far. 
Scripture fails, then, to present a consistent picture 
helpful to the ethics of abortion. This seems not to . 
have been a concern that occurred to the biblical writers. 
Their silence could be interpreted speculatively as implying 
a permissive view, or a presupposition that abortion 
is wrong, or even an assumption that no one would want 
to terminate a pregnancy. 2 But none of these proposals 
is verifiable. 
After the biblical age, however, Christians began 
to think in a more disciplined way about the matter of 
abortion, and today the Christian church has -access to 
an impressive array of doctrines on the matter. 
One of the earliest extant non-Canonical writings, 
·the Didache, describes abortion as murder. So do various 
other early Christian texts, including the writings of 
Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian. Abortion 
1 Italics mine. 
2
see C. E. Gerling, Jr., "Abortion and contraception 
n Scripture," Christian Scholars' Review 2, 1 (1971): 42-58. 
248 
was prohibited in the legislation1 of the early Christian 
empire. 2 
St Augustine, however, distinguished between the 
formed and the unformed.foetus: the former, he ruled, 
was a person, and to kill that person was murder. St 
Thomas Aquinas specified that the soul is infused into 
the body at forty days in the case of males, and at eighty 
days in the case of females~ The seventeenth-century 
theologian Torreblanca, in the same tradition, ruled 
that abortion is permissible if the foetus is unformed, and 
if the operation is necessary to save the life of the 
mother--or even to save her reputation. Torreblanca's 
contemporaries and successors were divided on this view, 
but Pope Innocent XI condemned it in 1679, and the distinction 
for moral purposes between the various stages of a pregnancy 
has since disappeared from official Roman Catholic teaching. 
Canon 747 decrees that even the smallest living foetus 
should be baptised, and thus clearly rejects the earlier 
distinction between the formed and the unformed foetus, 
implicitly supposing (though this is not a matter of 
dogma) that every foetus possesses a soul. 3 
In his 1930 encyclical Casti Conubii, Pope Pius 
XI held that foetal life is "equally sacred" to the life 
1Godex Theodosianus, 4.9.2 (A.D. 412). 
2Ettlinger, pp. 11-12. 
3Ibid.; Curran, pp. 176-177; Harmon L. Smith, pp. 26-30. 
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of the mother, and termed direct. abortion--even on the 
grounds of medical emergency--as "direct murder of the 
innocent." Pope· Pius XII reaffirmed this teaching in 
1951: 
Innocent human life, in whatsoever condition it 
is found, is withdrawn, from the very first moment 
of its existence, from any direct deliberate attack. 
This is a fundamental right of the human person, 
which is of general value in the Christian conception 
of life; hence as valid for the life still hidden 
in the womb of the mother, as for the life already 
born and devloping outside of her; as much opposed 
to direct abortion as to the direct killing of the 
child before, during or after its birth. • . . All 
these cases involve a grave and unlawful attack 
upon the inviolability of human life. 1 
Pope Pius XII permitted indirect abortion, however--a 
distinction to which I shall return. Modern Catholic 
writers tend to continue to regard direct abortion as 
murder, and the present pope has reaffirmed this position 
several times. 2 
The Protestant position on abortion, as the CPSA 
Report both notes and demonstrates, is "less clear-cut". 
While the value of human life is everywhere upheld in 
general terms, together with the right of innocents to 
be protected from wilful assaults, some circumstances 
,are allowed by Protestant theologians to permit direct 
1 Curran, p. 17 2 . 
2Ibid., pp. 174-177; Harmon L. Smith, pp. 26-30; 
Peschke, pp. 357-359; Jessma Blockwick, "Pro-choice is 
pro-life," Engage/Social Action 11 (December 1979): 41-46. 
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abortions. At this stage I am still in search of a consistent 
rule, and I shall not enter into the casuistry until 
a little later. There is no such rule to be found in 
the Protestant domain. 1 
More will be said about the current prevailing positions 
below. But the time has come for this quest for a historical 
norm to yield to contemporary and contextual analysis. 
Certainly Scripture does not provide the kind of consistent 
rule that is contemplated by presumption 3.6, and while 
Catholic tradition, especially in the past three centuries, 
has been increasingly single-minded in condemning abortion, 
most Protestants allow themselves more latitude of conscience. 
What Protestants and Catholics share might be described 
as a cautionary heritage--a historical fountain of sobering 
reminders that human life is something to be closely 
guarded, and therefore foetal life is not available to 
be casually dispensed with. 
1on the contrast between the Catholic and Protestant 
traditions on this matter, it may be noted that the 
Catholic doctrine has the advantage of saving doctors 
and parents from the awesome responsibility of having 
to take decisions on this matter. However: 
Dean Fitch's analysis of internal tensions in (the) 
two branches of Christendom is altogether apposite 
here: "There is a Catholic strength, and its name 
is order. There is a Catholic sickness, and its 
name is tyranny. There is a Protestant strength, 
and its name is liberty. There is a Protestant 
sickness, and its name is anarchy." Notwithstanding 
the force of this observation, even a cursory look 
will remind us that as among Catholics there are 
exceptions to rules and conscientious limits to 
tyranny, so among Protestants there are boundaries 
to liberty and dykes against anarchy. (Harmon L. 
Smith, p. 35.) 
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There does not, however, appear to be a valid a 
priori reason why the life of a foetus should be inviolate 
while the life of a child or an adult may be destroyed 
under a variety of circumstances. If, as the discussion 
so far in this ~thesis indicates~ homicide is ever ethically 
Justified, then the ethical killing of a foetus, too, 
must be plausible in theory, and the various motivations 
for such an act must be assessed in the same way--and 
subject to the same methodological restraints--as must 
revolutionary violence and the various other "grey area" 
forms of homicide. Thus this discussion must now move 
on to take account of the various situations in which 
pregnant women find themselves considering the option 
of abortion. 
4.3 Assessing the act of abortion 
The primary presumption of this thesis is that 
while the Sanctity-of-Life Principle is not a viable 
absolute, the burden of proof weighs against all justifications 
of homicide. Since abortion must be assessed within 
the context of the morality of homicide, the arguments 
which have been produced to make a case for abortion 
under speci~ic circumstances must now be assessed in 
turn. 
(1) Killing to save a life: 
therapeutic abortion 
Compare the following two statements: 
The members of the Commission agreed that in a case 
where, to quote the South African Act, "continuing 
pregnancy endangers the life of the woman concerned 
or constitutes a serious threat to her physical 
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health" (e.g. severe diabetes, hypertension, heart failure, 
etc.) abortion may be permitted. The grounds of such 
a decision are that, over against the rights of the 
foetus, the rights of the mother and those dependent 
on her must be weighed. She herself has entered upon 
life and has entered into a variety of relationships; 
others will be dependent upon her, and her claim (and 
theirs) must be given priority. 1 
It is never permissible to commit a sin, a moral evil, 
in order to prevent any other evil, physical or moral. 
It is preferable· by far that a million mothers and foetuses 
perish than that a physician stain his soul with murder. 2 
Both statements refer to the situation in which a choice' 
has to be made between direct abortion to save the life of 
the mother, on the one hand, and allowing both the foetus 
and the mother to die, on the other. The second statement 
puts the official Roman Catholic view that it is better for 
hoth to die, upon the grounds that direct abortion is always, 
under all circumstances, a moral evil. The doctor would 
sin in killing the foetus, but not in allowing it to die 
with its mother. The first statement puts what has become 
nearly a universal position of mainstream Protestant orthodoxy: 
that in such a situation the rights of the mother take precedence 
over those of the foetus (if any such conflict exists), and 
it would therefore be wrong to oblige the mother to die by 
refusing to perform an abortion. 
1CPSA Report, §7.2. 
2Edwin F. Healy, quoted by Marvin Kohl, The morality 
of killing: Sanctity of life, abortion, and euthanasia (London: 
Peter Owen, 1974), p, 40. 
253 
At first glance, presumption 2.2 appears to challenge 
an act of therapeutic abortion. How can the powerless foetus 
be killed because of a preference for the life of the more 
autonomous mother? This presumption for the powerless makes 
it impossible simply to dismiss the matter of therapeutic 
abortions in life-saving situations as self-evident--as the 
CPSA commission was content to do. The paragraph quoted 
above is the repo·rt 's only reference to this particular form 
of the abortion dilemma: there is no attempt to justify 
the conclusions contained therein. There is not even a recognition 
that life-saving abortions constitute a dilemma for many 
Christian doctors. 1 
Only in the present century has there been a clear trend 
in Roman Catholic theory towards an absolute prohibition 
on therapeutic abortions. The tradition of permitting a 
life-saving abortion goes back to Tertullian, although between 
the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries a distinction was 
' 2 
made between the unanimated and animated foetus in this connection. 
Twentieth-century magisterial teaching, as I have mentioned, 
dnes not countenance abortion under any circumstances at 
all. Arguing strongly against the official view, Peschke 
admits that the direct killing of an innocent human being 
is always immoral, and that in no reasonable sense can the 
1John R. Connery, "Eugenic abortion," in Human life: 
Problems of birth, of living, and of dying, ed. William C. 
Bier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1977), p. 109, 
claims that with the advance of medical science the situation 
in which doctors must choose between abortion and the death 
of the mother never arises today. Most writers disagree. 
2 ' Peschke, pp. 359-360. 
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foetus be considered an "unjust aggressor"--whether materially 
or subjectively speaking. 1 But where it is reasonably certain 
that both the mother and the foetus will die unless there 
is intervention, Peschke suggests the dilemma is justly resolved 
by the realisation that life itself is not the highest good: 
The highest good, besides a person's eternal salvation, 
is the realisation of God's plan with mankind and the 
world. This plan also includes the unfolding of his 
creation. Viewed in this perspective, the anticipated 
death of a foetus constitutes a lesser evil and offends 
against a lesser right than the death of mother and 
child together. Because the mother can still contribute, 
and perhaps much contribute, to the realisation of God's 
plan with the world. This is especially evident if 
she is the mother of several children; but it can also 
be shown in other regards. The foetus, on the other 
hand, who is unable to survive the mother's death, is 
therefore also unable to contribute to God's creative 
plan. Hence his right to be kept alive for some days 
more must yield to the higher claims of the divine plan, 
which demands that the mother's life be saved, if necessary 
by the direct removal of the unviable foetus. 1 
Bonho~ff&r takes the opposite view: 
If the child has its right to life from God, and is 
perhaps already capable of life, then the killing of 
the child, as an alternative to the presumed natural 
death of the mother, is surely a highly questionable 
action. The life of the mother is in the hand of God, 
but the life of the child is arbitrarily extinguished. 
The question whether the life of the child is of greater 
value can hardly be a matter for a human decision~3 
1
see above, pp. 95-98. 2 Peschke, pp. 363-364. 
2Bonhoeffer, p. 150. 
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I have already referred to this false distinction between 
what is natural or intended by God, on the one hand, and 
what is medically recommended on the other. The doctor, 
in acting to preserve life and health, is always in conflict 
with the "hand of God" seen in this narrow sense, but in 
a broader sense, the doctor, in carrying out the vocation 
of a healer, could be said to be the hand of God in foiling, 
or delaying, the natural tendency towards death. In the 
instance now under discussion, the doctor's choice is what 
will decide between the life of the mother and the death 
of mother and foetus. If the matter is left in the "hand 
of God", a decision has almost certainly been made: that 
the mother will die with her foetus. 
Roman Catholic moral theology takes a small step towards 
recognising this dilemma in some situations by distinguishing 
between direct and indirect abortions. Direct abortions 
are instances where the foetus is simply removed from the 
mother's body, or delivery is artificially induced--either 
way, killing the foetus. In indirect abortions, the removal 
of the foetus is incidental to another procedure aimed at 
preserving the mother's life. By the principle of double 
effect, indirect abortions are not wrong, because abortion 
was not the intent of the procedure, but rather a secondary 
effect. This principle allows doctors to save a pregnant 
woman's life at the cost of the foetus's life, so long as 
this happens in the course of a procedure not aimed directly 
at terminating the pregnancy--for example, the necessary 
removal of a diseased uterus. 1 Haring, however, disputes 
1connery, "Notes," p. 322. 
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the helpfulness of the distinction. He quotes a case history 
reported by an anonymous gynaecologist: 
I was once called upon to perform an operation on 
a woman in the fourth month of pregnancy, to remove a benign 
uterine tumour. On the womb, there were numerous 
very thin and fragile varicose veins which bled profusely, 
and attempts to suture them only aggravated the bleeding. 
Therefore, .in order to save the woman from bleeding 
to death, I opened the womb and removed the foetus. 
Thereupon the uterus contracted, the bleeding ceased, 
and the woman's life was saved. I was proud of what 
I had achieved, since the uterus of this woman, who 
was still childless, was undamaged and she could bear 
other children. But I had to find out later from 
a noted moralist that although I had indeed acted 
in good faith, what I had done was, objectively, wrong. 
I would have been allowed to remove the bleeding uterus 
with the foetus itself, he said, but was not permitted 
to interrupt the pregnancy while leaving the womb 
intact. He informed me that my intervention constituted 
an immoral termination of pregnancy, even though the 
purpose was to save the mother, whereas the other 
way would have been a direct lawful intention (prima 
intentio) and action to save life as in the case of 
a cancerous uterus. For him, preservation of the 
woman's fertility and in some cases, preservation 
of the marriage itself, played no decisive role. 1 
Haring believes the "noted moralist" who advised the doctor 
to have been wrong, even though the moralist was probably 
reflecting accurately the prevailing official view. Since 
the doctor could determine with great moral certainty that 
there was no chance for both mother and foetus to survive, 
he was, in Haring's view, right to take advantage of the 
1Haring, pp. 108-109. 
I 
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only available opportunity to "serve life". He thus saved 
the life of the mother, preserving her fertility, while 
not affecting one way or another the fate of the foetus. 
In this case, at least, the distinction between direct 
and indirect abortions had no effect on the foetus, but 
made every difference to the mother: direct abortion being 
far preferable, from her point of view. The same argument 
applies to every case where an abortion is needed to save 
the life of the mother of an unviable foetus. The foetus 
will die anyway, while the mother can be saved. In such 
a case, direct abortion seems clearly to be the desirable 
course. 1 A morality which ignores the possibility of saving 
a life, in obeisance to some grand but abstract moral principle, 
fails to take seriously the co-responsibility for creation 
that has clearly been placed in human hands. 
In my opinion, then, the case for most emergency abortions--
that is, abortions required immediately in order to save 
the life of a mother of an unviable foetus--is a secure 
one. It may be argued that doctors can err in saying that 
the mother is dying and that the foetus is therefore doomed. 
Of course it is true that doctors can err. No doubt there 
1sometimes not only the mother's life but that of 
a second foetus may be saved by killing its twin. The 
Star, Johannesburg, reported on June 19 1981 that doctors 
at New York's Mount Sinai School of Medicine had punctured 
the heart of an abnormal foetus to destroy it, while leaving 
its normal twin to survive and be born four-months later 
as a healthy baby. This was the second such operation 
to be performed in the world, and was apparently completely 
successful. The doctrine against direct abortions would 
have prohibited it. 
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are anecdotes being told somewhere in the world concerning 
a mother having made a heroic choice for her foetus and 
having delivered safely, despite a doctor's prediction 
of death. 1 Doctors who regard a foetus with the reverence 
appropriate to even nascent human life, are no doubt especially 
careful in making their prognoses, but they too are fallible. 
This fallibility cannot, however, be considered ample reason 
to conclude that a therapeutic abortion intended to save 
the life of a mother where the death of the foetus is almost 
certain on the basis of all known medical facts, is not 
justified. Doctors, like anyone else, must make their 
decisions carefully, and knowing they are fallible, but 
cannot avoid the business of deciding simply by virtue 
of the fact that they could be wrong. 
Since I have already referred to the relevance of 
the stages of pregnancy in determining the probability 
that the foetus is a human person, it should be added here 
that the stage of pregnancy is almost irrelevant with 
regard to emergency therapeutic abortions. Even if one 
assumes for the sake of argument that the foetus is certainly 
a human person at the time of the _operation, none of the 
above arguments would be adversely affected. Indeed, that 
assumption has already been made in applying, and conscientiously 
disregarding, the presumption for the powerless person! 
The exception to the general rule for direct abortion 
in case of life~threatening emergency, would be the rarer 
case when a genuine choice must be made between the life 
1r have not come across such a case in the literature. 
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of a foetus and the life of its mother. Here, the rule 
is not so simple, because the presumption for the powerless 
is indeed appropriate. This choice can occur where a foetus 
is not yet viable, but has a reasonable chance of surviving 
the pregnancy even if the mother is likely to die in labour 
or indeed after delivery as a result of the continuation 
of pregnancy. For example, the case of Marianne Hill could 
be mentioned. She was diagnosed while pregnant as having 
cervical cancer, and advised to have chemotherapy and/or 
radiotherapy. She declined both for the sake of her foetus, 
and died nine months after giving birth to a healthy son. 
After declining an abortion, she was reported to have told 
a friend: "That would be like lining two people against 
a wall and saying, 'shoot him--I don't want to die'." 1 
In such a situation as that faced by Hill--but fortunately 
faced by few mothers--it is hard to deny the force of the 
presumption for the powerless. That presumption, however, 
is not the end of the argument but only an indication of 
the need for careful utilitarian calculation. There may 
be other factors that lend weight to the need to preserve 
the mother's life--such as, most obviously, the needs of 
other less-powerful parties, including the mother's other 
dependants. Additional situational factors might arise 
such as those considered later in this chapter. Further, 
the extent to which the pregnancy has developed may well 
be relevant here, adding a calculation of probability concerning 
the human personhood of the foetus to all the other complexities. 
1 The Star, Johannesburg, August 12 1981. 
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Each case is unique, and it is not possible to make absolute 
judgements about all cases of this "type". What should 
certainly be recognised in each case is the agony which 
would be involved in making the choice. 
This rare instance aside, though, an absolute statement 
can be made about the morality of direct abortions where 
the choice is not between woman and foetus, but between 
the mother's life and the death of both mother and foetus. 
In such a case, direct abortion is the right course (assuming 
everyone involved consents to the procedure). 
(2) Killing "in case of emergency" 
If one puts aside for a moment the complexities of 
the morality of killing nascent life, and recalls the arguments 
about homicide outside the womb, one will recall that both 
Protestant and Catholic moralists are agreed that there 
are many factors, rather than simply defence of the life 
of another party, which might justify the killing of a 
person. One might assume reasonably that the same would 
be the case for killing foetuses, since their personhood 
is not even certain, but, as has been shown, this is not 
true in Catholic orthodoxy. Nevertheless, reason dictates 
that other factors should be considered as providing possible 
reasons for abortion, apart from threats to the life of 
the mother, and indeed many such reasons have been advanced. 
The first group of reasons to be considered may be grouped 
under the heading of "emergency" indications of abortion, 
even though these emergencies are not of a life-threatening 
nature. 
Mental health of the mother. It is becoming an accepted 
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feature of modern abortion-permitting laws (where these 
exist) that serious threats to health include '''.mental health, 
and these qualify a mother to have an abortion. It is 
far from easy to weigh the value of life against the value 
of mental health. If the reason for the value of life 
includes any kind of of evaluation of the divine destiny 
of a person--an aspiration and calling to live in peaceful, 
creative relationships with God and society--then it is 
hard to counter an argument which would place the value 
of life itself and the value or mental health on the same 
plane. In this perspective, serious mental illness is 
a barrier to life itself. More basically, of course, serious 
mental illness can result in suicide or danger to other 
people's lives, so the issue can become one of life against 
life. 
The subject of abortion for reasons of mental health 
has received limited attention from moralists, probably 
because the imponderables are so great. The CPSA Report 
concludes that abortion can be justified where the danger of 
continuing pregnancy would be such mental damage that the 
ability of the woman to enter into and continue relationships 
of mutual care would be impaired--or that violent behaviour, 
causing harm to the woman or others, might result. 1 As 
the report recognises, the major obstacle to any casuistry 
on this question is a "lack of objective criteria which 
may be applied in assessing the seriousness of probable 
mental illness." Psychiatrists are, presumably, at least 
1 CPSA Report, §7.3. 
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as fallible as other scientists in predicting the results 
of action and inaction--and one imagines, considerably 
more so, due to the highly complex and unfathomed nature 
of the human mind. Obviously there must be a clear distinction 
under this heading between mere unhappiness on the part 
of the mother and actual grounds for diagnosing a real 
danger to mental health. There may also be mental sequelae 
to abortion itself, in the form of unanticipated guilt 
reactions. But all this presuming leads nowhere. All 
that can be said is that in theory a serious and highly 
probable threat to mental health would have to be considered 
possible proportionate reason for abortion. This consideration 
would have to be made in the light of the probability of 
personhood of the foetus (which depends to some extent 
on the stage of the pregnancy), and simultaneously of the 
the right of the powerless foetus (to the extent that its 
personhood is probable) to continue its life (although 
there is an extent to which a seriously mentally ill person 
is as powerless as her foetus.for the purposes of this 
presumption). 
Eugenic abortion. Recent medical advances have made 
possible fairly accurate projections of deformity in foetuses. 
Such deformities have been held by many to justify abortion. 
The CPSA Report, for example, unequivocally recommends 
abortion in cases of Down's Syndrome (or Mongolism, a severe 
mental disorder), Lipoidoses ("because of early death and 
in most cases blindness and mental deficiency") and anencephalic 
foetuses (which do not survive after birth anyway). However, 
the commissioners were divided on whether abortions are 
-••W•-----~----j us tified. for hydr~ocephalic foetuses, and where the 
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mother has been afflicted by Rubella (German measles) in 
the early stages of pregnancy, or exposed to X-rays. In 
these instances the chances of a normal baby are less predictable. 
The commission decided as follows: 
Where there is doubt under this heading, much depends 
on the faith and ability of the mother (and her husband 
and family) to cope with an abnormal child ••• 
Nevertheless, the Commission asserts firmly the 
creative power of God to turn any situation to his 
praise, including the life of the deformed child and 
his family. Yet it must also be asserted that it 
is part of our power and responsibility under God 
to terminate a pregnancy when the life to emerge is 
almost certainly incapable of reasonable human relationship 
and so of the fullness of life which is God's will 
for humanity. 
Careful and informed counselling is important 
in these cases. 
Thus the commission chose not to choose. Its emotional 
dilemma is clear enough. Apart from the choice between 
one life and another, there is the need to decide between 
being led by compassion for the mother, child and family 
on the one hand, and the awful possibility of homicide 
on the other. Moreover, one is confronted here by the 
uncertainty over whether the deformed being in the womb 
is even to be considered a person--in contrast with the 
certainty that if the pregnancy comes to term a live person 
will be born and will live an unenviable life. Here the 
balancing of probabilities , rights and duties is especially 
complicated. On the other hand, where (because of a relatively 
advanced stage of pregnancy) there is a high degree of 
1 . . CPSA Report, §7.5. 
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probability that the foetus, however deformed, is a human 
person, it is difficult to admit justification for killing 
that person because it is deformed. One does not normally 
think of killing persons morally simply because of their 
deformities. Burtchaell develops this thought: 
•.• Any living individual of the human species is 
a human, a person. What is being argued in some quarters 
• • • is that "human" or "person" are special categories 
of being for which there are minimum performance requirements. 
This would have us believe that there are humans who 
are not legal persons. I want to learn wherein this 
differs from the Hitlerian doctrine that supported 
the Final Solution to the Jewish Question. Under 
the Third Reich it was not enough to be a human to 
keep the right to live. One had to have certain other 
qualities. Because Jews and gypsies lacked these 
qualities, they were destroyed. My position is that 
no one has the power to decide what qualities others 
must have to avoid being killed. 1 
Burtchaell writes this in the context of the status of 
the normal human foetus, but it seems especially apposite 
here.. Who is to decide that a certain kind of deformity 
is great enough to warrant killing the deformed one? One 
is not here concerned with an unjust aggressor threatening 
the life or mental health of the mother, but at best with 
abortion "for the foetus's own sake"--to save it from a 
life of hell on earth. At worst, one may have to contend 
with conflicting motives on the part of the parents with 
a view to their own future. The matter of comparing the 
conflicting values is a complex one. Connery has compared 
1James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., "Continuing the discussion--How 
to argue about abortion II," Christianity and Crisis 37 (26 
December 1977): 311-313. 
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eugenic abortion with the ancient Roman practice of infanticide. 
But (as with Burtchaell's Nazi analogy) the motivation 
is usually rather different from preserving a supposed 
ethnic purity. Here the motivating factor tends to be 
a genuine compassion for individuals--for their happiness 
and for their relationships. But it is still probably 
true that only doubtful morality kills for the sake of 
an unconsulted victim, and if and when the foetus is a 
human person, there is little significant difference--
aside from a residue of ontological uncertainty--between 
killing deformed foetuses and deformed children or adults. 
The eugenic abortion dilemma should never be confronted 
with less agony than that bald statement suggests. 
In both the case of the deformed foetus and that of 
the deformed child or adult, the presumption for the powerless 
would thus appear to inhibit the justification of homicide 
or abortion, where the probability is high that the foetus 
has developed to the point of achieving personhood. 
Diminished responsibility in the mother. This 
convenient heading is used in the CPSA Report, and here, 
to group four distinct types of "emergency" indication 
--or rather, alleged indication--for abortion. The report's 
casuistry becomes rather intricate at this point, and because 
' 
the report is interesting here only as an indication of 
contemporary Protestant thinking, it will have to be summarised 
as briefly as possible before assessing the arguments in 
each case. 
(a) RAPE: The commission finds that the raped woman 
is "in a position similar to a country which has been invaded." 
Thus, in the same way that a just war is always defensive, 
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abortion is justified in defending the rights of the mother. 
The woman's "physical integrity" has been violated, and 
her personality has probably been damaged psychologically. 
Thus, especially in the case of a young child, abortion 
is "highly desirable" where pregnancy has resulted from 
rape. 1 
There is no doubt about the seriousness of the invasion 
of a woman's body, psyche and dignity which is always 
involved in rape. However, the analogy with an invaded 
country (even assuming the latter's right to defend itself 
by violent means) is spurious, since in that case it is 
the invading army, an objective aggressor, that is the 
target of react~ve homicide, whereas the foetus, not the 
rapist, is killed in an abortion. Considerations of mental 
health can play a part in the decision about abortion following 
rape, but that is a separate, and complicated, issue, as 
I have shown. In the case of rape, the woman is a powerless 
party, although the foetus remains powerless relative to 
the woman (if she is adult and mentally competent). How 
such a conflict between powerless parties should be resolved 
is not as easy a matter as is suggested by either the prevailing 
Protestant view (that justifies abortion as a matter of 
course) or the Catholic view (that prohibits it as a matter 
of course). 
However, it is in the context of rape that the balancing 
of probabilities, which has been a slightly significant 
factor so far in this survey, could become a very significant 
1 CPSA Report, §7.4a. 
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one. I have shown that the probability of personhood in 
the recently fertilised ovum. (i.e. within fourteen days 
of conception) is very slight indeed. The routine dilation 
and curettage of raped women--already considered a good 
idea purely for the sake of preventing anguish even where 
the morality of abortion is not of great concern--becomes, 
in the light of this slight probability, a commendable 
moral solution to the conflict of values presented by pregnancy 
purusant to rape. In this way, even before a pregnancy 
is known to exist, the possibility of a person developing 
in the womb, whose fate would then have to be decided by 
agonising moral calculations, is avoided altogether, without 
the probability of having committed homicide being great 
enough to outweigh the conflicting considerations of compassion 
for the woman. 
(b) PREGNANT CHILDREN AND IMBECILES: The CPSA Report 
finds that while grounds "might" exist for abortion in 
the case of an imbecile mother, this would not necessarily 
be based on similar grounds to the case of rape. "Since 
she might not be conscious of a sense of outrage, shame 
or degradation, the same criteria as are applied in the 
case of rape do not automatically hold," and the baby might 
be delivered normally and then cared for by others. 
This is R9t ·always so.i Some mentally handicapped 
women would indeed suffer c9nsiderably during pregnancy 
and labour. There may also be genetic indications for 
abortion, in which case the analysis of eugenic abortion 
would apply. Once again, this is a potential conflict 
between two powerless parties: the foetus and the imbecile 
mother. Once again, the stage of pregnancy and ontological 
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probability must be taken into account. But here once;, 
again no straightforward rules suggest themselves for resolving 
the complex conflicts involved. 
Similar arguments could apply in most instances when 
the mother is not yet old enough to make responsible decisions. 
A large burden of responsibility obviously rests on the 
mother's parents in such a case. 
(c) INCEST: Leaving aside the frequent cases of rape 
(statutory or otherwise), the CPSA commission failed to 
reach agreement on the morality of abortion based on the 
pregnancy having arisen out of incest. "An important but 
complex factor concerns the possibility of genetic deformity 
of a foetus," the report notes. 
By itself, as I have argued in the case of eugenic 
abortion, this concern does not provide a compelling argument 
for abortion. 
( 3) Non".'"eme!gen<?Y _§:b9J:'~}-on_~_ 
In most groups of cases,considered above, it is from 
the viewpoint of the mother that abortions are justified 
(the exception being, sometimes, the case for eugenic abortion). 
The life of the mother is at risk, or her rights have been 
violated, or she may be harmed in some way by the continuation 
of the pregnancy. Frequently, however, the case for abortion 
is framed in terms of the interests of the unborn child. 
The "unwanted child" is characterised as a child for whom 
life may not prove worth living. The baby born to impoverished 
parents in overpopulated ghettoes will be undernourished 
and will have little or no prospect of escaping from poverty 
and a violent environment. The phrase, "quality of life," 
recurs repeatedly in this context, posing the question 
of how the quality of life can be evaluated against the 
fact of life. While the interests of parents and family 
(for example, the interests of the other children, living 
on the breadline now but facing the prospect of being crowded 
out in the nourishment stakes by the new brother or sister) 
are frequently invoked in this type of justification of 
abortion, these interests are usually held to be secondary 
to those of the foetus itself. 
Nor, of course, is the "quality of life" argument 
confined to impoverished families. It is invoked also 
in the case of unwanted children in any socio-economic 
grouping, based there on psychological factors involving 
the relationship of an unwanted child to his or her parents, 
and the mark frequently left by this relationship on the 
future adult's persona •. 
The CPSA Report, while stressing that abortion is 
always a "matter of grave consequence," found that there 
is a possibility, when quality-of-life considerations are 
examined, of a choice between two commensurate evils: 
The kind of grounds where there could beachoice between 
evils are where students are involved whose studies 
could be terminated; where existing families could 
suffer further and intolerable hardships in poverty 
and overcrowding; where the whole emotional balance 
of family life could be seriously threatened; where 
women could risk losing their employment and their 
income on which to support existing children; where 
widows, whose husbands die during the pregnancy, cannot 
cope emotionally with a child in those circumstances ••• 
It is arrogant and insensitive to dismiss all pleas 
for abortion on socio-economic grounds as being 
for the mere convenience of the mother. But it is 
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on these grounds that frivolous claims for abortion 
most easily slip in, and we need to remember that 
God's grace can enable people to cope with apparently 
intolerable burdens. However, we believe that God 
expects us to enter into the agony of making a decision 
with responsibility. 1 
There is something slightly (\~ounterintuitive about 
this finding when one considers that this same commission 
failed to agree on abortions for hydrocephalic foetuses 
and imbecile mothers. Here, apparently, there is an air 
of toleration in respect of abortions in order that parents' 
studies not be disrupted, and that the "emotional balance 
of family life" (whatever that means) not be disturbed~-just 
so long as this does not lead to other, more "frivolous" 
reasons being "slipped in". 
Be that as it may, it is true that non-emergency 
considerations are probably the most important and urgent 
class in the debate. A large number--probably most--of 
abortions are performed for personal, rather than emergency, 
reasons. 2 Mr and Mrs Lindermayer, however, are sure that 
these abortions are not sought on purely selfish grounds: 
•..• F.~r·manr;--we would venture most--women, there 
is a crucial • element that enters into their 
deliberations: the well-being of the child that would 
be. And that quality of life--not their own--is a 
major reason for terminating pregnancy.3 
1CPSA Report, §7.6. 2see Burtchaell, "How to argue," p. 314. 
3vivian and Eric Lindermayer, "Continuing the discussion--how 
to argue about abortion II," Christianity and Crisis 37 
(26 december 1977): 316-318. 
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The Lindermayers do not say on what data they base 
this statement about the motivations of "many" or "most" 
women seeking abortions. Even if it were true in a particular 
instance, however, that a woman sought an abortion for 
the sake of the child within her, on socio-economic grounds, 
one would be faced with the ethical problem of a person 
deciding to terminate the life of another being, probably 
also a human person, without the possibility of consulting 
the one whose life is to be destroyed for its own sake. 
The importance of the concept of quality of life cannot, 
on the other hand, be ignored. In 1977, 250 ethicists 
and theologians issued a "call to concern," declaring, 
in part: 
The most compelling argument against the inflexibility 
of the absolutist position (against abortion) is its 
cost in human misery. • • . Pro-life must not be 
limited to concern for the unborn; it must also include 
a concern for the quality of life as a whole. The 
affirmation of life in Judeo-Christian ethics requires 
a commitment to make life healthy and whole from beginning 
to end. Considering the best medical advice, the 
best moral insight, and a concern for the total quality 
of the whole life cycle for the born and the unborn, 
we believe that abortion may in. some.instances be 
the most loving act possible. 1 
Having agreed that the right to life, while a primary 
value, may in principle be challenged by other values in 
a situation, it is difficult to dispute that circumstances 
may arise where the quality of life is a concern which 
overrides the need to defend an actual life. This would, 
of course, especially be the case in the earliest stages 
1Blockwick, p. 44. 
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of pregnancy, the probability of foetal personhood being 
small. Quality of life, however, is an exceptionally vague 
concept, and it should not be understood in such a way 
as to avoid the ethical imperative presented by the moral 
presumptions concerning the ethics of homicide. The possibility 
of moral dilemmas based on relational and socio-economic 
factors cannot be ruled out, and, just as in the various 
emergency indicators of abortion, the decision in the situation 
is not an automatic one but rather a serious and painful 
one. Moreover, in any situation there is the possibility 
that a combination of various factors may present a uniquely 
weighty set of utilitarian considerations which combine 
to override the probability that the life being terminated 
is that of a human person. 
Having said that, however, it must also be remembered 
that abortion is often not the only alternative to the 
birth of an undesired child. A child can be well brought 
up by an.unmarried mother--with the necessary support of 
her family and .friends and the community--or by adoptive. 
parents or members of the extended family, for example. 
The possibility exists that after an initial desire, even 
keenly felt desire, to terminate the pregnancy, a mother 
can go on to bear, love and rejoice in her child--even 
a child conceived in the most traumatic of circumstances. 
In considering the morality of abortion, therefore, the 
quality-of-life factor can be given undue weight and premature 
force, and provide a temptation towards an easy, if vaguely 
conceived, solution which does no justice to the ethics 
of homicide. 
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4.4 Who decides? 
In analysing the arguments over abortion in various 
broad categories of circumstance, I have declined, on the 
whole, to come to hard-and-fast conclusions (save two: 
that direct abortion is usually the option of preference 
in the case of a life-threatening pregnancy; and that routine 
dilation and curettage shortly after a rape is not only 
a kind act but a moral one). Does this represent a failure? 
, 
I do not think so. As I showed in Chapter 1, Christian 
ethics is not a quest for universal laws, nor a search 
for casuistic lists describing the moral thing to do in 
various situations. Rather, Christian ethics is a process 
of examining moral issues from a Christian perspective, 
with a view not to telling people what to do and what not 
to do, but to enlightening them in their dilemmas, so that 
the choices they make are made under the influence of Christian 
values and of the heritage of theological criticism. Only 
by following that path can this study be true to the polar 
presumption (number 2.4) which requires the need for moral 
guidance to be balanced against the need for freedom of 
conscience. In this way, Christians are able to weigh 
their own intuitions as well as their cultural instincts 
and norms against the disciplined reflections of other 
Christians in other times and places. Where, then, has 
this look at the abortion issue led? I have shown that 
the human foetus is, morally speaking, probably a human 
person, depending on the stage of its development within 
the womb. Thus the decision to destroy a human foetus 
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is one that should be taken only after due consideration 
of the type and seriousness appropriate to a decision concerning 
homicide. 
Therefore, the one who would seek to abort a pregnancy 
must ask the same questions as must be asked concerning 
an act of homicide. Is it an act of self-interest? Does 
the act amount to exploitation of the powerlessness of 
the victim? Is the conflict of rights and values involved 
here a conflict of proportionate values, or is it in the 
end for spurious reasons that I seek to end this life? 
If, having asked these questions in a serious way, considering 
both the high ethical value of human life and the probabilities 
relating to the fact that the being in the womb is a human 
person, a decision for abortion can be made in a humble 
and self-critical way, then what other Christian is in 
a position to judge the act of abortion harshly? Rather, 
other Christians must recognise that while a terrible decision 
has been taken, it has been done as a "necessary evil" 
in the context of respect for life--one negative act among 
many that have to be contemplated in a not-yet-perfect 
world. 
When all these considerations are completed, whose 
decision is it that counts? Some would reply that abortion 
is a private matter--that is, a matter of private morality--and 
that the ~decision is therefore the mother's. (where she 
is physically and mentally capable of making it). I would 
broadly agree with that conclusion, but not with the reasoning 
that it is a matter of private morality. It may be doubted 
whether there is any such thing as an absolutely private 
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morality, but there certainly cannot be in the case of 
homicide. In homicide, there are two people involved--the 
killer and the victim--and probably many more, if one numbers 
all those who have significant relationships with the two. 
Abortion is a special type of killing which involves at 
least the foetus and its mother, but also usually the father, 
the parents' families, the health-care agents, and others. 
·As with any killing, the whole community is rightly considered 
to have a right and duty to be involved in some way with 
the decision--thus the presence in most countries of laws 
either prohibiting or permitting abortion under certain 
circumstances. Those who have an interest in protecting 
the rights of the foetal person, or the potential rights 
of the potential person, have a right and duty to have 
a say of some kind in the decision. Obviously, this cannot 
be applied to mean that outside parties can interfere at 
will in what is always a traumatic time for a woman and 
her loved ones, but the law should protect the interests 
of unborn persons. Thus it is essential, rather than a 
nuisance, that there should be people in the community 
with a special concern for advocating the rights of unborn 
persons, and for educating the public about the responsibilities 
involved in nascent life. 
A pregnant woman, then, should be neither encouraged 
nor expected to make alone a decision about the termination 
of her pregnancy. Whether or not she appreciates it, 
she is making a homicide-related decision, and for the 
sake of her own spiritual welfare as well as for all the 
more apparent reasons, she needs to confront that reality 
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in a serious way. She may need help in recognising the 
complexities of the decision •. For example, she may have 
been led to think that abortion is always homicide, and 
that homicide in this case is always equivalent to murder--
and thus she. could be. plagued by excessive guilt feelings 
even after authorising an abortion for the best of medical 
or other reasons. If those statements are false (as I 
have shown them to be), then they should not be allowed 
to prey on her spirit. She may also need help in discovering 
both the possible benefits and the possible costs of an 
abortion in her situation--including the possible costs 
to herself, as has been pointed out by a feminist writer, 
Ginny Earnest Soley: 
I believe that women are damaged by having abortions, 
psychologically, spiritually, and, often, physically. 
My word to women facing the difficult decision about 
abortion is not a word of condemnation but a word 
of encouragement that says that if we are really working 
at this together, we can do better: We don't have 
to settle for something that is life-destroying and 
painful. 1 
But when the mother has received all the care and counsel 
she requires, and when all the voices who must have their 
say have been heard, it must be recognised that this particular 
homicide-related decision is ultimately the mother's. That 
is simply an unavoidable consequence of the unique nature 
of the mother-foetus relationship. She has an unenviable 
right and an unavoidable duty to make daily decisions during 
1Ginny Earnest Soley, "To preserve and protect life: 
A Christian feminist perspective on abortion," Sojourners, 
.October 1986, pp. 34-37. 
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pregnancy about the life and welfare of her foetus. Whether 
or not she smokes or takes medication; how much and what 
kind of exercise, or alcohol, she enjoys; what she eats 
and how she prepares for labour; her feelings, and behaviour: 
all these affect her foetus. Some of these and other decisions, 
under certain circumstances, could mean life or death to 
her foetus. Her own death, at most stages in the pregnancy, 
will probably mean her foetua's death too. The quality 
of her life will affect the quality of her foetus's life. 
Who, then, can deny her the right to make the final decision 
about abortion? She is certainly in every sense the one 
who is closer to the foetus than doctors, Judges, and moralists, 
and even the father. Where the foetus can be regarded--for 
instance, in case of life-threatening pregnancy--as an 
unjust aggressor, the victim of that aggression is the 
mother, and it is the victim of aggression who is allowed 
the final say in all other cases of justifiab.le homicide. 
This responsibility of the mother is, as Robinson 
writes, a frightening one: "It is a terrible freedom to 
have, and for others to share, for another human life is 
(I would say: "may be") ·involved." 1 But such is the freedom 
and responsibility involved in all decisions relating to 
homicide. 
This general truth cannot, of course, apply in all 
situations. There will be cases of medical emergency, 
for example, where the decision about abortion must be 
taken on the operating table by the doctor alone. In 
1 Robinson, p. 57. 
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other instances, the mother is not fit to decide, but unless 
there is a medical emergency the responsibility for the 
final decision should not in that case rest with the doctor 
alone. For example, where the mother is mentally ill or 
under the age of competency, the family and society would 
have to share the decision about the foetus's life. But 
in the great majority of cases, it is the mother who will 
make the final decision. At some point in making that 
decision, I suggest, she should be faced with presumptions 
such as I have suggested concerning homicide--and specifically 
with the challenges about self-interest and powerlessness. 
These are hard questions, but I doubt whether the thoughtful 
mother would not eventually--and hopefully not for the 
first time when it is too late--find herself asking them. 
Robinson and Haring say that the physician is always 
duty-bound to submit to the mother's decision. 1 This is 
doubtful. It seems reasonable to allow, except in case 
of life-threatening emergency, that the surgeon exclude 
himself /herself from abortion proceedings, if the mother 
should choose them. (This is the position taken by Catholic 
tradition, according to Soane, who nevertheless suggests 
that final decisions about treatment should be "shared" 
between doctor and patient. 2) 
1Ibid., and Haring, p. 115. 
2Brendan Soane, "Consent and practice in the Catholic 
tradition," in Consent in medicine: Convergence and divergence 
ip tradition, ed. G.R. Dunstan and M.J. Skelton (London: 
King Edward's Hospital, 1983). 
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Conclusion 
In arguing about abortion, people frequently take 
one of two contrasting positions. They hold either that 
abortion is wrong, or that the pregnant woman has the right 
to make a decision about abortion •. This chapter has defended 
.Q2.!h of these~ two statements, which indicates how complex 
is the problem. Abortion is never a good thing and always 
a bad thing, since it denies at least a potential to life, 
but it can be a necessary evil. And in the end, it is 
the mother and no one else who has the duty of deciding 
about the necessity of this evil (if she is fit to do so). 
Whether or not this position translates into a call 
for abortion-on-demand legislation depends on quite another 
discussion, concerning the function of legislation vis-a-vis 
social morality. Such an analysis would have to take account 
of both the rights of society and the need to protect individual 
conscience, of both the reality of great numbers of illegal 
and unsanitary abortions and the need for law to uphold 
widely-held standards. All that is a matter for the ethics 
of social legislation, which is outside of the scope of 
the present study in the ethics of homicide. Here, I seek 
only to make a contribution to the task of discovering 
ways in which Christians' free decisions can be morally 
informed. 
Some will consider this discussion of abortion liberal, 
while others will consider it retrograde. It seems appropriate, 
therefore, to end it with this quotation from Robinson's 
call for abortion-law reform in Britain: 
. I regard (abortion} as an evil thing, as a scourge 
to be removed from any civilised society. For there 
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is nothing creative about it at all. It is destructive 
of personal life ... , it is not in itself therapeutic, 
except of a purely gynaecological disorder. It is 
much more likely to bring on adverse physical or psychological 
consequences. Unlike contraception, it does not make 
for love. Indeed, as a widespread phenomenon it undermines 
the relationships as well as the health of a society. 
Countries that have dropped all barriers to it have 
on the whole not liked what they have seen, and have 
drawn back. The question, as I see it, is: How do 
we abolish abortion? 
The challenge of finding a way to "abolish" abortion 
remains the primary challenge facing Christians in this 
context. But that is a problem that will not be solved 
for a long time. Meanwhile, Christian women and men will 
continue to have to face dreadful life-and-death dilemmas, 
and these will need to be confronted within a real world 
in which, contrary to the divine will, many live beset 
by pain and die beset by futility. 
1Robinson, pp. 66-67. 
PART THREE 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER 5 
THE ETHICS OF HOMICIDE 
The Sanctity-of-Life Principle is usually defined 
as: "One ought never to kill an innocent human being." 
The contextual critique contained in the foregoing chapters 
has shown that this formulation is fatally inadequate as 
aba~is for the ethics of homicide. The "grey area" issues 
are far more complex than the Principle allows. The term 
"innocent" is ambiguous, and misconceived, as the subjective 
guilt of the person killed is seldom the most pressing 
criterion for assessing the act of homicide in the "grey 
areas". And once the word "innocent" is removed from the 
Principle, the word "never" must follow, as all but the 
moral perfe~tionists (whose arguments I have rejected) 
will concede. Without those two words, the Sanctity-of-Life 
Principle is simply a statement of the obvious: that to 
kill a person is wrong unless there is adequate moral 
justification. Since no one would dispute thi~, the Principle 
is of no great worth to morality. Rather, the focus of 
attention r~ghtly becomes the nature and place ·of moral 
justifications of killing. 
In order to clarify my conclusion about the Sanctity-of-Life 
Principle, and to indicate what I am proposing as an 
alternative direction for the ethics of homicide, it is 
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appropriate to summarise here what has been discovered 
so far in this study. 
5.1 Review of findings 
In Chapter 1, I raised questions concerning the value 
of general moral laws in assessing the options facing a 
Christian confronted with a moral dilemma. I showed that 
while normative statements can have a general guiding 
impact, it would be incompatible with God-given human freedom 
and responsibility to assume for any such norm an absolute 
status. I demonstrated the need to recognise that certain 
actions can be necessary evils in an imperfect world, 
and rejected the idea that departure from given norms places 
one on a "slippery slope" towards the destruction of all 
morality. Rather than seeking normative absolutes, then, 
it is necessary to adopt an appropriately respectful, but 
critical, attitude to Scripture and tradition. · The Judeo-
Christian heritage is one factor in forming the relationship 
that a Christian enjoys with God. Within this relationship, 
it is possible to discern what is right through a combination 
of intuitive and rational insights. The use of methodological 
presumptions can assist in this process in order to test 
one's intuitions and other competing ideas. The moral 
presumption should prevail unless it can be shown that 
greater good will result from an exception to it. 
The purely theoretical arguments in Chapter 1, then, 
already cast in some doubt the value of universal norms 
such as the Sanctity-of-Life Principle. In Chapter 2, 
I proceeded to examine the question of the sanctity of 
life itself. Without doubting the critical moral importance 
of the value of human life, as a fundamental value underlying 
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all human rights and responsibilities, I showed that those 
who have sought to grant the right to life an absolute 
status have failed to recognise the serious conflicts of 
rights which have sometimes led to justifications of homicide. 
Christ's teachings and example certainly lend weight to 
the pacifist position, but there are important hermeneutical 
difficulties which must be overcome before that weight 
becomes overpowering. Neither absolute pacifism nor the 
more limited Sanctity-of-Life Principle (which is concerned 
only with the lives of "innocent" persons) emerge from 
analysis as plausible moral positions. They are neither 
more nor less acceptable than the various casuistic arguments 
which would seek to apply simplified rules to complex "grey 
areas" of homicide ethics--such as the alleged justification 
of killings in self-defence or in defence of one's country. 
These arguments led naturally to the formulation of 
certain methodological presumptions against which intuitions 
and ideas should be tested in dilemmas concerning homicide. 
There should be a primary presumption for the preservation 
of life itself. There should also be secondary presumptions 
against acts of self-interest; against acts directed against 
the less powerful; for the principle of proportionality; 
and for a balance between the need for moral guidance and 
the ultimate freedom of the Christian conscience. Certain 
linguistic presumptions were also proposed. In Part Two 
of the thesis, the various arguments for revolutionary 
violence and for abortion were weighed against these presumptions. 
In the light of the presumptions, many of the classic arguments 
for either of these types of act were found wanting. 
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I rejected, for example, the justifications of revolutionary 
violence which are based solely on the last-resort argument. 
This form of argument assumes that it is possible to analyse 
history--by means of listing and assessing strategies--while 
in the process of trying to influence it. Under the most 
favourable conditions, it is impossible to predict with 
total reliability the result of a group's actions. Even 
more so, when the presumption against self-interest is 
taken into account, it cannot be expected that those who 
are oppressed can enter into this type of analysis and 
justify homicide on the basis of it. I recognised that 
there are no theoretical obstacles to the idea that under 
certain historical circumstances killings may become the 
only possible way to achieve necessary ends. But, on the 
basis of the presumption for proportionality, I suggested 
that the historical probability that violence will be 
counterproductive, in most situations, must be taken into 
account in weighing whether or not it is a legitimate way 
of seeking the greater good. It is important to recognise 
also that in reality most arguments about revolutionary 
violence have little to do with the justifiability of homicide 
in general. Rather, the interests of those who are arguing 
tends to affect the position taken on the revolutionary 
impetus. 1 Clearly, one would wish the arguments about 
1Davies, pp. 164-168, produces a long.list of church 
statements defending the right of people to rebel against 
their oppressors. But as Villa-Vicencio, Between Christ, p. xxii, 
notes, while theologians have usually agreed on this principle, 
"it is more difficult to reach a common mind . • . as to 
whether a particular government is tyrannical." (Italics mine.) 
revolutionary violence to be "realistic" rather than idealistic, 
but "realism" is not necessarily on the side of violence. 1 
In short, it is true that if truly "all else" were known 
to have failed, violence would be justified, as an alternative 
to continued oppression of a grave nature, but the arguments 
produced to legitimate this type of homicide are often 
untenable. 
In looking at the arguments for abortion, I found 
that there are no valid moral objections in principle to 
direct abortion where pregnancy threatens the life of the 
mother and the foetus has no chance of survival. I also 
found that routine dilation and curettage of rape victims 
is a sound moral idea, based ori the small degree of probability 
of the foetus being a human person at least within the 
first fourteen days after conception. On the other hand, 
I showed that with the advancing stages of pregnancy, the 
probability of foetal personhood becomes far greater, and 
thus the presumption for the powerless has significant 
force over against many arguments produced for abortion. 
Killing for the sake of the one killed, as is proposed 
by some for deformed and ''unwanted" foetuses, is, in the 
light of this presumption, as problematic as killing for 
the sake of the mother (even when she has been raped or 
1The argument on this point between Yoder and Niebuhr 
is described in some detail in Chapter 3, while a recent 
pacifist perspective has outlined its implications for 
South Africa (Wink, pp. 27-31), arguing that not non-
violence, but the "dream that violence might produce 
constructive social change, is an "opium vision with no 
basis in reality." 
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is a minor or imbecile). But because the identification 
of the foetus as a human person is a statement of theoretical 
probability rather than of certain fact, I argued against 
drawing absolute conclusions on these matters. Abortions 
are probably homicide, in most instances, and are therefore 
probably wrong in most instances, but, as with revolutionary 
violence, more positive statements should be avoided in 
principle. 
5.2 Assessment of method 
At this point, I ask the reader to forgive my striking 
a personal note which occurs to me to be of great relevance. 
Many of the findings contained in the contextual critique 
of homicide ethics have come as a surprise to me. When 
I commenced this study some years ago, I not only had a 
sense that the ethics of homicide were problematic, but 
also had a strong instinct that the Christian would frequently 
be justified in taking part in revolutionary and obstetric 
killings. Some years before, my wife and I had helped 
a young friend who had decided to have an abortion. She 
delivered a tiny but apparently perfectly formed foetus, 
and I buried it (or him, in this case) in a public park, 
feeling some awe over this little creature's short life, 
but no guilt for having assisted someone who had decided 
that the termination of that life was necessary. I have 
never been faced in a similarly direct way with the dilemma 
of whether or not to assist actively in an act of revolutionary 
violence, but I have come into contact with those who do 
support and participate in the armed struggle against apartheid, 
and I think I understand, respect, and instinctively sympathise 
287 
with their position, acknowledging their willingness to 
make supreme personal sacrifices in the cause of justice. 
The relevance of this is that the intuitions I have 
in these matters of abortion and revolutionary violence 
are far from identical to the conclusions I have been led 
to when confronting the forms of argument for homicide 
in these cases in the light of the methodological presumptions 
that commended themselves. I am intuitively uncomfortable 
with many of my own findings. While this thesis has not 
made absolute judgements on the "grey area" issues, the 
general thrust of these judgements has been to severely 
question the arguments for homicide. To some extent, then, 
this study has represented an internal battle between rationality 
and intuition, and whether or not its preliminary conclusions 
are right (perhaps the presumptions are invalid; perhaps 
the logic is flawed), the possibility of "mind" criticis~ng 
"heart" suggests that the methodology experimented with 
here is both valid and helpful. I say this because the 
single greatest methodological challenge identified in 
Chapter 1 was the need for an approach which would recognise 
a place for intuition in ethics, but find a way of subjecting 
intuitions to criticism without falling foul of casuistry, 
or legalism. 
It seems to follow, then, that the primary aim of 
this study has been achieved. That aim was to find a way 
of reflecting on "grey area" issues of homicide from a 
disciplined but de-absolutising perspective. There is, 
however, an alternative, less encouraging way of reading 
the apparent conflict between my intuitions and my conclusions. 
288 
It could be that the method fails to give account of the 
suffering which usually underlies a decision to kill a 
human being (or a foetus). With the presumptions standing 
like monsters guarding the gates of moral rectitude, is 
there sufficient room in this method for compassion? Or 
does the fore.nsic model in the end ensure that contextuality 
must yield to the blindfolded supermorality which should 
(as was argued in Chapter 1) be more characteristic of 
criminal justice than of Christian faith? 
Perhaps all rational methods are inclined to fail 
the test of compassion, but there may possibly be room 
for the development of some kind of calculus of suffering 
to complement methodological presumptions and provide a 
counterbalance to their logical impressiveness. After 
all, it has already been recognised in the presumption 
for proportionality that there can exist extreme conflicts 
of rights where the right to life is outweighed by other 
factors. Such a calculus of suffering would give more 
weight than has perhaps been allowed for above to such 
conditions as helplessness, loneliness, alienation, extreme 
deformity, enduring pain, humiliation, despair, deprivation 
of dignity, and others. All of these could in principle 
provide utilitarian counterweights to the presumptions. 
In this way, the ethics of homicide could become more sensitive 
to the depths of human emotion, without discarding the 
necessary cautions provided by the presumptions for life, 
for the powerless, against self-interest, and so on. 
It has been acknowledged in previous chapters that 
there are inherent difficulties in comparing the value 
of life to other values--in other words, comparing death 
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with suffering. How would one do the complicated arithmetic 
which the calculus of suffering would inevitably involve? 
Is it justifiable to kill a tyrant if ten percent of his 
or her people have no meat to eat? If fifty percent are 
technically undernourished? If ninety percent live in 
fear of arbitrary imprisonment or exile? These things 
are not easy to measure. Nor are mathematical problems 
the only obstacles to the calculus of suffering. Three 
other problems arise. 
The first is Berger's "postulate of ignorance", which 
has already been referred to in this thesis: 1 the impossibility 
of being able to predict certainly what the results of 
action or inaction will be in any situation, and therefore 
the difficulty inherent in such statements as: "If I kill 
X, then Y will suffer less than at present." But there 
is no living without risks, and the problem of ignorance, 
while always an obstacle to utilitarianism, must be viewed 
realistically, rather than with an attitude of hopelessness. 
It will be less of a problem in some situations than in 
others. For example, it will be less of an obstacle in 
cases where an abortion is being justified on the basis 
of Down's Syndrome in the foetus (where this has been diagnosed 
.by means of amniocentesis), than in cases where insurrection 
is justified on the basis that this will necessarily diminish 
popular suffering. 
The second major problem is the tendency to see the 
suffering that is before one's eyes, rather than the suffering 
that is, while no less real but not readily apparent. Some 
1 See pp. 20 7-208 above. 
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way would have to be found of compensating for this if 
a calculus of suffering were used to justify homicide. 
For instance, it is easier to observe the dehumanisation 
and starvation of today's masses than the bitterness and 
resentments which lie beneath the surface and which, under 
post-revolutionary conditions, would explode in various 
ways that might be counterproductive to the revolutionary 
ideals. Similarly, it is easier to see mothers and their 
living families than foetuses, and thus a calculus of suffering 
would tend to neglect the interests of the foetus in favour 
of the prevention of suffering in favour of those who are 
already born. 
The third potential problem which would be associated 
with the introduction of a calculus of suffering could 
be characterised by a biblical anecdote which it calls 
to mind: the logic used by Caiaphas, who held that it was 
"expedient that one man should die" rather than risk the 
destruction of a nation (John 11:50). In ruling that a 
homicide would be the most expedient way to avoid suffering, 
Caiaphas was, of course, identifying his own interest 
(in preserving power, in this case) with the common good. 
The calculus of suffering, being an extremely subjective 
type of formula, would provide a relatively easy way to 
justify arguments of expedience which would otherwise not 
be able to withstand the counterveiling force of the presumptions 
regarding the preservation of life, and especially self-interest. 
These problems are not necessarily insuperable. There 
is an intuitive difference, for example, between Caiaphas's 
tran:sparently self-serving expediency, on the one hand, 
and the cry of a mother for the sake of her family against 
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the birth of a hopelessly deformed child for whom the family 
is unable to care, or the cry of a black youth who has 
seen her people suffering under the yoke of apartheid for 
generations and says "no more", on the other. The purpose 
of seeking ways of making moral decisions is not to change 
the mind of a person who has made up his or her.mind to 
kill, and is looking for excuses (for this would be a waste 
of time), but to help resolve dilemmas for the one who 
does not know what to do. Therefore, if the presumptions 
against self-interest and for the powerless can be looked 
in the eye and seriously weighed, if the seriousness of 
homicide can be faced up to instead of being avoided or 
ignored, who can deny the need in.this context to look 
also at the amount of suffering that is present and is 
likely to result from the choice made? 
5.3 On making judgements 
The point which has just been made emphasises the 
seriousness of recognising clearly who it is who makes 
a moral decision. Who, for example, is in a position to 
make a final decision about abortion? I argued in Chapter 
4 that, contrary to various alternative views of medical 
ethics, the only plausible answer to this question is the 
mother. She is the one who is "tied" in a most literal 
sense to the foetus. She may decide rightly or wrongly, 
and she would be wise, no doubt, to consider carefully 
the counsel of doctors, relatives, moralists, and friends, 
but it is she who must--and will--decide. And who will 
decide about taking part in revolutionary violence? Not, 
for the most part, theological scholars, and not the members 
292 
of privileged classes, whose views are usually represented 
in the editorial columns of newspapers, in the boardrooms 
of corporations, ard in the corridors of political power. 
The ones who will decide are the ones for whom there seems 
no other decision to be made: those who have been systematically 
deprived of access to political and economic means of 
otherwise influencing the course of history, and even of 
more basic necessities like food and land and dignity. 
It is unlikely that their decision will be influenced by 
this, or any other, study of morality. It is probably 
true to say of homicide (not only in the revolutionary 
situatio~ but in general) that it usually expresses feelings 
rather than the results of analysis. (Presumably, that 
is why the framers of criminal law cite premeditation as 
one essential criterion which makes a homice "murder). 
Understanding this implies a sobering, but necessary, limitation 
on the role that can be played by ethical reflection. To 
a large extent, one must accept that there will be violence 
in societies, and that the function of Christian ethical 
reflection is something other than persuading those drawn 
to it against yielding to the temptation. 
What, then, is the role of Christian morality in this 
context? I suggest that the main question facing Christians 
who "have the space" to make decisions about homicide, 
is whether or not they will legitimate it. In other words, 
the ones who must decide morally about homicide are those 
who have not yet decided--obviously enough! What, for 
example, will be the response of Christians who have not 
(yet) chosen to participate in, but sympathise with the 
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goals of revolutionary violence in a particular situation? 
There are variety of possible responses, from outright 
condemnation and excommunication of those who unrepentantly 
commit homicide, to open support and encouragement of the 
activity. I have argued against both of these extreme 
options. Homicide is justifiable under some circumstances, 
and it is implausible that the church, which has lent its 
weight to wars and other types of killings for almost its 
entire history, should condemn so positively those who 
feel justified in killing in a revolutionary cause. On 
the other hand, how can one give unqualified support to 
acts that one considers counterproductive or otherwise 
inappropriate--acts which, for one good reason or another, 
one has decided not to participate in for moral reasons? 
The preferred option, I suggest, lies between these poles. 
One can accept, first, that it is. inevitable that some 
will turn to violence, and second, that people are free 
to decide, under extreme circumstances, whether or not 
they will do so. If one accepts these two things, but 
for reasons of principle or analysis (such as that the 
acts are counterproductive) chooses not to take part in 
the violence, one can be respectfully critical of the 
violence, while throwing one's weight, in non-violent ways, 
behind the revolutionary cause. 
What would be involved in this attitude of respectful 
criticism, apart from the two acceptances stated above 
(that violence is inevitable, and people are free to make 
moral choices about participating in it)? An illustration 
of the answer is perhaps provided by the often-publicised 
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actions in recent years of black Christian leaders like 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Revd Alan Boesak. During 
emotional events such as the funerals of activists and 
other gatherings, those leaders have sometimes found themselves 
in a situation where the mood of the crowd turned to violence. 
By their presence and in their words, the church leaders 
have shown that they are in solidarity with .the cry of 
the oppressed for justice. But by shielding--sometimes 
at great risk to themselves--from violence those individuals 
against whom the crowds turn in a desire to vent their 
rage, these clergy have indicated clearly not only that 
they cannot personally legitimate violence, but that they 
are willing to risk their own lives in an attempt to save 
the life of someone else (whose innocence or guilt of, 
say, complicity in oppression, has not seemed to be an 
important issue in the eyes of the leaders seeking to save 
them). The crowds have not seemed to turn against the 
church leaders for obstructing the homicidal acts, perhaps 
because the leaders so clearly do not stand against, but 
for, the crowds. Thus Tutu, Boesak and others have managed 
to maintain a respectfully critical position vis-a-vis 
violence, while retaining a position of solidarity with 
·the oppressed. 
It is thus not to enragedmasses that Christian moral 
reflection on violence is addressed, but to those who do 
have the privileged position of being able to reflect on 
the problem ethically. And the call for ethical reflection 
is not the same as that made by Jacques Ellul for Christians 
to join revolutionary movements while abstaining from the 
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1 
violent act.a. p~rpetra ted by those movements. Unlike Ellul, 
I recognise first, that Christians may disagree with the 
position for non-violence, and second, that there is no 
point in joining a violent movement while seeking to keep 
one's hands clean of the violence. The attitude of respectful 
criticism is one which recognises that people who are in 
a position to decide freely, are free to decide. 
In short, if one decides for revolutionary violence, 
or for abortion, or other kinds of homicide which one sees 
as justifiable, then one is entitled to the critical respect 
of those Christians who have decided against it. And if 
one decides against it, then one is obliged to give critical 
respect to those who have, with at least as much agony 
as oneself, been led to decide for it. The reverse, of 
course, applies with equal force. Such an attitude of 
mutual respect is called for not only because of the fact 
that the deciders come from different backgrounds and "spaces". 
It is also called for because of the very complexity of 
the issues related to homicide in the "grey areas". As 
Chapter 4 noted in respect of the moral implications of 
the uncertain status of the foetus, a difficult decision 
made about a theoretically uncertain and complicated matter 
does not appropriately lead to a dogmatic moralistic stance. 
In the cas~ of abortion, there is a close "judgement call" 
on the moral status of the foetus. In the case of revolutionary 
violence, much hinges on a judgement concerning the productivity 
or counterproductivity of such acts. No one rightly claims 
1 See pp. 211-212 above. 
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to possess certainty on such matters of fact or theory. 
Yet once these judgements have been made, positivist moral 
rhetoric so often appears on the scene--on both sides of 
the argument. The debates about homicide issues would 
be markedly more communicative if uncertainties · about 
factual. and theoretical matters were recalled when normative 
statements were being made. 
It is perhaps ironic--but appropriate--that a thesis 
which is in part about abortion should lend itself to being 
described as both pro-choice and pro-life. But that is 
how these findings can be accurately characterised. The 
study has affirmed the value of human life, and the inevitable 
wrongness of killing. Yet it has also affirmed that evils 
can be necessary, and that Christians and other people 
need to make free choices on diffult moral questions--
including homicide, which can be the least wrong thing 
to do in a situation. 
5.4 The last word 
If this concluding chapter has failed to arrive at 
final "conclusions" on the "grey areas" of homicide, that 
is hardly surprising. The only conclusions that count in the 
end are those reached by the people who have to make specific 
choices in specific situations. As Part One of the thesis 
made clear, the purpose was not to discover a new casuistry 
for abortion or revolutionary violence, but rather to explore 
a pattern of analysis which would take account of both 
the imperative for obedience and the gift of freedom, of both 
the faculty of intuition and that of reason, and of both 6 
the sanctity of human life and the limitations of the Sanctity-
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of-Life Principle. 
In. the course of that process, a necessary ambivalence 
about justifications for homicide has appeared on the scene 
again and again. Homicide is never good, but can be a 
nece~sary evil. The importance of retaining perspective 
on this ambivalence is eloquently shown in a statement 
by East German church leaders on the South African revolutionary 
struggle: 
Christ's act of reconciliation, his commandment to 
love one's neighbours and one's enemies, and his interp-
retation of the Fifth Commandment exclude any justification 
of the use of violence • • • {Yet} we live in 
a world which bears the mark of injustice and repressive 
violence, and we are complicit in its guilt. In this 
world we may stumble into borderline situations, in 
which we see no other possibility to work effectively 
for the justice and dignity of our neighbour than 
by the use of violence, which itself always remains 
questionable. The contradiction which lies in this 
cannot be solved rationally. It prevents our self-justif-
ication and our condemnation of others, and makes 
us dependent on God's gracious judgement .••• 
We must call guilt by its name and damage by 
its name, and we must resist the temptation to make 
euphemisms for the use of violence as "just struggle" 
or "just rebellion". 1 
The first moral imperative for the Christian is, then, 
to oppose homicide. To oppose it does not mean to condemn 
those who, out of desperation, do desperate things. Rather, 
it means working with God to create a world in which there 
1 
-"Position paper on the issue of the use of violence in the 
struggle against racism in South Africa," issued by the 
Conference of Protestant~ Church Leaders of the Federation of 
Protestant Churches, German Democratic Republic, July 1979. 
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is less despair. In the case of abortion, for example, 
this means seeking ways to prevent the conception of unwanted 
children, and to care both for those who are born unwanted, 
and for their parents. In the case of revolutionary violence, 
it means working conscientiously for justice and peace. 
What, then, has this study achieved? At the very 
least, it has shown that there are important common characteristics 
of the "grey areas" of the ethics of homicide, and that 
these ethical issues are best considered in the context 
of the "big picture" of the sanctity of life rather than 
in isolation from one another. I have proposed a method 
which could contribute to the process of making serious 
moral decisions in this broad framework. In the process, 
I have offered certain methodological presumptions which 
may allow for, and discipline, utilitarian decision-making, 
teaching and counselling on homicide. In the end, though, 
the hard choices will continue to be made by people in 
hard situations. They may be informed by such teaching 
and counselling as is available, but in the lonely hour 
of choosing, their most important resource would be an 
awareness that they are creatures of a divine Creator who 
does not want death, but life without limitations, for 
those whom he formed out of nothing to be his children, 
his stewards, his lovers. 
* * * 
(1) 6§QBI1Q~ e~Q I~s §I6IY§ QE I~s EQsIY§ 
Bennett, John, and Hoyt, Robert. "Continuing the discussion 
--how to argue about abortion . " ~tl!:.i§.!.i~!J.L~.:t ~DQ ~[i§i§ 
37 <14 November 1977): 264-266. 
Bier, William c., ed. ~Yffi~D !if~l E!:.2Ql~m§ 2f ~ic.1b~ of 
llYiD9i ~DQ Qf g~lD9· New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1977. 
Blockwick, Jessma. "Pro-choice is pro-life." 
6Sii20 11 <December 1979>: 41-46. 
Bourne, Gordon. London: Pan Books, 1976. 
I 
Burtchaell, James T., C.S.C.; Harrison, Beverley; and 
Lindermayer, Vivian and Eric. "Continuing the 
discussion--how to argue about abortion II." 
~b.!:i§1i2Di1~ 2DQ ~[i§i§ 37 (26 December 1977): 311-318. 
Cerling, C.E., Jr. "Abortion and contraception in 
Scripture." ~b!:.i§1i§D §£bQl§.!:§ B§Yi§~ 2,1 <1971>: 
42-58. 
Cobb, William Daniel. "Abortion and the sanctity of life." 
SD£Q~D1§.!: 38 (1977): 273-287. 
Connery, John R., S.J. "Notes: Abortion and the duty to 
preserve life." Itl~Q.!Q.gii:,~! §i'::!.9.i.€§ 40,2 (June 1979>: 
318-333. 
"CPSA Report": See 13~29.C! Qf S2i§£Q2!§!1 §:t!JQQ ~9.ffiill.i§§i.Q!J QQ 
6Q9.!:1i2!J· 
Curran, Charles E. 
5 : Abo r t i o n ) . 
1974. 
~§~ Q§[§Q§£!.iY§§ iD illQ.!:§1 1b§Q!Q9:t <ch. 
Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, 
Evans, J. Claude. "The abortion debate: A call for 
civility." ~b.!:.i§!i2!J ~§JJ1'::!.CZ 96 <21 March 1979): 
300-301. 
299 
300 
Abortion--cont. 
---------------
Haring, Bernard. ~gQl£§1 g!blS§· Notre Dame, Indiana: 
Fides Publishers, 1973. 
Kohl, Marvin. Ib.~ ffiQ!:.2li!~ Qf ~illing1 §~!J£!i!~ Qf lif§L 
§QQ!:1l2Di §DQ g~!b§D~§l§· London: Peter Owen, 1974. 
Noonan, John T., ed. Ib.§ ffiQ!:.211!~ Qf 2QQ!:!iQ!J· Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
O'Donovan, Oliver. §~gQ!!@!J Q!: ffi2Q~l Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984. 
O'Mahoney, Patrick. "Where human life begins." Ib.§ t!Q!J!b. 
10,12 <December 1977>: 400-404. 
Peschke, C. Henry. ~br:i2!i§D §!bis§' vol. 2 <pp. 344-368>. 
Alcester: C. Goodliffe Neale, 1978. 
B§QQ~! Qf sQl§£QQ§l §~oQQ ~Qmml§2lQD Qo egQr:!lQD· 
Johannesburg: Church of the Province of Southern Africa, 
c. 1980. 
Robinson, John A.T. ~b.Ci§!i~!J f!:@@QQffi i!J ~ Q~!:ffii§§i~~ 
§QSl§!~ <ch. 3: Abortion). London: SCM Press, 1970. 
Soley, Ginny Earnest. "To preserve and protect life: A 
Christian feminist perspective of abortion." 
§QjQ~!:D§!:§' October 1986, pp. 34-37. 
Smith, E 1 i zabeth M. "A fallow-up study of women who request 
abortion." 6ffi~I:.i£~!J JQ.~!:.!J~l Qf Qr:!b.QQ§~SIJ.i~!!:~ 43,4 
(July 1973>: 574-585. 
Smith, Harmon L. s!IJ.i£§ ~!Jg !IJ.~ !J~~ ffi§Qi£i!J~ Cpp. 17-54>. 
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970. 
Willke, J.C., Dr and Mrs. H~!JQQQQ~ Q!J ~QQ.!:iiQ!J• Cincinatti, 
Ohio: Hi 1 t z Pub 1 i sh i ng Co. , 1971 . 
Zahn, Gordon C. 6QQ!:!lQDi Ibg !!:§91£ Qll§mm§· Bristol: 
Student Christian Movement, n.d. 
Aquinas, St Thomas. §~mm§ Ib§QlQ9i2§' 2a2ae <ch. 40). 
London: Blackfriars, 1975. 
Augustine of Hippo, St. §glgs! lg!!§!:§' tr. J.H. Baxter <no. 
189: Letter to Marcellus>. London: William Heinemann, 
1953. 
-------- Ib§ £11~ Qf §QQ §Q§iD§! !b§ Q§Q§D§' tr. W.C. 
Greene, vol. VI <pp. 149-173). London: William 
Heinemann, 1969. 
301 
Bakkevig, Trond. "The doctrine on just war: Relevance and 
applicability." §!!:!.9.i2 I!J~QlQ9.i£2 37 Cl983>: 125-145. 
Burtchaell, James Tunstead, c.s.c. Enll~filQD:§ QCQel~ml I!J~ 
9silY 9i!§ffiffis gf 10§ ~bri§!isn <pp. 85-122>. Chicago: 
ACTA Foundation, 1973. 
Burton, Anthony. B§YQ1~1i2D2LY YiQ!§D£§i !O§ 1!J§2Li§§· 
London: Leo Cooper, 1977. 
Cadoux, Cecil John. Ib.~ ~2Cl~ £Q!:!.CS!J 2ng !!J~ ~QC!Ql e 
!Ji§!QC~ Qf !!J~ ~!JCi§!i~n ~!!i!~Q~ i£ E~9~0 §££i~!~ down 
19 10§ 1iffi§ Qf gQD§12D1iD§• Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1925. 
Chi kane, Frank. · "Where the debate ends." To be pub 1 i shed 
in: "Violence in South Africa: A theological history," 
ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio. Grand Rapids: William P. 
Eerdmans. 
Davies, J.G. g!Jri§1isD§i Q9!i1i£§ 2DQ YiQ!§Di r§YQ!!:!.iiQD• 
Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1976. 
Easwaran, Eknath. "Mohandas Gandhi's lesson for the 
Philippines." \;b.L!.E.!i2n 2£i§!D£~ r12ni!QC' world edition, 
22 December 1986, p. 34. 
Ellul, Jacques. ~iQl§!OS~l B§!fl~£!iQD§ fCQfil 2 Qhci§!i2D 
Q§r§Q§£!iY§• tr. Cecilia Gaul Kings. New York: Seabury, 
1969. 
Fanon, Frantz. IQ~sc9. !h~ Bfci£sn C€YQl!:!.!i2Dl EQli!i£sl 
§§§sY§· New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967. 
Ferguson, John. Ih~ QQ!i!i£§. Qf lQY~l Ib.~ ~§~ IEE.!~m~o! !09. 
DQD=YiQ!§D1 r§YQl~iiQD• Greenwood, South Carolina: The 
Attic Press, n.d. 
Freysinger, Robert Charles. "The problems of resistance of 
the contemporary Christian radical movement." Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1977. 
Helgeland, John; Daly, Robert J.; and Burns, J. Patout. 
gbri§1isD§ sDQ £0§ miliisC~~ !O§ §sClY §~Q§Ci§D£§' ed. 
Robert J. Daly. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985. 
Holmes, Arthur F., ed. ~§C sDQ gbrla!i2D §!bl£§· Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1975. 
Hornus, Jean-Michel. 1! i~ OQ! l~~f~! fQC ffi§ !Q figb!~ 
S~Cl~ ~QCi~!i2D ~!!i!~Q~~ !£~2C2 ~~Ci ~i£!~~£~2 2~2 the 
§!~!@· Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1980. 
302 
Hyde, Douglas. "The counter-productivity of violence." It:l§ 
~1§[9~ 8§Yi§~ 61 (1976>: 8-13. 
Kainz, Howard P. It:l~ ~DQiDQing Qf Ec£m~!D~~§l IQ~~[Q§ a 
QbilQ§QQb~ Qf [§YQlH!iQD· New York: Libra, 1976. 
Kee, Alistair. ~QD§!2n!in~ Y~[§~§ ~t:lCi§!· 
Press, 1982. 
London: SCM 
Marrin, Albert, ed. ~~[ 2DQ !t:l~ ~t:lCi§!i2n £QD§£i~D£~l ECQffi 
BH9H§1iD§ !Q ~2C1iD 6H1b§[ ~iD9i le~ Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1971. 
May, Rollo. EQ~~[ 2DQ iDDQ£~D£~l e §~2[£Q fQ[ !t:l~ §Q~[S~§ Qf 
YiQl§D£§· New York: W.W. Norton, 1972. 
Niebuhr, Reinhold. ~QC21 ffi2D 2DQ imm2c2l §Q£i§1~· 
Scribner, 1960. 
New York: 
-------- ~bCi21i2Di1~ 2DQ QQ~§[ QQli1i£§· 
<n.p. >, 1969. 
Archon Books 
Paul VI, Pope. Encyclical letter: EQQHlQCHffi ECQ9[§§§iQ ("On 
fostering the development of peoples"). London: 
Catholic Truth Society, 1968. 
Russell, David. "A theological critique of the Christian 
pacifist perspective, with special reference to the 
position of John Howard Yoder." Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 1984. 
Swomley, John M., Jr. New York: 
Macmillan, 1972. 
Turner, Geoffrey E. "The necessity of Christian pacifism." 
Ibg ~b~C£bffi2D 92,2 (1978): 144-154. 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. ~~!~~~Q ~bCi§! 2DQ ~2~§2[1 ~l2§§iS 
§DQ £QD1§ffiQQ[2[~ 1§~1§ QD £bHC£b 2DQ 2121§· Grand 
Rapids: William P. Eerdmans, 1986. 
Von der Mehden, Fred R. ~QffiQ§C21iY§ QQli1i£2l YiQl§D£§· 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 
When all else fails: 
[§YQ.1~1.iQD' ed. 
1970. 
~t:lci§!i2n 2cs~~~n!~ £n Yi£l~n! 
"IDO-C". Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 
Yoder, John Howard. 8§.iDbQ.lQ ~i§QHD[ §DQ ~t:lCi21i2D Q§£ifi§ill· 
Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1968. 
-------- ~§Cl §§C!b 2DQ !b§ Q[QQl§ill Qf ~§[· 
Abingdon, 1970. 
Nashville: 
303 
Yoder, John Howard. The 2cigio!l C~~Q!~!i2DL ~§§i~§ QD 
~bCi§!igD Q2£ifi§ffi· Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald 
Press, 1971. 
-------- Ib§ QQ!i!i£§ Qf J§§Y§· Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1972. 
Aquinas, Thomas, St. §ymm2 Ib§Q!Qgigg, 2a2ae <ch. 64>. 
London: Blackfriars, 1975. 
Barth, Karl. ~bYC£b QQ9ffi2!i£§' vol. III, part 4 (pp. 
397-470). Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1961. 
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. s!bi£§ <pp. 120-160). London: SCM 
Press, 1955. 
Burhoe, Ralph Wendel 1. "What specifies the values of the 
self-made man?" ~l:'.:9.Q!J 6 (1971>: 224-246. 
Bier, William C. ed. ~~ffi!!:! !if§L Ec2~!~ffi§ Qf ~ic!bL of 
liYiD9i 2DQ Qf QYiD9· New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1977. 
Cutler, Donald R., ed. YQQg!iD9 !if§ 2DQ Q§2!b· 
Beacon Press, 1969. 
Boston: 
Curran, Charles E. l§§Y§§ iD §§~Y21 2DQ ffi§Qi£g! §!bl£! <ch. 
8: Respect for life). Notre Dame, Indiana: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1978. 
Dedek, John P. ~~ffii!J !if~l §Qffi§ ffiQCi! i§§Y~§· 
Sheed and Ward, 1972. 
New York: 
Dennehy, Raymond. "The ontological basis of human rights." 
Ib2mi§! 42 <July 1978>: 434-463. 
Dunstan, G.R. and Skelton, M.J., ed. ~Q!J§~!J! i!J ffi§Qi£i!Jgl 
~QDY§C9§D£§ gDQ QiY§[9§D£§ iD !C99i!iQD· London: King 
Edward's Hospital, 1983. 
Goodrich, T. "The morality of killing." Ebi!Q§QQbY 44 <April 
1969): 127-139.' 
Kohl, Marvin. Ibg ffiQC~!i!~ of ti!llD9.l §§!:!£!i!~ Qf !if~2 
§QQC!iQDi §DQ ~Y!b§D§§i§· Landon: Peter Owen, 1974. 
Kluge, Eike-Henner. Ib~ Q[i£!i£§ gf g~§!b· New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1975. 
Koop, C.E. "The sanctity of life." JQYCD~! of !bg f'.'.1§9.i£2l 
§Q£i§!Y Qf ~§~ Jg[§§Y 75 (1978>: 62-67. 
304 
Homicide/sanctitv of life--cont. 
----------------~---------------
Oosthuizen, G.C., ed. s~!b2D2§i2· Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1978. 
Schweitzer, Albert. 8§Y§L§DS§ fgr lif§l §§(IDQD§· London: 
SPCK, 1970. 
Steinbock, B. ~illiDQ sDQ l§!!iDQ 9i§· Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980. 
St John Stevas, Norman. bif§L £§21Q sDQ 1b§ 12~1 b2~ 2DQ 
gori§!i2D ffiQ(sl§ iD ~DQlsDQ 2DQ !b§ YDi1§Q §!a!§§· 
London: Ryerson Press, 1961. 
Winter, Arthur. bif§ 2DQ Q§s!b Q§Si§iQD§· Springfield: 
Thomas, 1980. 
Althaus, Paul. Ib§ g!biS§ gf ~2L1iD b~!b§r· Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1972. 
Barr, James. Ib§ ~iQl§ iD !b§ IDQQ§[D ~grl9· London: SCM 
Press, 1973. 
Barth, Karl. ggmm~Di!~i §121§ sDQ £0~(£0• Massachusetts: 
Peter Smith, 1968. 
Bennett, John C. §!Qrm over §!biS§· Philadelphia: United 
Church Press, 1967. 
Birch, Bruce C. and Rasmussen, Larry L. §iQl§ 2DQ §!bi£§ iD 
!b§ gbri§!isD lif§· Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976. 
Brandt, Richard B. ~!bi£2l !b§QCYl IQ§ 2C.QQl§ID§ Qf DQC.ID21i~§ 
~DQ sri!is2l §!bi£§· Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1959. 
Calvin, John. lD§!i!~!§§ gf !b§ Qbri§!isD C§li9iQD• London: 
James Clarke, 1962. 
Ib§ S2DQD§ 2DQ Q§S(§§§ Qf !b§ gg~nsil gf IL§D!· London: 
Routledge, 1851. 
Childs, Brevard S. ~iQlis2l !bgglgg~ iD £Ci§i§· 
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970. 
Cochrane, Arthur C. B§fQ(fil§Q ~QDf§§§iQD§ Qf !h§ §i~!§§D!n 
S§D!~C~· Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966. 
Crossley, John P., Jr. "Theological ethics and the 
naturalistic: fallacy. " J.:Q!:!C.D2l Q.f 6§li9iQ!d§ ~10.1£§ 6 
( 1978) : 121-134 • 
305 
Dodd, C.H. §Q§Q~l 2DQ 12~1 Ib~ relation.of f2i!b 2DQ ~!b.if.§ 
iD §2C1Y ~bCi§!i2Di1Y· Camb;idg;;-c~~bridge University 
Press, 1951. 
-------- Ibg 2~1b2Ci1Y Qf !b§ §!Ql§· New York: Harper and 
Bros., 1958. 
Dyck, Arthur J. "Moral requiredness: Bridging the gap 
between 'ought' and 'is'--part II." J:Q'dCD2! Qf 
8§1!9!QY§ 5!b!£§ 9 <1981>: 131-150. 
sD£~f.lQE§Qi2 Qf Eb.i!Q§QQ!Jy, 1967 ed. S.v. "Ethics, history 
of," by Raziel Abelson and Kai Nielsen; "Ethics, 
problems of," by Kai Nielsen. 
Fletcher, Joseph. §i!'d2!iQD ~!b.if.§• Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1970. 
Forde, Gerhard o. Ib.~ !2~=SQ§Q§! Q~~2!~1 en in!gCQC§121i9.D 
Qf !1§ bi§!QC!Ss! Q§~§!QEID§D!· Minneapolis: Augsburg, 
1969. 
Frankena, .Wiliam K. 51!:U:.f.§' 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973. 
Gi 1, Maeng Yong. "The command of God: A study of Kar 1 
Barth's theological ethics." Ph.D. thesis, Emory 
University, 1974. 
Gustafson, James M. "Context versus principles: A misplaced 
debate in Christian ethics.'' t:!il!C~E!CQ Ib.§9.!QSiS.21 B§Yi§~ 
58,2 (April 1965): 171-202. 
Klug, Eugene F. §~!!ins iD!Q !b.~ EQC~ldl2 Qf ~QDS.QCQl e 
b!§!QCY 2DQ 9!9§§! Qf !b§ EQCID~l2· St Louis, Missouri: 
Concordia, 1977. 
Lehmann, Paul L. 5~bi£§ !D 9 ~bCi§!isD f.QD!§~!· 
Harper & Row, 1963. 
New York: 
Luther, Martin. B S.Qffiffi~D!2C~ QD !b.~ sQi§!l~ !Q !b.~ §2!2!!eD§' tr. Theodore Graebner. Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Zondervan, 1949. 
Macquarrie, John. "Schleiermacher reconsidered." s~QQ§i!.Q!:.:!t'. 
Iiro~§ 80 (1969>: 196-200. 
Murray, John. E!:.iDSiEl§§ Qf SQDQYS!· Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Eermans, 1957. 
Nineham, Dennis. Ib§ y§g §DQ 29Y§§ Qf !b§ §!21§~ London: 
SPCK, 1978. 
306 
Nurnberger, K 1 aus. "The 1aw-gospe1 debate as a poss i b 1 e 
basis for a theological ethic." Ib.~QlQ.912 S::!2[!g~li£2 
14,2 <June 1980>: 25-47. 
Dutka, Gene H. and Ramsey, Paul, ed. ~Q[ffi 2Qg £Q:c!i§~i in 
~b.Ci§!i2:c! §ib.1£§· New York: Scribner, 1968. 
Ramsey, Ian T. B§li9iQ!:!§ 12~g!:!2g§i Br:! §ffiQiCi£21 Ql2£i:c!9 Qf 
!bgQlQ9i£21 QbC2§§§· New York: Macmillan, 1957. 
-------- ~b.Ci2!i2:c! §!b.i£2 2[!g £Q:c!i~ffiQQ[2[~ Qb.ilQ.§QQQ~· 
London: SCM Press, 1966. 
Ramsey, Paul. Q§~g2 2[!g C!:!l§§ iD ~b.Ci2ii2D §ib.i£2· 
Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965. 
Rice, Philip Blair. Q[! !b.~ ~[!Q~l§gg§ Qf 9QQ.g 2QQ ~~il· 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975. 
Roberts, T.A. "Bishop Kirk and modern ethical intuitionism." 
~bYCSb 9Y2C!§C!Y B§Yi§~ 167 (1966): 29-44. 
Thielicke, Helmut. Ib~QlQ.gi£21 ~ib.i£2' vol. 1. London: A&C 
B 1 ac k, 1968. 
Todt, H.E "Towards a theory of making ethical judgements." 
JQYC:c!2l Qf 8§li9iQY§ s!bi£§ 6 (1978):108-120. 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. "Christian social ethics as a de-
absolutising discipline." JQ!:![!J2l Qf Ib.§QlQ.9.:t fQI: 
§QY!b§CD 6fcis2 31 <June 1980>: pp. 7-17. 
Williams, Ernest Claude. "A <:ritical appraisal of the 
§.C!rn~f2ll in Karl Barth's ethics." M.Th. dissertation, 
University of South Africa, 1981. 
Willis, Robert C. Ib.~ ~ib.i£2 Qf Karl ~2Cib.· London: E.J. 
Br i 1 1 , 1 971 . 
Wingren, Gustaf. "Law and Gospel and their implications for 
Christian life and worship." §i!:!gi2 Ib.~QlQ.gi£2 17,2 
( 1963) : 77-89. 
Wagaman, J. Philip. B ~bCi§!i2D ~§!b.QQ Qf ~QC2l jyQg§~§D!· 
London: SCM Press, 1976. 
1 7 DEC 1987 
THE ETHICS OF. HOMICIDE 
IVOR SHAPIRO 
